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The First World War left few untouched on Canada’s Native reserves: many councils 
donated money to war funds, thousands of men enlisted and their families sought support 
from the Military and war-specific charities, and most became involved in the debate 
over whether Native men could be conscripted and the implications that decision could 
have for broader Native-government relations.  Much of the extant literature on Native 
participation in the war has paired enthusiastic Native engagement with the Canadian 
government’s shabby treatment.  However, in many different ways and with many 
different goals, Native peoples achieved significant success in determining the 
parameters of their participation in the war.  Yet, the resolution of these debates between 
Native peoples and the Canadian government, specifically the Department of Indian 
Affairs, inadvertently (from the Native perspective) cemented the Indian Act’s key role in 
Native peoples’ lives, displacing other foundational agreements and traditional 
organizational principles of reserve life.  Native peoples’ varied participation in the First 
World War paradoxically saw Natives temporarily take control of their relationship with 
the Canadian government, but in the end brought them more completely under the 




 This project would have been impossible without the ongoing, honest and always 
challenging advice and guidance of Dr. Ken Coates.  Importantly, he had faith in my 
abilities even when I did not, and has pushed me beyond my comfort zone.  This has 
helped me become a better scholar, and hopefully set me on the path of continual 
development and questioning.  
 I was lucky to have a committee of passionate, critical scholars, Drs. Susan 
Neylan, Whitney Lackenbauer, who have never been afraid to demand the best of me.  
The challenges they offered proved to me I can stand by my scholarship.  Dr. 
Lackenbauer began me on this journey, and Dr. Neylan’s continued and detailed 
comments have helped me through this process.  I am truly grateful.  Additionally, Dr. 
John Herd Thompson’s excellent editorial comments have helped shape this work in its 
present form and will help guide me through future stages. 
The Tri-University History Program has been my home for the past four years, 
and the staff and faculty have always been wonderful help in various stages of this 
degree, particularly Donna Lang.  This project was funded in part through a Social 
Science and Humanities Research Council Armand Bombardier Graduate Scholarship 
(Doctoral Fellowship), and a President’s Graduate Scholarship from the University Of 
Waterloo.  I am also thankful for the constant attention and consideration I have received 
at the National Archives of Canada.  Without their help, this project would have been 
impossible. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Greta Kroeker for her constant guidance, both 
inside and outside the classroom.  She has provided an excellent example of an academic 
 v 
driven by the quest for knowledge as well as the desire to introduce new historians to the 
love of learning.  My parents, Dr. Rosemary McGowan and Keith McGowan taught me a 
similar lesson early in life, and I believe they set me on this path (for better or worse).  To 








Introduction:          1 
 
 
Chapter 1:           












 The Native Fight against Conscription     131 
 
 
Chapter 5:  




 Protests Against Registration       194 
 
 
Conclusion:          232 
 
 




The First World War announced itself with violence in the Mohawk community 
of St. Regis on a spring night in 1915.  St. Regis straddled the border between Canada 
and the United States, and its members had passed freely between the two countries.  
However, at dusk on 5 April 1915 (witnesses disagreed about the specific time) Nancy 
Oak and three of her daughters, aged 12 and 10 and an infant, crossed the North Bridge 
of the Ottawa & New York Railway over the St. Lawrence River and Cornwall Canal, on 
their way to Cornwall Island.1  Suddenly, and Nancy claimed without warning, Pte. 
Joseph Tyo appeared from the bridge’s south side, sixty yards from the family, and fired 
twice.  The first shot flew “wild,” but the second passed through ten year-old Sarah Oak’s 
upper-left thigh.  Major Hugh Cameron, who claimed to have heard his soldier call “halt” 
thrice before shooting, ran to the scene and used his handkerchief to tourniquet Sarah’s 
leg.  His soldiers improvised a stretcher and carried the injured and hysterical girl to the 
nearest hospital.2 
Indian Agent Francis E. Taillon and Nancy Oak both swore Pte. Tyo did not order 
the family to halt, and the Agent asserted the Militia had not made known their intention 
to patrol the railway bridge in question with armed soldiers.  Yet, four days after the 
incident, a Military Board of Enquiry declared that the soldiers guarding the bridge 
                                                
1 Indian Agent F.E. Taillon to Secretary J.D. McLean 7 April 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 3188 File 466, 
239; Proceedings of the Board of Enquiry, 3rd Division, Kingston, Ontario “Enquiring into and reporting 
thereon as to the accidental wounding of an Indian Maiden by a Sentry protecting the Ottawa and New 
York Railway Bridge at Cornwall, on Monday evening 5th day of April 1915,” 9 April 1915, LAC RG 10 
Volume 3188 File 466, 239. 
2 Proceedings of the Board of Enquiry, 3rd Division, Kingston, Ontario “Enquiring into and reporting 
thereon as to the accidental wounding of an Indian Maiden by a Sentry protecting the Ottawa and New 
York Railway Bridge at Cornwall, on Monday evening 5th day of April 1915,” 9 April 1915, LAC RG 10 
Volume 3188 File 466, 239. 
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“performed their duty, as instructed, and under the circumstances were justified in firing 
upon the supposed intruders.”3  Unaware of this decision or dissatisfied with it, Sarah’s 
father Mitchell Oak haunted Agent Taillon’s office for a month seeking some resolution 
to his daughter’s ordeal.  Taillon asked Department of Indian Affairs Secretary and 
Assistant Deputy Superintendent General John McLean (hereafter Secretary McLean) to 
send Mitchell an official letter detailing the Militia’s conclusion about Sarah’s shooting.4  
Indian Affairs’ head bureaucrat and decision-maker Deputy Superintendent General 
Duncan Campbell Scott (hereafter D.C. Scott) reminded Agent Taillon, “I instructed you 
not to allow the child to want for anything.”5   
Bureaucrats D.C. Scott and John McLean were key players in the implementation 
of policy during the war, but also frequently in its creation.  Scott in particular was 
recognized as an expert in a largely isolated policy realm.  McLean and Scott were career 
Indian Affairs bureaucrats who had risen primarily on their work rather than political 
connections, and by the beginning of the war both were located at the centre of Indian 
Affairs’ decision-making structure.6  Both men were committed to the Department of 
Indian Affairs, and they were involved in all important decisions, both crises and 
opportunities, regarding Native participation in the war. 
                                                
3 Proceedings of the Board of Enquiry, 3rd Division, Kingston, Ontario “Enquiring into and reporting 
thereon as to the accidental wounding of an Indian Maiden by a Sentry protecting the Ottawa and New 
York Railway Bridge at Cornwall, on Monday evening 5th day of April 1915,” 9 April 1915, LAC RG 10 
Volume 3188 File 466, 239. 
4 Indian Agent F.E. Taillon to Secretary J.D. McLean 11 May 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 3188 File 466, 
239. 
5 D.C. Scott to Indian Agent F.E. Taillon 19 May 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 3188 File 466, 239. 
6 Scott’s connections with the then Prime Minister John A Macdonald may have helped him get his job as a 
clerk, and although he was a Tory, Scott worked with both parties when in government.  He was the first 
Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs whose appointment was not based on patronage. E. Brian 
Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1986), 17, 23-25; Dominion of Canada Annual Reports of the 
Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 1909 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1909), 601. 
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The Militia granted Sarah Oak $100 “in respect of her suffering,” which the 
Department of Indian Affairs decided to hold in trust until she reached the age of 
majority, married, or was in desperate need; Agent Taillon believed Sarah would receive 
little or no benefit if her parents received the money.7  Sarah Oak’s shooting was an 
extremely rare event, yet her ordeal encompasses many of the central themes in the 
debates between Native peoples and the Canadian government over Native participation 
in the First World War.  Sarah Oak’s shooting represented an invasion of the Native 
world by non-Native actors and interests.  It breached the barrier around the reserve that 
kept its occupants physically, legally, and economically separate from the wider 
Canadian population, and it represented the shift from traditional arrangements and 
agreements towards integration into the Canadian state as wards.  The events of the war, 
its challenges, and opportunities were exceptional and temporary, but the outcomes 
strengthened the role of the Indian Act at the expense of treaties’ role as nation-to-nation 
agreements and tradition as organizational principles of Native communities. 
Contemporary observers celebrated His Majesty's Indian Allies, who “true to the 
brave spirit of their race,” enlisted in droves, as the Department of Indian Affairs 
estimated 4,000 Native men enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), 
approximately 35% of the adult male population, and donated liberally to war funds, 
particularly the Canadian Patriotic Fund (CPF).8  This enthusiasm led one observer to 
                                                
7 Rudolphe Boudreau, Clerk of the Privy Council to the Minister of Militia and Defence, P.C. 39/1248 1 
June 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 3188 File 466, 239; Indian Agent F.E. Taillon to Secretary J.D. McLean 29 
June 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 3188 File 466, 239. 
8 D.C. Scott to Hector B. Charlesworth of the Saturday Night Magazine (submission) 31 May 1916 LAC 
RG 10 Volume 3180 File 452, 124-1; Dominion of Canada Annual Report of the Department of Indian 
Affairs for the Year Ended March 31 1919 (Ottawa: King's Press, 1919) 13; “Indians in the War,” 
Winnipeg Evening Tribune 3 October 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 3181 File 452, 124-1A. 
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assert, “the war attitude of the Indians at large has been a revelation of patriotism.”9  Yet, 
each of these transgressions of resources’ physical, legal and cultural boundaries sparked 
questions about Native peoples place in Canada.  Within this ambiguity, a portion of 
Native peoples sought rights and treatment equal to their white comrades, others looked 
to protect themselves from this outside encroachment, and many traveled a complicated 
middle way in an effort to control the outcome of their participation in the war.  Yet 
agency and outcome are mutually exclusive concepts: one can advocate in their best 
interest and achieve undesirable and unintended ends.10 The sum outcome of these 
negotiations over Native participation in the war was the affirmation and entrenchment of 
the Indian Act as the document that would define and govern the relationship between 
Native peoples and the Canadian government. 
In their interactions with the Department of Indian Affairs and the Militia, Native 
peoples had, and argued for, specific goals surrounding the war effort, whether to donate 
to the Patriotic Fund and other wartime charities, whether or not to serve, and not to be 
conscripted, through the nation-to-nation obligations contained in treaties, and according 
to the protections contained in the Indian Act, with its legal identity for Native peoples as 
wards of the state.  With rare exceptions, the Indian Act proved the more successful path 
for Native peoples trying to control the character and scope of their contributions to the 
war effort. Yet, when Native peoples used the Indian Act, this strengthened the 
government’s effort to replace tradition with their legislation.  Native participation in war 
                                                
9 D.C. Scott to Hector B. Charlesworth of the Saturday Night Magazine (to be published) 31 May 1916 
LAC RG 10 Volume 3180 File 452, 124-1; “Indians in the War,” Winnipeg Evening Tribune 3 October 
1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 3181 File 452, 124-1A. 
10 It is important to distinguish between agency and outcome as mutually exclusive concepts. J.R. Miller, 
Reflections on Native-Newcomer Relations: Selected Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 
7; Frank Tough, ‘As Their Natural Resources Fail’: Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern 
Manitoba, 1870-1930 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996), 300-301. 
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programs hinged on the application and implications of the legal status of Indian – both 
for those included and those excluded in that identity, entitled to its protections, and 
restricted under its regulations. 
As late as the 1901 and 1911 censuses, many Native peoples expressed a fear that 
the act of collecting information about them was a tool for assimilation.  Having an 
outsider collect their personal information and then categorize Native peoples as an 
“Indian” within Canada was an unwelcome invasion and imposition.11  According to the 
1906 Indian Act, an Indian was “any male person of Indian blood reputed to belong to a 
particular band, any child of such person, any woman who is or was lawfully married to 
such person.”  Bands (or “tribes”) are understood as body of Indians who “own or are 
interested in a reserve or in Indian lands in common of which the legal title is vested in 
the Crown,” or who share in the payment of annuities or interest from the Canadian 
government.  By contrast, an individual (“non-treaty Indian”) with “Indian blood” who 
did not belong to a band, or belonged to an “irregular band” or “follows the Indian mode 
of life” had no equivalent relationship with the Crown. 12  When this narrative employs 
the term Indian outside of quotations, it refers specifically to this legal definition, and 
otherwise uses the broader term Native. 
Many historians have correctly identified the crucial role of the Depression in 
prompting Native peoples to work within the legal identity “Indian” and the Indian Act.  
This was a question of both an external push and an internal pull as local and regional 
                                                
11 Michelle Hamilton, “Anyone not on the list might as well be dead”: Aboriginal Peoples and the 
Consensus of Canada, 1851-1916,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 18.1 (2007): 57-79. 
12 In this study, historical actors frequently differentiated between the term Indian’s social/ethnic and legal 
uses by the qualifier “bona fide” when they referred to status Indians.  When the term Indian appears within 
the body of this manuscript however, it is only used as a legal category, with specific implications 
(otherwise the author uses the broader term Native). Section 2 (g), The Indian Act, (Canada: 1906) p. 16 
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businesses failed or faltered and Native peoples looked to the Department for economic 
relief.13  The Depression caused uncertainty in many markets, including resource 
economies in which many Native peoples were employed, and the various levels of 
government became more interventionist as a result.14  For Native peoples, this 
intervention was largely dictated from the Indian Act, particularly “the minimal amounts 
of ‘relief’ and other social assistance it provided,” which although Robin Brownlie 
argued was largely illusory in practice, still promised “a rudimentary safety net.”15   
However, the crises of the First World War began the process of internalizing of 
the concept of Indian and the Indian Act in reserve life over a decade before a global 
economic crisis starved Canada’s reserves. The distinction between treaty or status and 
non-treaty Indians or the broader Native population became exceptionally important 
during the war as the government identified treaty Indians as the only group to whom 
they owed protection.  The logic is very much the same as the argument that the Great 
Depression in the 1930s catalyzed the Indian Act’s solidification on reserves – that an 
exceptional shock or circumstance from outside the reserve acted as a push factor, and 
the potential protection offered by the Indian Act provided a sufficient pull to change the 
relationship between Native peoples and the government.  The reciprocal if imbalanced 
exchanges between reserves and Ottawa surrounding Native involvement in the war 
                                                
13 Rolf Knight, Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native Labour in British Columbia, 1858-1930 
(Vancouver: New Star Books, 1996), 4; Robin Jarvis Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, 
Government Power and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003) 101, 123; Tough, 308; Hugh Shewell, “Enough to Keep Them Alive,” Indian Welfare in Canada, 
1873-1965 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), ix, 3, 5, 9, 23, 30-31.  
14 Frank Tough, As Their Natural Resources Fail: Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern 
Manitoba, 1870-1930  (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 268, 297, 308. 
15 Robin Brownlie Jarvis, “‘A better citizen than lots of white men’: First Nations’ Enfranchisement, an 
Ontario Case Study, 1918-1940,” Canadian Historical Review 87.1 (March 2008): 29-52. 
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effort resulted in the reinforcement of the Indian Act as a basic element of Native life and 
increasingly the self-identification as Indians among Native peoples.16  
 
Native Peoples, the Indian Act, and the War in Literature  
The following study links two narrative streams within the Native historiography, 
that of Native political expression and the Indian Act, and the Native experience of the 
First World War.  The development of the “total institution” of the Indian Act and its 
associated policies that lay out the path for the assimilation of Native peoples, has been 
tackled as a legislative, economic and practical history.17  J.R. Miller delineated the 
Indian Act’s development and Native political expression.  While the two were definitely 
linked, in his survey Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens he traced the Indian Act’s 
development in its broad strokes over the 19th century. Although Native people never 
                                                
16 These Indian Act-based rules became so normalized within reserve communities that the 1985 change 
Sections 6(1) and (2) of the Indian Act (Bill C-31) that offered Indian status to women (and their children) 
previously denied such status stirred strong protest among many Native peoples themselves. The 1996 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recorded the negative reception of newly recognized status 
Indians on reserves, and the discrimination they faced in obtaining band membership or access to on-
reserve services or accommodation. “Women and Indian Status,” Highlights from the Report on the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Canada: 1996). For further discussion of the gender-rights question, 
please see: Joanne Barker, “Gender, Sovereignty, Rights: Native Women’s Activism against Social 
Inequality and Violence in Canada,” American Quarterly 60.2 (June 2008): 259-266; Ann McGrath & 
Wiona Stevenson, “Gender, Race and Policy: Aboriginal Women and the States in Canada and Australia,” 
Labour/Le Travail 38 (Fall 1996)/ Labour History 71 (November 1996): 37-53.  The tension between status 
and non-status individuals, however, is not exclusive to gender, as Sally Weaver asserted: “Status Indians 
have not supported efforts by non-status and Métis groups to grain equivalent status or rights from the 
federal government, fearing that their own position and limited resources might be endangered in the 
process.”  Sally M. Weaver, “The Status of Indian Women” in Canada: Two Nations, Many Cultures? 
Ethnic Groups in Canada, 2nd Edition, ed. Jean Leonard Elliot (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1983): 
56-79, 62 68; Also see D. N. Sprague, “The New Math of the ‘New Indian Act:’ 6(2)+6(2)=6(1),” Native 
Studies Review 10.1 (1995): 47-60; Steffi Retzlaff, “What’s in a Name? The Politics of Labeling and 
Native Identity Constructions,” The Canadian Journal of Native Studies 25.2 (2005): 609-627. 
17 This phrase is borrowed from Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada’s First Nations: A History of Founding 
Peoples from Earliest Times (Toronto: McClelland & Stuart, 1992), 286. 
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simply yielded to government authority, Miller emphasized its most recent, mid-20th 
century incarnations.18   
Miller argued that the Indian Act developed out of earlier colonial, particularly 
Upper Canadian, practices, in contrast to Olive Patricia Dickason’s emphasis on Western 
expansion and western problems as a catalyst for both the Indian Act and its more 
repressive iterations in the late 19th and 20th century (this is largely a question of earliest 
origin of the policy regime vs. the catalysts for its national spread and standardization).19  
Arthur Ray acknowledged the Indian Act’s heritage of imperial responsibilities, but he 
draws different traditions towards a mean, the uniform “Indian,” as “a special class of 
people designated solely on the basis of their race, and it [the Indian Act] established a 
means for governing them autocratically.”20  Ray pointed to a pattern of the government 
adjusting its powers as defined through legislation to achieve its specific goals, whether 
those be related to the Sun Dance or residential schools.21 
As the companion to the discussion of legislative development, many have turned 
their attention to the practical reality of its enforcement, successful and successfully 
rebuffed.22  These studies focused on the creation and workings of that rudimentary 
                                                
18 Other historical studies of the development of Indian Act-related legislation include: McGrath & 
Stevenson, 37-53. 
19 There are two basic questions here, one about where the policies surround Indigenous peoples began, and 
second about the obstacles and opportunities in the latter quarter of 19th century around settling what would 
become the Prairie provinces.  The former was born out of the transition from military allies to internally 
settled peoples and the latter is interested with quickly and quietly settling vast tracks of land. Dickason, 
283-4. 
20 Arthur J. Ray, I Have Lived Here Since the World Began: An Illustrated History of Canada’s Native 
Peoples, Revised Ed. (Toronto: Key Porter, 2005), 205. 
21 Ray, 204-205, 235, 242. 
22 Tina Loo, “Dan Cranmer’s Potlatch: Law as Coercion, Symbol and Rhetoric in British Columbia, 1884-
1951,” Canadian Historical Review 72.2 (1992): 125-165; J.R. Miller, Shingwauk’s Vision: A History of 
Native Residential Schools (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 11, 372-3; Brownlie, A Fatherly 
Eye, ix-x, 10, 56-57, 79, 98-99, 123-5; Brownlie, “A better citizen than lots of white men,” 29-52; Celia 
Haig-Brown, Resistance and Renewal: Surviving the Indian Residential School (Vancouver: The 
Secwepemc Cultural Education Society, 1988); Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve 
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safety net.  These included the painful sticks used to correct or align behaviour, such as 
encouraging farming, discouraging traditional practices, and generally undermining 
independence and encouraging assimilation.  These studies presented the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries as a period of increased government control of Native peoples, 
establishing the roots of problems of dependency, political oppression and cultural 
dislocation that endure to the present day.  These analyses have tended towards regional 
or band-level studies, in comparison to the breadth of Miller, Dickason or Ray’s 
nationally focused works.  These methodological choices were often justified but they 
have also undermined the scope and impact of their work.  
Non-Native literature on the First World War emphasized the transformative 
power of that conflict, as a discrete series of events or as a memory, in nearly every 
imaginable sub-set of historical inquiry; it is common hyperbole to assert, “Canada was 
formed in 1867, but forged during the Great War.”23  Observers have pointed to the war’s 
transformative effects in the efforts to organize a national army, the organization of the 
economy to meet the CEF’s needs, the political compromises and complications of 
conscription and the expanding civil service, the questions of breadwinner and gender 
roles, and internal division contrasted with a nationalism emerging from the colonial veil.  
                                                                                                                                            
Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990); Frank Tester & Peter 
Kulchyski, Tammarniit (mistakes): Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic, 1939-1963 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1994); Robert A. Campbell, “Making Sober Citizens: The legacy of 
Indigenous Alcohol Regulation in Canada, 1777-1985,” Journal of Canadian Studies 42.1 (Winter 2008): 
105-126 
23 Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2006), 253.  For examples of similar pronouncements, please see: 
C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict Volume 1: 1867-1921 (Toronto: MacMillan, 1977), 203, 
Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Official History of the Canadian army in the First World War: Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1962), 533-534, 535, 535-536; Desmond 
Morton, A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo, 4th Ed. (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stuart), 1999), 145, 165; David MacKenzie, “Introduction: Myth, Memory, and the Transformation of 
Canadian Society,” in Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown, ed. 
David MacKenzie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) pp. 3-15, 3-4, 12. 
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While David MacKenzie correctly warned against finding what we want in the First 
World War – the clear, concise birth moment of Canada – the war’s place in the narrative 
of modern Canada is undisputed.24  Yet, as historians debated the transformative power 
of war, observers of the same historical period pointed to the development of a modern 
bureaucratic state that controlled and sought to direct Native peoples’ behavior and 
identity through legislation and an extensive and empowered public service.   
Much of the literature on Native participation in the First World War contained a 
response to non-Native war histories, but also borrowed or mirrored trends in that same 
literature stream.  The major thrust of literature on Native participation in the First World 
War combined the celebration of Native peoples and the condemnation of the 
government and to a lesser extent the Canadian public. Fred Gaffen’s heartfelt (but 
largely descriptive) narrative Forgotten Soldiers (1985) exposed, in the author’s view, a 
blind spot in the country’s memory of 20th century military conflicts.  Gaffen established 
Native soldiers’ heroism in the First World War through a series of mini-biographies of 
notables such as Francis Pegahmagabow, Henry Norwest and Cameron Brant.  Janice 
Summerby expanded on Gaffen’s method and message in her Veterans Affairs 
publication Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields (2005).  Both works emphasized the 
integral role of Native soldiers in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, and thereby 
amended the storyline of the First World War.   
Gaffen’s project has been largely successful in how it has been developed by 
subsequent authors: Jonathan Vance’s Death So Noble (1997) included a recognition of 
Native participation (albeit in the conclusion), and Desmond Morton’s When Your 
Number’s Up (1993) incorporated a discussion of Native enlistment, soldiering and 
                                                
24 MacKenzie, 12-13. 
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conscription.25  Indeed, Summerby’s work (and the Aboriginal Veterans’ monument in 
Ottawa – which is within sight of the national war monument – unveiled in 2001) might 
be conceived as an official recognition of Gaffen’s effort to commemorate Native 
soldiers.  
If Gaffen celebrated Native soldiers and demanded the attention of a previously 
(and inexcusably) ignorant public, others have been more explicit in their condemnation 
of the Canadian government and even Canadians generally.  Several authors contrasted 
Native soldiers’ willingness to fight and Native communities’ generous donations to war 
funds with a government eager to use the demands of war to dispossess them of their land 
(for war production) and rights (unsuccessfully attempting to conscript non-citizens), and 
a Canadian people who could so easily dismiss Native contributions from their 
memory.26  Tina Loo emphasized the war’s exceptional circumstances as providing an 
opportunity (or the perception of a necessity) for the government to further their 
campaign against such practices as the potlatch.27  These arguments often (although not 
exclusively) serve as an addendum to the control and oppression narrative discussed 
                                                
25 Desmond Morton, When You Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War (Toronto: 
Random House, 1993) 58, 59, 66, 78. 
26 Examples of this tragedy narrative include: James Dempsey, “The Indians and World War One,” Alberta 
History 31 (Summer 1983): 1-8; James Dempsey, “Problems of Western Canadian Indian Veterans,” 
Native Studies Review 5.2 (1989): 1-18, 1-5; James St. G. Walker, “Race and Recruitment in World War I: 
Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force,” Canadian Historical Review 70 
(1989): 1-26, 26: Loo, 142-143; Sarah Carter, “Infamous Proposal”: Prairie Indians reserve land and soldier 
settlement after World War I,” Manitoba History 37 (Spring-Summer 1999): 9-21; Desmond Morton, “Les 
Canadiens Indigènes Engagé dans la Première Guerre Mondiale,” Guerres mondiales et conflits 
dontemporains 2008/2 no. 230: 37-49. L. James Dempsey, “Problems of Western Canadian Indian 
Veterans,” Native Studies Review 5.2 (1989): 1-18; Titley, 1986; Sally M. Weaver, “The Iroquois: The 
Grand River Reserve in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 1875-1945,” in Aboriginal 
Ontario: Historical Perspectives on the First Nations, eds. Edward S. Rogers and Donald B. Smith 
(Toronto: Ontario Historical Society & Dundurn, 1994); Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 203, 217; 
Adrian Hayes, Pegahmagabow: Legendary Warrior, Forgotten Hero (Hunstville: Fox Meadow Creations, 
2003); John Moses, “The Return of the Native: Six Nations Veterans and Political Change at the Grand 
River Reverse, 1917-1924,” in Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives, 
eds. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Craig Leslie Mantle (Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 
2007), p. 117-128; Dickason, 326. 
27 Loo, 142.  
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above.  This comparison becomes particularly acute when authors compare Native 
veterans’ hopes for improving their and their communities’ circumstances against a 
government who acted “as though the war had never occurred and that nothing had 
changed.”28   
There are at least two interesting parallels between Native-focused and non-
Native studies of the war.  Local-focused home front studies appear in both Native and 
non-Native historiography on the civilian experiences of the First World War.  Robert 
Rutherdale’s Hometown Horizons (2005) offered a structured comparison of Trois-
Rivières, Guelph and Lethbridge and concluded that the local perspective or framework 
was the realm in which the average Canadian understood the war.29  At the risk of a 
tautological argument, Rutherdale offered a bounded method of detailed analysis that is 
attractive regardless of the ethnic composition of the communities in question.  This 
focus on community-level dynamics has allowed historians to examine the complex web 
of Native government relations, and offer greater nuance to land disputes (Mohawks of 
the Bay of Quinte), the politics of enlistment (Six Nations, Georgian Bay), or even 
conscription (Post Simpson and the Naas River).30   
                                                
28 Dempsey, “Problems of Western Canadian Indian Veterans,” 5. 
29 Rutherdale is not the first author to study the First World War in Canada from a local perspective.  Other 
examples include:  Andrew Theoblad, The Bitter Harvest of War: New Brunswick and the Conscription 
Crisis of 1917 (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2008); Ian Hugh MacLean Miller, Our Glory and Our 
Grief; Torontonians and the Great War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); W.R. Chadwick, The 
Battle for Berlin, Ontario: An Historical Drama (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1992); Pat 
McKegney, The Kaiser’s Bust: A Study of War-Time Propaganda in Berlin, Ontario, 1914-1918 
(Wellesley, Ont: Bamberg, 1991).  This local focus is perhaps a narrowing of scope from a slightly earlier 
regional focus, evident in: John Herd Thompson, The Harvests of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978); C.A. Sharpe, “Enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
1914-1918: A Regional Analysis,” Journal of Canadian Studies (Winder 1983-4): 16-22. 
30 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “‘Pay No Attention to Sero’: The Mohawk of the Bay of Quinte and Imperial 
Flying Training during the Great War,” Ontario History 46.2 (Autumn 2004); Katharine McGowan and P. 
Whitney Lackenbauer, “Indigenous Nationalisms and the Great War: Enlisting the Six Nations in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), 1914-17” in Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: 
Historical Perspectives, eds. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Craig Mantle (Kingston: CDA Press, 2007) 89-
 13 
The broadest local/regional study is James Dempsey’s Warriors of the King 
(1999), whose focus was largely (although not uniquely) on the Native populations of the 
Prairie Provinces.  Dempsey, one of the most prolific authors on Native participation in 
the First World War, left few elements of the war effort untouched in his survey.  His 
breadth does not contribute to a novel conclusion but confirmed the impressive record of 
service among Native peoples; he differentiated between loyalty to the British Crown and 
the abuses of the Canadian government.31  This regional study fits nicely into the 
structure of many broader Native historical studies, which bound analysis to a specific 
regional or ethnic group within Canada.   
Yet across the country Robert Talbot argued there was a far murkier picture than 
these smaller studies would suggest.  Talbot emphasized the sum of these complex 
community responses points to a generally less favourable (or at least not simply blindly 
patriotic) reception of the war in Native communities.32  Tim Winegard however inverted 
this question of common Native experience.  In his comparison across Canada, New 
Zealand, Australia and South Africa, Wingeard argued that, despite a fair degree of 
variance between the four countries, there were four general trends: that Native peoples’ 
participation was part of a long “pragmatic” tradition of the British’s strategic alliance 
with Indigenous people; that involvement was allowed only when white manpower could 
not meet the respective country’s need; Native men units’ insignia reflected the racial 
                                                                                                                                            
115; Katharine McGowan, “‘In the Interest of the Indians’: The Department of Indian Affairs, Charles 
Cooke and the Recruitment of Native Men in Southern Ontario for the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
1916,” Ontario History 102.1 (Spring 2010): 111-126; Katharine McGowan, “‘Until We Receive Just 
Treatment’: The Fight against Conscription in the Naas Agency, British Columbia.” BC Studies no. 167 
(Autumn 2010): 47-70.  
31 L. James Dempsey, Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I  (Regina: Canadian Plains 
Research Centre & University of Regina, 1999),vii, 83. 
32 Robert J. Talbot, “It Would be Best to Leave Us Alone”: First Nations Responses to the Canadian War 
Effort, 1914-1918,” Journal of Canadian Studies 45.1 (Winter 2011): 90-120. 
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assumptions about their inherent martial characteristics, and; although they served 
willingly, their service did not improve Native peoples’ circumstances but the post-war 
period saw a return of their government’s “paternalistic and authoritarian policies.”33  
Although Winegard went to great length to capture the experiences of many Indigenous 
soldiers, the commonalities he underlined were focused on the policies British Dominions 
followed, speaking to the broad applicability of race as an analytical lens.   
Native-focused histories of the First World War have also examined Native 
soldiers’ experiences and perspectives, where possible.  Susan Applegate Krouse’s 
discovery of thousands of surveys of American Indian veterans’ reflections on their 
service provided an interesting meeting of the focus on soldiers’ experience and 
ethnography in North American Indians in the Great War (2007).34  Krouse’s analysis 
showed a strong tendency among respondents to mix ideas about warrior-hood and a 
more broadly understood American patriotism.  Russell Barsh described warrior-hood as 
a coping mechanism among American Indians, both in the battlefield and at home.  In a 
mix of masculine, ethnic, and political concerns, Barsh argued, “it was very important to 
come home a man who had broken the shackles of Indian Office colonialism and gained 
Indian power and competence.”35 There are very few similar studies in Canada, although 
this must in large part be attributed to a lack of sources.  Similar considerations of non-
Native soldiers’ experiences relied on such sources as personal letters and diary entries, 
                                                
33 Timothy C. Winegard, “All the Wing’s Men: Indigenous Peoples of the Dominions and the First World 
War,” (Ph.D. dissertation, St. Anthony’s College, 2009), 1, 8-9, 
34 Susan Applegate Krouse, North American Indians in the Great War: Photographs and Original 
Documentation by Joseph K. Dixon (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2007) 1, 5. 
35 Russell L. Barsh, “War and the Reconfiguration of American Indian Society,” Journal of American 
Studies 35 (2001): 371-410. 
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of which there is a paucity of Native-specific examples in the public record.36  One of the 
exceptions was James Dempsey’s inventive examination of Mike Mountain Horse’s 
warrior robe as a traditional expression of the soldier’s experiences in France.37  
Although the artifact analysis was a novel source choice, its inherently limited nature, as 
it is essentially a biography by way of analyzing Mountain Horse’s personal belongings, 
limited the study’s conclusions. 
 
The Need for a New Perspective and the Relevance of the Second World War  
One of the significant problems with much of the above literature is its treatment 
of the First World War in isolation or as the culmination of generation-old memories, 
only to be met with severe disappointment.  The processes of assimilation long predated 
and outlasted the war, political activism cannot be isolated to veterans’ activities, and the 
land the government took from Prairie and British Columbian reserves had been long 
coveted by local white farmers.  Yet more than just a continuation, the war itself 
fundamentally influenced Native-government relationships well into the twentieth 
century. The failure to appreciate how the First World War cemented Native-government 
                                                
36 These works about soldiers from a soldiers’ perspectives are neither limited to the First World War, or 
Canadian historiography.  A selected list include: Frank Emery, The Red Soldier: Letters from the Zulu 
War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1977); Kenneth Griffin, Thank God We Kept the Flag Flying (London: 
Hutchinson, 1974); Philip MacGuire, Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters from Black Soldiers in World War 
II (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1983); Sandra Gwyn, Tapestry of War: A Private View of Canadians in the 
Great War (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1992); Carmen Miller, Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South 
African War, 1899-1902 (Montreal: Canadian War Museum & McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993); 
Morton, 1993; James McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why men fought in the Civil War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997); Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the 
First World War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999); Peter Boydon, The British Army in Cape Colony: 
Soldiers’ Letters and Diaries, 1806-58 (London: Society for Army Historical Research, 2001); Craig Leslie 
Mantle, Learning the Hard Way: The Leadership Experiences of Lieutenant Agar Adamson during the 
South African War, 1899-1902 (Kingston: Canadian Defense Academy Press, 2007); Katharine McGowan, 
‘A Finger in the Fire: Canadian Volunteer Soldiers and their Perceptions of Canada’s Collective Identity 
through their Experience of the Boer War,” War and Society 28.1 (May 2009): 61-87. 
37 Dempsey, “Persistence of the Warrior Ethic Among the Plains Indians,” 1-10; Dempsey, “A Warrior’s 
Robe,” 18-22. 
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interactions has led to repetition in the literature on Native participation in both world 
wars. 
Historians have correctly identified Native peoples’ willingness to enlist in both 
wars, and their opposition to conscription in both wars, including the underlying 
questions of rights and the relationships with the Canadian government (particularly in 
the Second World War).  P. Whitney Lackenbauer identifies as a common theme in the 
literature on Native participation in the Second World War as the “bitterness of broken 
promises and shattered dreams.”38  Native peoples contributed men and money, but saw 
their treaty rights trampled through the introduction of conscription, and by the inclusion 
of Native peoples in new taxation measures.  Again, Native soldiers sought equality with 
their white comrades, and challenged the government’s paternalism in favour of greater 
self-government on reserves.39  Similar to the racial stereotypes that marked much of 
Native recruitment in the previous war (as detailed by Walker, McGowan, and in chapter 
                                                
38 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “The Irony and the Tragedy of Negotiated Space: A Case Study of Narrative 
Form and Aboriginal Government Relations during the Second World War,” Journal of the Canadian 
Historical Society 1.15 (2004): 177-206. 
39 L. James Dempsey, “Alberta’s Indians and the Second World War,” in For King Country: Alberta in the 
Second World War (Edmonton: Provincial Museum of Alberta, 1995), p. 39-52; Grace Poulin, Invisible 
Women: World War II Aboriginal Servicemen in Canada (Thunder Bay: Ontario Native Women’s 
Association, 2007); Keith Thor Carlson, ed. You Are Asked to Witness: The Stó:lō in Canada’s Pacific 
Coast History (Chilliwack: Stó:lō Heritage Trust, 1997) 129; Janice Summerby, Native Soldiers, Foreign 
Battlefields (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs Canada, 2005) 21-33; R. Scott Sheffield & Hamar Foster, “Fighting 
the King’s War: Harris Smallfence, Verbal Treaty Promises and the Conscription of Indian Men, 1944,” 
University of British Columbia Law Review 33.1 (1999): 53-74; Emily Arrowsmith,  Fair Enough? How 
Notions of Race, Gender, and Soldiers’ Rights Affected Dependents’ Allowance Policies Towards 
Canadian Aboriginal Families During World War II.  PhD Thesis, Carleton University (Ottawa), 2006 
(unpublished); P. Whitney Lackenbauer detailed how contemporary observers celebrated Native patriotism 
(an updated and more Canada-focused version of the image of loyalty presented in the First World War) in 
Battle Grounds: The Canadian Military and Aboriginal Lands (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2007), 113-4; P.W. Lackenbauer, R. Scott Sheffield & Craig Leslie Mantle, “Introduction,” in 
Aboriginal Peoples and Military Participation: Canadian and International Perspectives, eds. P. Whitney 
Lackenbauer, R. Scott Sheffield and Craig Leslie Mantle (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 
2007) 1-13, 4.  To a lesser extent, Michael D. Stevenson dealt with the protests against conscripting Native 
peoples, although his primary concern was to test the practical administrative concerns of the processes of 
conscription itself.  He used Native men as a form of intensity sampling, to highlight the concentration of 
problems that, he argues, were apparent among other groups but not in such sharp relief, Michael D. 
Stevenson, “The Mobilization of Native Canadians During the Second World War,” Journal of the 
Canadian Historical Association 7 (1996): 205-226. 
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two of this text), R. Scott Sheffield examined the explicit policies and informal practices 
that influenced if and how Native men could join different branches of the Canadian 
military.40  Hugh Shewell’s described the Comité de Protection des Droits Indiens’ fights 
against conscription and taxation, which served as focal points for a broader protest 
surrounding the government’s disregard for Native rights, and appeals for self-
determination.  This not only closely mirrors a pattern of political expression that arose 
out of the conscription question in the First World War, but the Comité included some of 
the same people as those earlier protests, namely Andrew Paull of British Columbia (see 
chapter four).41   
At first glance, the First World War’s failure to significantly improve Native 
peoples’ lives may be attributed to several causes.  A change in the Indian Act in 1927 
that prohibited band councils from supporting any land claims with band funds without 
Indian Affairs’ express approval undermined the possibility of any sustained political 
action.42  In a more local context, Robin Brownlie points to interfering Agents’ “petty 
sorts of revenge” as small-scale obstacles to Native political activity in the interwar 
period.43  J.R. Miller offers a plausible explanation for why the Second World War 
proved more of a watershed than the First World War for Native peoples: the institutional 
racism of the Axis powers, and its horrific outcomes, made it difficult for Canadians to 
justify policies based on an assumption of Native peoples’ racial inferiority to white 
peoples.44  
                                                
40 R. Scott Sheffield, “‘Of Pure European Descent and of the White Race’: Recruitment Policy and 
Aboriginal Canadians, 1939-1945,” Canadian Military History 5 (Spring 1996): 8-15. 
41 Hugh Shewell, “James Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism in Canada, 1943-4,” Journal of Canadian 
Studies 34.3 (Fall 1999): 211-243. 
42 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 217. 
43 Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye, 60. 
44 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 220. 
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Robert Alexander Innes argued that after the Second World War, previously 
politically active individuals used the image of the Native veteran long before veterans 
themselves became politically engaged.45 This suggests an extant political consciousness 
on reserves waiting for an opportunity rather a non-existent Native political culture in the 
interwar years.  However, historians’ general failure to project the political battles of the 
First World War forward into the 20th century may lie less in the obstacles to Native 
peoples’ success and more in historians’ focus on their apparently temporary interests.  
For example, Shewell argued that Native political organization in the first half of the 
twentieth century was crisis-based.46  This seemingly fleeting character of Native 
responses to government policy both in war and in peace should not blind us to the 
importance of the political battles of the First World War, and the long-term implications 
of their deceptively specific solutions.   Indeed, it was the solutions derived during the 
First World War that established the path for the much of Native-government interaction 
over the rest of the century – it is not that the First World War had no lasting effect and 
therefore Native peoples fought the same battles twenty years later, but that the First 
World War shaped a Native-government relationship that, from a Native perspective, 
demanded the continuation of these battles over rights, land and sovereignty.  
 
Approaching the War from the Reserve   
Sarah Oak’s unfortunate experience does not conform to the historiography 
summarized above, which is dominated by a narrative of commitment and betrayal.  
                                                
45 Robert Alexander Innes, “‘I’m on Home Ground Now, I’m safe,’: Saskatchewan Aboriginal Veterans in 
the Immediate Post-War Years, 1945-6,” American Indian Quarterly 28 (Summer & Fall, 2004): 685-714. 
46 Through the 1927 change to the Indian Act meant to stifle activism by banning the use of band funds for 
lawyers’ fees (etc), the government sought to make political organization, particularly intra-reserve, 
impossible.  Shewell, “James Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism in Canada, 1943-4,” 212. 
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Exceptional circumstances altered her and her community’s world, and the Agents’ 
combination of defence and control were in response to these novel concerns.  The 
accommodations and long-term outcomes included in Sarah’s story highlight the need for 
a methodological approach that can appreciate the complexity of the Native communities 
(i.e. agency, voice, structural constraints) into which war programs arrived, but which 
also allows for the creation of a satisfying explanation of the importance of experiences 
like Sarah Oak’s in the wider Native-Government relationship(s). 
To achieve this end, this study presents a series of cases studies covering Native 
communities across the country.  This study attempts to paint a national picture not by 
suggesting there is one narrative that applies across the country but that many smaller (in 
scale) narratives collectively make a compelling case that the war was important (albeit 
in varying ways) force on reserves across the country.  Each chapter focuses on selected 
war programs, policies or activities (such as donations to wartime charities, military 
service, dependents' support programs, and conscription) at the band level.  The nuance 
of a case study permits a bounded but detailed analysis on the functioning relationships 
and the internal workings of communities.  The local/reserve context is highly relevant to 
understanding the Native-government dynamics under examination.47  Donations to war 
funds, enlistment, soldier family supports, or the debates over conscription and its 
implementation were mutual exchanges; these programs placed new demands on Native 
communities, but the communities sought to direct how these programs were applied and 
implemented.  Rather than assuming national policies had the same effects across the 
                                                
47 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd Edition (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2003), 13; Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Reserve Methods, 2nd Edition 
(London: Sage, 1990), 169, 387; Earl Babbie & Lucia Benaquinto, Fundamentals of Social Research, 1st 
Canadian Edition (Toronto: Thompson Nelson, 2002), 309. 
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country, and that local circumstances simply added a bit of parochial colour to that 
narrative, these local contexts fundamentally determined how war programs came into 
fruition.   
The cases in this narrative were chosen because they represent similar trends – the 
flows of Native advocacy, cooperation, protests and internalizations of the Indian Act – 
within the heterogeneous Native nations across Canada.  These case studies are not meant 
to highlight the fact that Native people experienced the First World War – that is already 
well-documented – but to clearly describe how the war influenced Native peoples' 
broader interests and vice versa.  This study thereby integrates the First World War into 
the larger narrative of Native peoples' relationship with the Canadian government, not as 
a transitory event, but as an important catalyst for serious change.  This story underlines 
how Native peoples' social, political, economic and legal conditions during the war 
affected how they interpreted and engaged war programs, and how those programs 
shaped Native peoples' lives for the future. 
 A risk with case studies is that the observer may dismiss the conclusions as 
unique to the case, and if the cases are chosen out of convenience (perhaps because they 
are the best-documented), or selected on the dependent variable (that is, selected because 
they demonstrated a certain outcome), this criticism is warranted.  For instance, the oft-
cited case of Francis Pegahmagabow ought to be presented as an exception rather than a 
typical example of a Native soldier.  Since Pegahmagabow was an early enlistee, one of 
the most successful snipers on the Western Front, and an important political figure who 
subsequently worked with Diamond Jenness, he was unique not only in terms of his 
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wartime achievements, but his post-war activities as well.48  While Pegahmagabow is 
worthy of historical attention, it is difficult to come to any general conclusion about the 
Native soldier experience based on Pegahmagabow’s record alone. 
The following narrative follows the cumulative, often halting process of the 
Indian Act’s growing role on reserves.  This story establishes a general but not strict 
chronological order, focused more specifically on how Native peoples (as individuals and 
communities) responded to these war programs and how those responses in turn 
cemented Indian Act-based identity and organizational principles on reserves.  This is not 
a linear story but a series of ebbs and flows of varying strengths in each Native 
community across the country; not all reserves participated to equal degrees in all 
available programs, nor did the war chart a clear progression of the Indian Act into ever 
increasing prominence.  Yet unquestionably by 1919, reserves’ and Native peoples’ 
relationships with the Indian Act had changed significantly from 1914, and the following 
narrative examines important moments in that process.  
 This story begins with the least obviously active contribution to the war effort – 
donations to wartime charities.  The first chapter investigates Native bands’ methods and 
motives when they participated in war fund campaigns and fundraising.  In particular, the 
chapter focuses on the different goals of the Blood (Káínaa), Blackfoot (Siksika), and Six 
Nations different in contributing to the Canadian Patriotic Fund for the Blood and 
Blackfoot, and the War Loans Campaign for the Six Nations.  These were reciprocal 
discussions between Native individuals, bands, Agents, and the Department headquarters, 
both within the reserve and between reserves and Ottawa.  This is not only the beginning 
                                                
48 John Steckley & Bryan Cummins, “Pegahmagabow of Parry Island: From Jenness Informant to 
Individual,” The Canadian Journal of Native Studies 25 (2005): 36-50. 
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of war-related exchanges, but also these players and communications chains are 
consistent throughout the war and will reappear throughout the study. 
 Chapter two considers the avenues available to Native men to join the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, and how the Department of Indian Affairs and the Department of 
Militia and Defence cooperated to recruit on reserves.  This chapter examines the 
mechanisms and implications of crossing the physical, legal, and cultural barrier between 
reserves and the rest of Canada – particularly the evolving role of the Indian Act in 
Native peoples’ lives and Indian Agents’ authority in the face of the war effort.  In the 
case of soldiering, tensions arose most clearly over the issues of drinking and desertion, 
but to a lesser extent to recruitment as well.  As men left reserves to navigate new 
situations as soldiers, their families had to cope with the absence of their breadwinners.  
Chapter three follows the Cope family of Nova Scotia, and identifies common challenges 
faced by Native soldiers’ families.  Whereas non-Native women faced the life without 
breadwinners, Native men had the additional difficulty of obtaining this financial support 
from their Indian Agent and the need for family members (usually matriarchs) to openly 
challenge the Militia and the Department of Indian Affairs’ authority and control over the 
family’s finance in the absence of the male head of the household.  
Thus far, this narrative considers how Native peoples participated in the war 
effort (and the consequences of that participation); yet, not all programs were greeted as 
opportunities.  Chapter four follows the fight over land and legitimacy in British 
Columbia, particularly in the Naas Agency, as Native political organizations used the 
urgency of conscription to challenge the Department of Indian Affairs' authority in their 
lives.  The Naas protests fit within the spectrum of challenges to Native men's inclusion 
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in the Military Service Act of 1917 that introduced conscription.  While they did not 
speak with one voice, the multitude of protests on treaty and/or Indian Act/ward grounds, 
from Native groups across the country upended attempts to conscript Native men.  While 
the torrent of voices speaking against conscripting Native men succeeded in changing 
that policy, the immediate aftermath shaded that victory.  Chapter five examines the 
application of Native men's exemption from conscription in Maniwaki, Parry Island, Fort 
William, Gibson and Edmonton.  Since this exemption required Native men to be 
registered as Indians with their Indian Agent, who would then apply to the Military 
authorities for the exemption, questions of Indian identity were brought into the centre of 
this registration process.  The promise of exemption from conscription was deeply 
enticing and therefore the majority of Native men across the country either openly or 
tacitly sought to claim the legal label of Indian under the Indian Act to obtain the 
exemption.   
A minority of Native peoples rejected the conscription exemption on the grounds 
of its legal implications for the relationship between Native peoples and the Canadian 
government.  The last chapter examines the cases of Wesley Martin of Six Nations and 
Gaston Louie at Okanagan, both of whom challenged the practice of registering Natives 
for both conscription and the Canada Registration Act on the grounds that doing so 
implicitly included them in a political body – Canada – to which they felt no allegiance 
and fundamentally did not belong.  Both Martin and Louie believed that to be counted as 
Indians meant an attack on their sovereignty by the Canadian state.  These protests 
indicate the importance of the Indian Act’s use in the war; while most Native peoples (in 
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this case specifically men) were willing to use the Indian Act because of its short-term 
benefit, others refused. 
 
Conclusion 
 The unfortunate circumstances of Sarah Oak, shot on her way home by a military 
sentry, can offer this narrative one further point of interest.  The relevance of her story 
continued after the war, when the “so-called” (according to Agent Taillon) St. Regis 
Council passed a resolution to compel the Department to pay Sarah’s mother the $100 set 
aside for her (the family hoped to build a home).  As followers of the America-based 
Chief Thunderwater, the Agent refused to recognize this Council “as bona fide 
representing the Band.49   
Thunderwater and his doomed Council of Tribes, with their goals of pan-Indian 
organization, self-government and separation from non-Native society, took up the Oaks’ 
cause.50  The Thunderwater followers wanted to wrestle control of Sarah’s money away 
from the Department of Indian Affairs, thereby reasserting their sovereignty over 
reserves, an effort in which they were ultimately unsuccessful.  While she never went 
overseas, the war violently invaded Sarah’s world, just as the war’s incursion into 
reserves brought into sharp relief questions about the place of Native peoples in Canadian 
society and their relationship with the Canadian government.
                                                
49 Indian Agent Taillon to the Department of Indian Affairs 19 November 1919 LAC RG 10 Volume 3188 
File 466, 239; Miss Cecilia Oak to the Department of Indian Affairs 31 May 1920 LAC RG 10 Volume 
3188 File 466, 239.  Sarah died some time before May 1921, and her father continued to fight for the 
money the Department held in trust for his daughter. Frank Smith & Mitchell Oak to Indian Agent Taillon 
30 May 1921 LAC RG 10 Volume 3188 File 466, 239. 
50 Lackenbauer, “Pay No Attention to Sero,” 148-149; Titley, 97-101. 
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Chapter 1:  
Native Councils and Individuals Donations to Canada’s Wartime Charities 
 
 While Canada’s offer of a 25,000-man contingent to the British forces was still 
only a promise, the Blood Council of Southern Alberta met on 7 August 1914 in their 
Alberta Agency and decided to donate one thousand dollars to “aid [the] King in this 
hour [of] peril.”1  The Blood Council claimed that “a condition of war exists against the 
children and Dominions of our Gracious King,” and they were intimately concerned with 
the emerging conflict in Europe.  Additionally, the Council claimed they owed the King a 
debt of gratitude: “we of the Blood Indian tribe are thankful for the kindly just and 
honourable treatment always given us by the King’s Government.”2  Indian Agent W.J. 
Dilworth praised the Council’s donation “as a token of the pride they have in their 
country, their King and their Government,” and in a self-congratulatory declaration, 
announced that “their hearts were full of well wishes and thankfulness for past 
treatment.”3  Dilworth claimed his entire Agency actively followed the events in Europe 
and would celebrate any British victory. 
 The Blood Council’s rapid engagement in the war impressed Dilworth, so he felt 
his superiors in Ottawa should acknowledge the Council’s unprompted action.  The 
Agent beamed “I am proud of our Indians, proud of the fact that they of their own free 
                                                
1 Resolution of the Council of Blood, Blood Agency 7 August 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-2 
Pt. 1; Council of the Blood to Secretary J.D. McLean 9 August 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-2 
Pt. 1. Britain had only accepted Canada’s offer of the 25,000 man contingent, paid entirely by the 
Dominion, on 7 August 1914, the same day the Blood made their offer.  Morton, A Military History of 
Canada,130. 
2 Resolution of the Council of Blood, Blood Agency 7 August 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-2 
Pt. 1. 
3 Indian Agent W.J. Dilworth to Secretary J.D. McLean 8 August 1914 LAC RG 6762 File 452-2 Pt. 1. 
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will and accord spontaneously,” displayed “their fealty to the Mother Land.”4  According 
to Dilworth, 1914 had been “the worst year in the history of farming operations in this 
district”, yet Scott believed the Blood could give the $1000 from their “considerable” 
revenue from grazing leases and other (unidentified) sources.5  Luckily, a few months 
later, Blood farmers received a significantly higher price for their hay harvest than 
previous years, which buoyed the band’s available capital.6  Scott thanked Agent 
Dilworth, the Blood Chiefs, and the Council for their generous donation, “to be used in 
whatever way the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs may deem to be of greatest 
advantage to the British Arms,” rather than be sent to the King.7   
The Blood donation and others like it reveal the complexity of First Nations’ 
participation in the First World War.  This does not question the Blood’s declarations, but 
highlights bands’ effort to maximize the benefit of involvement in the war effort 
according to their and their communities’ interests.  Three case studies addressed in this 
chapter highlight different approaches to war-time fundraising: the Blood’s effort to have 
the Canadian Patriotic Fund (CPF) recognize their donations, the Blackfoot’s hope of 
donating money rather than sending men to the front, and the Six Nations’ attempts to 
buy War Bonds.  The approaches also speak directly to dramatically different motivations 
                                                
4 Indian Agent W.J. Dilworth to Secretary J.D. McLean 8 August 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-
2 Pt. 1. 
5 Dilworth’s negative evaluation of the Bloods’ crops in the 1914 harvest suggests the possibility of a lean 
winter, both in terms of what Blood farmers collected for themselves and what income they drew from 
what they sold.  In such a case, the Agent might have had to provide relief during the winter to make up for 
the poor harvest, for which band funds would have been valuable assert and therefore a $1000 
nonrefundable donation on the heals of a bad harvest from small band funds seems contrary to the Blood’s 
interests.  D.C. Scott to Acting Superintendent General Robert Rogers 19 August 1914 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6762 File 452-2 Pt. 1; Indian Agent W.J. Dilworth, Indian Agent Report to Secretary J.D. McLean 
22 August 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 1547. 
6 Indian Agent W.J. Dilworth, Indian Agent Report to Secretary J.D. McLean 5 October 1914 LAC RG 10 
Volume 1547. 
7 D.C. Scott to the Chief and Headmen of the Blood 20 August 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-2 
Pt. 1; D.C. Scott to Indian Agent W.J. Dilworth 20 August 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-2 Pt. 
1. 
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for engaging financially in the war effort.  The Blood and Blackfoot sought an exchange 
for their donations, the former as part of a wider contribution to the war effort and the 
latter to avoid losing any of their young men, while the Six Nations Council wanted to 
purchase War Loans to improve the band’s finances.   
Each of these cases demonstrates one of a set of representative responses to 
wartime fund raising, and highlights key actors and important avenues of communication 
that dominated Native communities’ involvement in the war.  The Blood Agent acted as 
the band’s advocate to both Ottawa and the local CPF committee.  Blackfoot band 
members (with the approval of their band council) worked with a sympathetic missionary 
who spoke to the Department directly, rather than to or through their Agent, J.H. 
Gooderham.  The Six Nations Council both hired a lawyer to represent their interests in 
Ottawa and accepted deputations from the War Loan Committee at home, asserting their 
independence from Departmental authorities.  The essential communication latticework 
of this narrative is composed of band members and councils, missionaries and lawyers, 
Agents and Departmental bureaucrats, and flow of communication, from reserve to 
Agent, Agent to Ottawa, reserve to Ottawa and Ottawa back.  
 
Negotiating Participation through Donations: 
The Canadian Patriotic Fund began in Montreal in 1914 and was designated to 
support soldiers’ dependants by filling the gap left by absentee breadwinners.8  Three 
days after the Blood’s first financial donation, the bombastic and controversial Minister 
of Militia Sam Hughes declared the creation of a special fund for soldiers and their 
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dependents.  Local volunteers collected donations and redistributed that money through 
the fund’s local branches to soldiers’ dependents, defined as wife, children – the number 
increased the amount received – or a widowed mother.9  Native peoples – individually 
and collectively – donated frequently and generously to the CPF, the Red Cross, the 
Belgian Relief Fund and various local war-related funds, to the eventual total of 
$44,545.46, of the CPF’s total collection of a little over $47 million (from a total 
Canadian population of eight million, albeit unevenly donated).10  Herbert Ames, 
Honorary Secretary of the CPF, was so impressed with Native donations that he believed 
“if a general appeal were issued, and the Indians were asked to make a contribution on 
the same day, they would probably do so, and a considerable addition to the Canadian 
Patriotic Fund would result.”11   
According to Department of Indian Affairs records, approximately 30% of the 
Native population under the Department’s jurisdiction belonged to a band that donated 
money to a variety of Canadian war funds.  These donations were concentrated in the 
central and western portions of the country, with Albertan Agencies having the greatest 
per capita donation rate (82% of the Native population under Departmental authority in 
that province belonged to a band that donated money to a war fund), then Ontario (60%), 
and Saskatchewan (55%).  British Columbia and Manitoba had almost identical per 
capita rates of donation (27% and 26% respectfully).  Quebec was last, with less than 
11%, and all but one of the donations made from Agencies in this province can be traced 
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to specific individuals or small groups.12  The Department recorded no donations from 
the Maritimes, or the bands under Treaties 9&10 in Yukon and the North West 
Territories.  This does not necessarily mean Native peoples from those areas did not 
donate money, but that they never made a band-level decision to do so from their capital 
and/or interest funds which necessitated the Department’s involvement, or was otherwise 
recorded by the Department.  Nor did the Department monetize donations of socks, care 
baskets, furs, and contributions from fundraising events.13  These donations are, at least 
in part, a method of creatively engaging with the Department’s control of their finances 
and may be considered an expression of political autonomy and self-control.  
Additionally, the Blood and Blackfoot signed Treaty Seven only in 1877, while 
the Six Nations’ relationship with the British and then the Canadians was several 
centuries old by the outbreak of the First World War.  Although their respective 
relationships with the Canadian government were important to how these nations 
contributed to war funds and communicated their goals, the Blackfoot and Six Nations 
focused more on the broader relationship between themselves and Canada in how they 
chose to interact with war funds.  Specifically, the Blackfoot seemed to have continued 
their interest in protecting the internal integrity of their people against threat, and recently 
(since 1877) engaged in a “alliance of peace” with the Crown to protect themselves were 
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willing to pay to avoid more white incursion into their world.14  The Six Nations 
meanwhile sought to represent their sovereignty through their financial freedom in 
engaging with war fund programs on their – no the Department’s – terms.  The Blood, on 
the other hand, had the much more specific goal of obtaining equal treatment for equal 
involvement in the war effort.  This variance suggests that treaties formed only a part of 
Native motivations for strategic engagement with war funds – they are more important to 
the details of each case than the pattern of engagement itself. 
Donations to war funds were often Native peoples’ first foray into the war, and 
represented reaffirmations and reevaluations of important relationships.  At first glance, 
Native donors, like the Blood, frequently couched their contributions in expressions of 
their continued loyalty to the British Crown.15  Although firmly rooted in the present, the 
Blood and other nations who appealed to their historical loyalty to the Crown sought to 
reaffirm the validity of the treaty-based relationship.  
Not all Native nations in the country shared this historical relationship, however.  
Unlike the rest of the country, British Columbia had not signed treaties with Native 
nations, either when it was a colony or once it entered Confederation, nor was there a 
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broad tradition of military alliances with the British Crown.  Although donations from 
British Columbia were not the lowest in the country, many Agents there complained of 
the difficultly impressing the Crown’s needs upon the residents of their Agencies.  Agent 
Thomas Deasy of the Queen Charlotte Islands distributed a pamphlet throughout his 
Agency, in which he argued, “a great many of your people can read and write and reason, 
and you are aware that the British flag gives protection to all.”16  Deasy reported to 
Ottawa three months later that the Skidegate and Massett bands were collecting money 
and had held concerts to support the CPF.17  Agent McAllan of Fort Fraser collected 
$28.40 from the Stuart Lake band, but he lamented “It is difficult to convince them that 
the Govt. appreciates a contribution of this kind and I would be greatly obliged if you 
would write a personal letter to the Stuart Lake Band through the chief [Jimmy 
Ahoul]…to make this point clear.”18  Scott acquiesced to McAllan’s request, and sent 
Ahoul both a thank you and an explanation of the war effort itself:  
We are engaged in a struggle with a powerful and bad-hearted 
enemy…Your contribution will help feed and clothe the family of some 
soldier who is willing to lay down his life for you and for the 
Empire…your contribution will go to swell the large amount we have 
received from our loyal Indians throughout the country.19 
 
Indian Agents in British Columbia sought to instruct their agencies about the Empire’s 
needs and their responsibilities as members therein.20  While some Native communities 
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used their donations to reaffirm the bonds between the Crown and themselves, the 
Department also sought to shape the responses of those outside these historical 
partnerships and instill a sense of imperial belonging.  While the government, through 
Indian Agents, clearly attempted to generate donations and support for the war effort, 
many of the more substantial engagements came from the First Nations themselves.  The 
Blood, Blackfoot and Six Nations’ actions represented an exchange of interests and 
money rather than the Department instructing or attempting to instruct Native people on 
how they ought to interpret their place in the war effort.  Instead, the donations from the 
three communities and (attempted) purchases detailed below represent conscious efforts 
on their parts to dictate their involvement in the war; these decisions and opinions 
originated with the Native groups rather than the Department, and in ways not always to 
the Department’s liking.  
 
The Blood, Soldiers’ Dependants, and the Canadian Patriotic Fund  
The Bloods’ August 1914 $1,000 donation established a pattern of contribution by 
the band throughout the war, principally to the CPF and the Red Cross, eventually 
totaling over $2,400.21  Individual families donated as well: as of May 1916, Dilworth 
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recorded that 105 families requested that his office donate five per cent of any of their 
Departmental payments to the CPF.22  Once the Militia began recruiting Native men in 
December 1915, Indian Affairs helped the Militia enlist Native men (see chapter 2).  
While he was happy when the Blood Council donated to the war funds, Agent Dilworth 
believed “no matter how strong, rugged and healthy they may look,” Blood men would 
suffer if they fought in France.23  Dilworth feared that in the lower altitudes and in the 
presence of poison gas, Blood soldiers would develop tuberculosis so quickly and so 
universally that “instead of the Indians being an assistance in numbers they would be a 
burden on the medical and Red Cross service.”24  Scott, who wanted Native men in 
uniform, dismissed Dilworth’s concerns, and assured the Agent that the Department of 
Indian Affairs “would be pleased to have you give permission to enlistment to such of 
your Indians as may pass medical examinations.”25   
In November 1915, a month before the Militia began actively recruiting Native 
men, Dilworth prevented at least thirty young Blood men from enlisting; “all were 
counselled [sic] against going and none allowed to go.”26  However, three men “ran away 
and enlisted” despite being denied permission to leave the reserve, and Dilworth 
subsequently ensured they were dismissed from the CEF.27  Dilworth’s power to disallow 
enlistment caught the local press’ attention.  In May 1915, the Lethbridge Herald 
presented the case of a “full-blooded Indian” who joined the 13th Canadian Mounted 
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Rifles under the guise of being a “half-breed” to elude Dilworth’s attention.28  According 
to the enthusiastic reporter, this unnamed soldier was “an excellent horseman,” and 
“proved that as a marksman the white man was inferior,” and was generally “very 
popular with the other men, and was treated by them [the white soldiers] exactly as if he 
had been of the same race.”29  One trooper within the 13th CMR argued that “the 
government ought to raise an Indian regiment” on the grounds of this individual Native 
soldier’s performance.  The Herald lamented that the profiled Native man’s Indian Agent 
came to collect his ward.  
Albert Mountain Horse managed to evade Dilworth (and the Militia) and enlisted 
successfully.  Mountain Horse was attending a course at the Calgary Musketry School 
when war was declared.  He volunteered almost immediately in September 1914.30  
Overseas with the 10th Infantry Battalion, Mountain Horse was gassed in the battle at St. 
Julien.  He wrote to the Reverend S. Middleton of the St. Paul Mission School (of which 
Mountain Horse was an alumnus) and described German gas as “worse than anything I 
know of.  I don’t mind rifle fire, and the shells bursting around us, but this gas is the 
limit.”31  Although Mountain Horse remained in the trenches, and was gassed twice more 
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before he was hospitalized, Dilworth emphasized that gas, rather than a bullets or mortar 
shells, “proved too much for [the] natural weakness of the lungs of the Indians.”32   
Mountain Horse died six days after landing in Quebec on 19 November 1915.  He 
was interred on the St. Paul’s Anglican Mission grounds, his service observed by “all the 
Blood Indians and by the largest body of citizens that ever attended a funeral in this 
district, none seemed to poor to do him honour”: attendance was so large that mourners 
required a ticket to enter the church.33  The body arrived in MacLeod during a heavy 
snowfall to an escort that included officers of the St. Paul’s Cadet Corps, the MacLeod 
boy scouts, the Home Guard and the Royal North West Mounted Police, as well as a 
large crowd of Native and non-Native people.  The Herald remarked “the fraternizing of 
the Indians and the white men, combined with the solemnity of the occasion, presented a 
most striking and unique scene.”34  Mountain Horse’s casket, covered with the Union 
Jack and wreaths, was met by the “weird war chant” of the Blood as it traveled to the 
church.  During the service, Archdeacon Tims delivered his address to the audience in 
“the Indian language, which is the first time this language has been heard from the pulpit 
in MacLeod.”  In his eulogy, Reverend Middleton praised Mountain Horse who “fought 
to uphold the prestige and traditions of the British race,” and the speaker described the 
deceased soldiers as “truly an Indian warrior.”35   
Despite Dilworth’s opposition, at least seventeen Blood men enlisted and left 
wives, parents, and children behind them.  Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby Charles Bryan 
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of the 191st Overseas Battalion, the unit to which most Blood soldiers belonged, asserted 
that his Blood men were among the battalion’s best soldiers.  Contradicting Dilworth’s 
fears, all passed their medical tests and, “the boys from the Blood reserve have never 
complained of any duty imposed upon them, or of any punishment that has been inflicted 
upon them, but have played the game right thru [sic] as soldiers.”36   
While historians have been correct to point out that CPF volunteers typically used 
gendered and class-based rationales to evaluate soldiers’ dependents’ claims, racial 
stereotypes and preconceptions about Native peoples’ relationship with the federal 
government also affected Native claimants.  The CPF was a charity run by volunteers, 
largely from the Anglo-Protestant community, and collected donations to redistribute to 
soldiers’ dependents through locally run branches.37  The charitable organization’s 
support was meant to make up the difference between what a family needed to support 
itself and what its soldier former breadwinner sent home, all to maintain the male 
breadwinner structure in his absence.38  Local CPF branches had relief committees, who 
evaluated applicants’ claims for assistance, including proof of a soldier’s enlistment for 
active service, proof of marriage, dependency and children’s ages, and family 
circumstances to determine “whether the family, by its manner of living is worthy of 
assistance from the public monies.”39  When the Blood soldiers’ families appealed to the 
local McLeod CPF Committee for support, it rejected their applications outright without 
investigation on the (unsubstantiated) grounds that “the dependants of these Indians are 
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wards of the Government, and draw rations from the Government…and as the 
Government of Canada is responsible for their maintenance.”40  Proximity did not 
translate into familiarity but rather ethnic (and legal) difference established an intellectual 
barrier between neighbours, bolstering the assessment that the Blood’s “are a 
comparatively small and segregated community, with whom there is little if any 
intercourse with outside Indians or white people.”41  Without a Blood member (not 
entirely surprisingly) or having heard a Blood witness, the McLeod committee assumed 
that the Blood wanted for nothing, so that the loss of their husbands and sons did not 
actually mean the loss of their breadwinners. 
Dilworth found the McLeod CPF Committee’s attitude deeply frustrating.  In a 
reversal of his earlier position, he asserted, “there is more to be said in favour of an 
Indian enlistment, than there is of the enlistment of an [sic] white man,” and therefore 
promises of support made to one should not be denied the other.42  Indeed, the Agent and 
the CPF actually shared an interest in soldiers’ dependents’ moral conduct and concerns 
about dependency.43  Additionally, thanks to a successful hay sale in October 1914, 
Dilworth had been reducing the rations of beef and flour he gave to the Blood as “they 
[the Blood] must look past the ration house for their livelihood, with the result that they 
are looking further ahead for their food supplies.”44  Dilworth tied the reduction in rations 
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to the pursuit of farming on the Agency, which he believed reflected “great credit on the 
Indians themselves, and upon the officers of the Department, under whose care and 
supervision, the work is conducted.”45  The Agent managed to keep himself at the center 
of economic life on the reserve.  Dilworth admitted, “I do keep a firm hand over the 
money matters of these Indians,” as he sought to direct Native financial decisions towards 
farm improvements and general thriftiness.46   
From a general interest in the reserve’s economic situation to a specific concern 
for the economic circumstances of certain members, Dilworth became an advocate for 
Blood soldiers’ families.  Dilworth reminded his superiors that the Blood had generously 
donated to the war effort and therefore should not be denied the benefits extended to 
white dependents.  Concurring with his Agent’s views, Scott wrote to CPF secretary 
Herbert Ames with the Blood’s complaint of unequal treatment.  Scott assured Ames “I 
feel sure that this apparent discrimination against them is merely a matter of oversight” 
and not the product of malicious and/or conscious neglect.47  CPF Secretary Philip Morris 
assured Scott that their fund did not have a policy of excluding Native families from 
support.  Morris suggested the McLeod problem was a product of the local context, that 
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“there may be special conditions of life on the Indian Reserves which should be taken 
into consideration by a local committee.”48 
The CPF authorities in Calgary investigated the Blood’s concerns.  They found 
that the McLeod Committee believed that all those families living on the reserve paid no 
rent and received all their necessary food through government rations – that the 
Government took care of Native people in every capacity and therefore Blood soldiers’ 
wives did not need and were not entitled to CPF assistance.49  This assumption stood in 
direct contradiction to Dilworth’s proud pronouncements about reducing Departmental 
support to the Blood.  Scott corrected the McLeod committee’s misconceptions; the 
Blood families owned their homes (and hence did not have to pay rent) and received few 
government rations.  Scott asserted, “It is not good policy to have the impression go forth 
that the Indians who contribute to the Patriotic Fund would be refused any assistance 
from it.”50  Scott argued the blank dismissal would “cause irritation” as “these people are 
doing their duty,” and ought not to be dissuaded from contributing to the war effort.51 
The McLeod CPF Committee members had been unaware of the Blood’s 
donations.  Since the Blood Council donated from their funds controlled in Ottawa, they 
sent their instructions to the Department of Indian Affairs’ headquarters, bypassing local 
channels.  Initially the Department would only approve donations that could be taken 
from a band’s interest funds, not their capital funds (the principle).  They sent the money 
in question to the headquarters of the fund in question, unless otherwise advised.  The 
McLeod Committee Secretary R.T. McNicholl apologized to Scott (rather than the 
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rejected and needy families) and explained that the local CPF had no idea of the Blood’s 
numerous and generous donations to the wartime charities.  Though the McLeod 
Committee promised to consider any future Blood applications, its secretary insisted that 
any future donations from the Council ought to be channeled through them, rather than 
the CPF headquarters.52  Scott promised his Department would funnel all Blood CPF 
donations to the McLeod branch, and instructed Dilworth likewise.53  At the beginning of 
April 1917, the McLeod committee passed a resolution that the “families of Indians who 
have enlisted be treated in the same manner as those of other nationalities, and that each 
case be dealt with separately,” rather than dismissed en masse.54 
Nine months after Dilworth received these assurances, Joe Mountain Horse 
(Albert’s brother) wrote to Scott from France.  Between his glowing praise to the 
Department for “the interest you have taken” in the “Blood boys,” and his earnest desire 
to “try my luck again at Fritz,” Mountain Horse lamented his family’s poverty, of which 
he had been appraised in a recent letter from home.55  As Mountain Horse had no one 
else, he told Scott “I am forced to make this appeal to you.” 56 The soldier thought a loan 
and/or a house near Dilworth’s might allow his family to be “as comfortable as they can 
under the present trying circumstances.”57  He made no mention of the money the Militia 
allowed soldiers to send home (see chapter 3).  When Scott inquired of Dilworth about 
the Mountain Horse family, the Agent informed Scott that they “are many times better off 
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than they ever were when he was with them,” and attributed Joe’s concern to the “usual 
Indian course, ‘A man is never likely to get unless he asks for, probably might be missing 
something.”58 Dilworth acknowledged that “Indians are more or less jealous of their 
wives in their absence,” but he assured Scott (who subsequently allayed Mountain 
Horse’s fears) that “there is no mote virtuous woman on the reserve than Mrs. Joe 
Mountain Horse.”59 
The Blood donated money to the CPF and they expected that contribution to be 
returned with support from the CPF when necessary – it was meant to be a reciprocal 
relationship.  The McLeod Committee had considered Blood applicants to be ineligible 
because they lived on reserve, a place where Committee members imagined Native 
people had all their needs taken care of by a benevolent government.  The Committee 
found, through forced reexamination, that not only were Blood soldiers’ wives equally 
entitled to support as white soldiers’ dependents, but that the Blood had donated liberally 
to their main Ottawa branch and other funds. Ultimately, the McLeod Committee only 
allowed Blood women to apply for support (no such support was guaranteed) after 
authoritative non-Native outsiders investigated and disproved the McLeod Committee’s 
assumptions. Albert Mountain Horse’s death proved a brief moment of unity between 
white and Native communities, and only cooperation and advocacy from white 
authorities overcame those barriers. 
 
The Blackfoot’s Contribution Compromise 
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Some Native councils sought to use fund-raising to exclude themselves from 
other ways of supporting the war effort.  The residents of the Blackfoot Agency of 
Alberta, specifically the Siksika (hereafter simply the Blackfoot) agreed on 23 September 
1914 to donate twelve hundred dollars to the Government of Canada to support the war 
effort, and approached their Agent, J.H. Gooderham, to complete the financial paperwork 
a week later.60  The Agent found the Blackfoot party that presented themselves at his 
office “were all most enthusiastic and anxious to give,” and he believed their generosity 
was so great that the group would have donated as much as $1500.00 “if I had suggested 
it.”61   
Gooderham noted in his diary, “the whole thing was done quietly,” unknown to 
the nearby white Gleichen population, at least “until they saw it in the papers.”62  Similar 
to Agent Dilworth, Gooderham perceived the Blackfoot’s donation, which arose without 
the Agent’s encouragement or interference, as proof of his effective work on the 
Blackfoot Agency.  Gooderham suggested to Ottawa that the donation could come out of 
a CPR payment for a swath of reserve land.63  Instead, and a year and a half later, the 
Department of Indian Affairs appealed to the Governor General to take the twelve 
hundred dollars from the Blackfoot capital funds (which totaled $90,965.00) as the 
money from their interest fund was already earmarked for food supplies.64   
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This appeal represented a change in policy, as donations from most Native bands 
came from their interest funds rather than their capital funds, their principal investments 
and savings fund.  Unlike donations from interest funds, from which the above donations 
were drawn, withdrawals from capital funds were regulated under the Indian Act’s 
Section 90 of the Act (inserting war funds where they were not mentioned), which 
allowed withdrawals from band’s capital funds (with vice-regal approval) for on-reserve 
improvements.  Upon receiving a number of applications to donate money to the CPF, 
Deputy Minister of Justice E.L. Newcombe asked Scott why they needed the Governor 
General’s approval for charitable contributions.65  In these cases, a band’s desired 
donation exceeded the money in their interest funds and therefore the Department sought 
government approval for withdrawals from those band’s capital funds – the principal 
from land transfers/successions.  The Department of Indian Affairs explained that the 
wish to donate originated with the bands and that the Department believed that Native 
peoples “being allowed to feel that they were co-operating would have the effect of 
fostering the already strong sense of unity and partnership which is so desirable as 
between the Indians and the rest of the community.”66  
The Department reasoned that the Indian Act predated the war and hence would 
not mention war-related programs, therefore they liberally interpreted Section 90: as 
reserves are in Canada, and Canada is within the Empire, therefore “the successful 
persecution of the war will be of permanent value to the Indians.”67 Newcombe and some 
of his staff were hesitant to endorse Scott’s opinion based on their own readings of the 
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Indian Act.68  Yet the Minister of Justice believed the War Measures Act would allow the 
Governor General to approve the capital fund donations “if the Indians requested it.69  
 The Blackfoot wanted to give money so they would not have to give up their sons 
to the war effort.  At the beginning of the war, the Blackfoot had received assurances 
from Calgary MP R.B. Bennett that the reserve’s young men would not have to serve at 
the front.70  In April 1916, Paul Little Walker and Silas Wolf Collar, along with the local 
missionary Reverend Canon Gibbon Stocken, committed to collecting money for both the 
CPF and the Canadian Red Cross, alternating between the two every three months, on 
one condition.  In a form of exchange, the Blackfoot “could not face the thought of 
sending their young men to the front, for personal reasons, but they are more than willing 
to give of what money they have towards the Patriotic and Red Cross Funds.”71  Barely a 
generation removed from the collapse of the Northern buffalo herd which turned “stout 
and hearty” young Blackfoot hunters into “skeletons,” the Blackfoot did not want to loose 
any more healthy young men.72  This desire for protection against outside threats 
extended back before the buffalo collapse however, to the motivation for signing Treaty 7 
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in 1877, which Crowfoot signed against a shaman’s advice in an effort to establish a safe 
future for the Blackfoot.73  Therefore, although they were concerned about losing their 
men to the front, for the Blackfoot this was not an issue unique to the context of the First 
World War. 
Agent Gooderham noted in his diary that the Blackfoot had donated another 
$207.00 to the CPF in that month, for which Gooderham thought it was “Indian-like” that 
they wanted a letter of thanks (meaning that they wanted their contribution known).74  
The Blackfoot’s search for an acknowledgement of their donations arose out of their 
desire to support the war effort financially rather than through the sacrifice of its male 
population.  To have that exchange recognized officially would assure that the white 
authorities were aware of this contribution and that it could serve as a defense against 
questions of enlistment.  Underlining this concern, Little Walker and Wolf Collar offered 
to come to Ottawa to discuss the substitution of money for men directly with Scott.75  
Scott offered to arrange for a tour of the Parliament Buildings, but only on the condition 
that Little Walker and Wolf Collar paid for their journey themselves.76  They did not or 
could not meet this condition and did not travel to Ottawa. 
Little Walker, Wolf Collar and Stocken sent the CPF $34.25 in June 1916, in 
addition to an earlier collection of $100 for the Red Cross, and reiterated with this new 
money that the Blackfoot did not want their young men to fight.77  To emphasize their 
desire to cooperate with white authorities and to reinforce their commitment to the war 
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effort, the Blackfoot wanted Scott and the Department to know that “they all – old and 
young, Christian and non-Christians, pray daily, in public and in private for the success 
of the Allies.”78  Conversely, and without Little Walker or Wolf Collar, Stocken noted 
Blackfoot farmers made one to two and a half thousand dollars from their wheat crops 
“individually.”79  Stocken suggested to Scott that the Department offer Wolf Collar a 
preemptive thanks for offering the Blackfoot’s “riches,” to shame them into donating the 
proceeds of the harvest.80  As much as the Blackfoot hoped to sway white authorities with 
their donations, Stocken sought to influence Blackfoot behaviour with these same 
donations.  Stocken’s success seems doubtful, as the reserve’s next donation to the war 
effort was five dollars, followed by a New Years’ gift of over eleven hundred dollars (not 
specifically from farmers).81   
An article appeared in The Gleichen Call on 4 January 1917 that praised the 
Blackfoot’s generosity, which was “a pretty nice donation from our red brothers,” and 
argued their donations “shows them [the Blackfoot] to be more liberal than many white 
men” who were far, far wealthier their Native compatriots.  Contrary to the Blackfoot’s 
assertions, the article claimed that the reserve’s commitment to the war knew no bounds, 
and that if “should they be asked to go to the front every man on the Blackfoot reserve 
would volunteer.”82  These bold declarations, true and false, were meant to shame the 
white community and were not without precedent.  A member of the Onion Lake reserve 
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in Saskatchewan, Moo-Che-We-In-Es, sent $1.50 to Ames of the CPF and a letter 
explaining that he had “heard there was a big war going on over there and I feel like I 
want to help” and the “best I can do is to send a little money for I can’t go myself as I am 
nearly blind.”83  This money came out of Moo-Che-We-In-Es’ income from selling beef 
to the Government, but he had heard other Native people planned to give the CPF twenty-
five cents from their treaty payments of five dollars per year.84  
This correspondence so delighted Ames that he declared Moo-Che-We-In-Es’ 
story “one of the best I have ever seen,” and the CPF turned it into a poster with some of 
the story printed in Cree syllabic (with a footnoted English translation) to “create a lot of 
interest and help the Fund.”85  Ames requested Scott forward the CPF any similar stories 
for similar publication.86  Like the article in The Gleichen Call, the CPF hoped the Moo-
Che-We-In-Es poster would inspire or shame their white audiences into donating more; if 
Natives, whom the Canadian public generally viewed as poorer and inferior than 
themselves had given so much of their meager resources, how could the white patriot 
justify not donating even a small sum? 
While the CPF planned its schemes to increase donations from the non-Native 
population, the Blackfoot felt their reciprocal agreement with white authorities not to 
have their men enlisted was being violated.  In January 1917, recruiting officers visited 
the reserve unannounced and uninvited.  Captain Rankin in the 191st Overseas Battalion, 
and a local man “who is well known to the Indians,” attended a dance on the reserve, 
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where the Captain spoke to the assembled dancers and convinced thirteen men to attest, 
six of whom passed their medical exams in Calgary (two had previously served in the 
CEF).87  Neither the Agent nor the Chiefs were present at the dance, nor were they 
consulted about the Captain’s intentions, despite assurances from the officer and his local 
companion that they wanted the elders present when they presented the case for 
enlistment.88   
Scott, contacted by some angry Blackfoot, immediately told Agent Gooderham 
that this impromptu recruiting campaign “is not according to [our] understanding with 
[the Blackfoot] Indians and must be discontinued pending representations from [the] 
Indians” and the Agent’s report.89  Despite the numerous assurances the Blackfoot held 
from local Calgary MP R.B. Bennett and the Department, as well as their repeated 
assertions that they donated money in lieu of sending their young men, Gooderham 
claimed to be unaware of a previous policy of not enlisting Blackfoot.  Instead, the Agent 
attempted to assure Scott that “the minor chiefs said those that enlisted of their own 
accord were free to do so.”90  The Agent believed twenty-five young Blackfoot men 
would make good soldiers and not be missed on the reserve.  He dismissed any reticence 
against enlisting, which arose from Blackfoot’s “fondness for their children and [of] not 
wishing to part with them.”91  This dissonance between Agent and Blackfoot might 
explain why those concerned with recruiters spoke directly with Scott. 
When a month later Glen Campbell of the 107th Overseas Battalion tried to recruit 
on the reserve, the Blackfoot appealed to the Department of Indian Affairs, which gave 
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the reserve “assurance which they [the Blackfoot] understood to mean that they should 
not be formally recruited.”92  Despite Gooderham’s disingenuous dismissal of the 
Blackfoot’s desire to keep their young men out of uniform, Stocken forwarded the 
Blackfoot’s great thanks to Scott for stopping the 191st Overseas Battalion’s 
encroachments onto the reserve.93  Stocken sought to assure Scott that the Blackfoot’s 
desire not to serve did not rise out of disinterest in the war or in the Allies’ wellbeing. 
The Reverend assured the bureaucrat that the whole reserve followed the war events 
closely, largely thanks to the former reserve school students, who read the daily papers.94  
Additionally, although some minor chiefs had indeed asserted that volunteers could not 
be stopped, that should not mean military officers and respected, and therefore 
presumably persuasive, civilians could enter the reserve and tell the young men “they 
were there in the name of the King to seek recruits!”  Many of those men who had left, 
largely former pupils at Elkhorn and Shingwauk Industrial Schools, had died soon after 
enlisting, and the Blackfoot believed their young men would similarly die if sent to the 
“humid atmosphere of Europe,” which would deeply imperil their future as a people.95  
Repeating the logic that the Blackfoot must pay to avoid fighting, the reverend attached a 
check for $61.80 collected by Wolf Collar and Little Walker for the Red Cross.96   
Scott promised Stocken that the Department of Indian Affairs had been 
completely unaware of the Captain Rankin’s recruiting mission, and immediately 
telegraphed Agent Gooderham with the instructions that the mission must be 
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discontinued and that the Blackfoot “will not be urged to recruit; if they join any of the 
overseas battalions it must be voluntary.”97  The Blackfoot were one of a few exceptions 
in this regard, as the Department generally aided the Militia’s recruiting efforts on 
reserves, even encouraging Indian Affairs’ current and former employees to act as 
recruiters (see chapter 2).98  A handful of Blackfoot men volunteered despite their Chiefs; 
Cyril and Mike Foxhead, (alias Mike Many Bears) joined the 191st Overseas Battalion, 
enlisting when the uninvited Captain Rankin visited the reserve.99  Mike wrote home in 
July 1917, claiming he enjoyed the trip over the prairies and ocean and he was “glad to 
say everything is going on fine and dandy.”100  Foxhead inquired about the results of the 
reserve’s annual fruit harvest and asked how Blackfoot boys had performed at the 
Calgary Stampede.  The soldier absolved an acquaintance of his who had deserted and 
run to the United States, but Foxhead assured his friends and family at home that  
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I’ll stick to it until the end and put up a name for the Reserve, so they 
can say that they have one of their boys over here.  I could have got out 
of it when the other boys got their discharge [referring to the Captain 
Ranking incident], only I wanted to do my bit like all other 
Canadians.101 
 
Unfortunately for Mike Foxhead, his Chiefs’ concerns about the welfare of their young 
men overseas proved prescient.  The Director of Military Estates contacted the 
Department of Indian Affairs on 10 May 1918 to inform them that Pte Foxhead had died 
in France in October 1917.102 
Whereas the Blood appealed to have their CPF contributions recognized and to 
thus receive equal treatment as white Canadians in terms of support for soldiers’ 
dependants, the Blackfoot instead sought an exchange of men for money.  The demands 
of wartime Canada were rife with negotiations over the nature of Native participation and 
treatment in wider events.  By the end of the war, Blackfoot donations totaled $4,200: 
two hundred dollars shy of ten percent of all Native donations during the war.103  This is 
a particularly impressive figure as the 737 Blackfoot (as of 1914) represented only 0.7% 
of the entire status Indian and Inuit population in the country and only 2.3% of the 
population of Native people belonging to bands that donated to war funds; the Blackfoot 
donations were only outdone by the File Hills Colony (of the residential school), who 
collected $8562 for various funds through aggressive collection drives.104  The Blackfoot 
experience represents a generally successful negotiation of multiple demands of the war 
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to control and direct how their community would survive the war – they paid for the 
freedom of their young men. 
 
The Six Nations and the War Bonds Campaigns 
The Six Nations, unlike the Blood or Blackfoot, did not donate money to the 
Canadian government.  Before any question of war bonds arose, the Six Nations insisted 
their fifteen-hundred dollar donation only go to Imperial authorities as their Allies, and 
that the British repay that money semiannually over a period of 15 years.105  This precise 
expression of Six Nations’ sovereignty contrasted with the Blood and Blackfoot’s 
outward declarations of loyalty in their donations, although each band was equally 
concerned in ensuring a particular and locally beneficial outcome through their financial 
offers.  The Six Nations were His Majesty’s Indian Allies, as a sovereign nation fighting 
alongside the British, and had been through the American Revolution and the War of 
1812 – their reserve on the Grand River in Southern Ontario was a land grant to Joseph 
Brant and his original 1500 settlers after the American Revolution.106  Yet in this new 
war, it was unclear to the Council and members if the Six Nations would be asked to 
participate as allies once again, or if the past century had sufficiently atrophied their 
sovereignty and position to the point of subjects to the British Crown.  
The Six Nations’ participation in the war generally involved a fair amount of give 
and take, much of it focused on this question of whether they were allies or loyal 
subjects.  While over three hundred men from the reserve volunteered, principally in the 
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114th Overseas Battalion, the Council itself rejected an offer from Colonel Hamilton 
Merritt in 1915 to form Six-Nations-only companies, as the Imperial War Department 
had not contacted the Chiefs directly.107  On-reserve political struggles between 
competing political and sectarian factions determined much of Six Nations’ participation 
in the war, which in turn was an extension of the debate over the role of the Six Nations 
within/with Canada and the Empire.108  The Chiefs’ concern for securing a good financial 
return on any investment, as well as any political concerns, informed their approach to 
the Victory Bond Campaigns. 
The Canadian government funded the war effort in part by borrowing from 
private citizens via Victory Bonds, War Savings Certificates and children’s War Saving 
Stamps.109  The first fifty million dollars worth of bonds, issued in 1915, had twice as 
many subscribers as needed, and the government continued chasing this home-grown 
source of funds in subsequent annual campaigns, dubbed Victory Loans in 1917.110  
Finance Minister Sir Thomas White argued that as increased production and higher prices 
for goods meant greater profits for Canadians firms and citizens, they could contribute 
some of the profit back to the war effort.111  Through the banks, subscribers bought five, 
ten or twenty year gold-backed bonds at a rate of five per cent return.112  
When representatives from the Brant County Victory Loan Committee arrived at 
the Six Nations Council house on 20 November 1917, they may have felt some 
trepidation.  Conscription’s implementation through the Military Service Act on 29 
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August 1917 sparked a general backlash across Native reserves, from protests to evasion, 
and the Six Nations proved no exception.  Throughout October and early November 
1917, a number of the Chiefs and band members, in particular those belonging to the 
traditionalist Longhouse religion, urged with tangible success the reserve’s male 
population to disobey the requirement to register with the Military authorities for the 
purposes of conscription.113  Only fifteen of an estimated three hundred eligible men had 
registered by the initial 17 November 1917 deadline.114   
The Brant County Victory Loan canvassers entered a reserve with a complicated 
record of participation in the war effort, and tension over the possibility of conscription 
did not help the canvassers.  Yet the Six Nations Council listened to Messrs. Hunter and 
Dodge of the Brant County Victory Loan Committee at the 20 November Council 
meeting.  The Chiefs understood the presenters’ point exceptionally clearly.  Whereas 
they currently received three percent interest on their capital funds held by the 
Department of Indian Affairs, Victory Bonds offered a five percent return.115  The 
Council had already discussed the possibility of purchasing War Bonds with the 
Brantford solicitor A.G. Chisholm in March 1917, who traveled to Ottawa to place the 
Council’s request to invest $150,000.00 in bonds.116  Departmental officials bristled at 
                                                
113 Members of the Six Nations’ Longhouses practiced a religion based on the adherence to the “Indian 
Way” as defined in the Code of Handsome Lake, a religious leader at late 18th and early 19th centuries. 
Religious services were performed in Iroquois languages, the religious ritual cycle was based on the 
agricultural cycle, marriages were largely informal but fidelity was highly valued.  Longhouse members 
and Christians lived largely separate from one another (and the former generally tried to limit its contact 
with whites as well) and the Council House at Ohsweken was one of the few regular meeting points for the 
two groups. Weaver, “The Iroquois,” 214-217. 
114 Superintendent Captain Gordon Smith to D.C. Scott 13 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 
452-20 Pt. 1. 
115 Minutes of the Six Nations Council Meeting 20 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 452-23 
Pt. 1. 
116 This money was alternately described as coming from the Six Nations’ “interest monies,” and their “war 
funds.”  List of Billing hours, A.G. Chisholm to the Six Nations Council 20 March 1917, LAC RG 10 
Volume 3195 File 492,946; A.G. Smith and Asa R. Hill to A.G. Chisholm 8 March 1917 LAC RG 10 
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Chisholm’s presence and the Council’s circumvention of their normal communication 
network.  Scott sent the Council messages vaguely alluding to the possibility of 
increasing the return on their Indian Trust Fund.117  Frustrated with Chisholm’s failure, 
the Six Nations Council refused to pay Chisholm an additional two hundred dollars for 
the travel expenses he requested in May.118  Yet the promise of a better rate of return 
germinated.  Six months later, after the visit from the representatives of the Brant County 
Victory Loan Committee, the Chiefs decided once again to transfer a portion of their 
band funds to Victory Bonds subscriptions.119 
The Department of Indian Affairs welcomed donations from Native bands to the 
CPF, the Belgian Relief Fund, and Canadian Red Cross, and even reinterpreted the Indian 
Act to facilitate large donations when a band’s interest funds were insufficient to meet 
their intended contributions.  However, Scott discouraged efforts to participate in the 
Victory Bond Campaign, which was a loan program rather than the above listed donation 
programs.  Canvassers visited numerous reserves in late 1917 and again in 1918 in search 
of Victory Bond subscribers, and advertising the bonds’ benefits both in terms of 
supporting the cause and the bond’s quality as an investment.  The Mississauga of 
Alnwick voted unanimously to buy two thousand dollars in bonds in 1917.120  The 
Blackfoot tried to contribute fifty thousand dollars to the 1917 Victory Loan campaign.  
In 1918, the Chippewa of Sarnia sought to transfer ten thousand dollars, claiming, “this 
                                                                                                                                            
Volume 3195 File 492,946; Minutes of the Six Nations General Council 8 March 1917 LAC RG 10 
Volume 3195 File 492,946. 
117 D.C. Scott to the Six Nations Council 28 March 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 3195 File 492,946. 
118 Minutes of the Six Nations Council 1 May 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 3195 File 492,946. 
119 Minutes of the Six Nations Council Meeting 27 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 452-23 
Pt. 1. 
120 Minutes of the Mississauga Council 14 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 452-23 Pt. 1; 
Indian Agent H.R. Coyle to Secretary J.D. McLean 16 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 
452-23 Pt. 1. 
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was done not as much for the extra percentage which is promised, as for the patriotic 
desire of the Council to help the Empire win the war.”121  In the same campaign, the 
Tsimshian at Metlakatla voted to transfer twenty thousand dollars in band funds, and 
claimed to have already subscribed to eight thousand in bonds.122  Scott denied all these 
requests, claiming their donations “would not be of any advantage to the country” 
because he claimed the bands received the same interest on their capital funds (even 
though the capital funds only paid 3%) as they would on the Victory loans, and “it would 
be of no advantage to transfer the money from one pocket to another.”123   
Similarly, Scott rejected the Six Nations’ request to use some of their band funds 
to purchase Victory Bonds.  Why should the Government transfer money from one 
Department to another (as the money would come directly to the Government through the 
Bond program), and pay more in interest?124  While the Department of Indian Affairs 
could stretch the Indian Act to justify withdrawing money from bands’ capital funds for 
the CPF or Red Cross – money which would have never been repaid as those were 
donations – Scott refused to allow bands a similar, and much more beneficial freedom of 
purchasing Victory Bonds, which would not only be repaid but at a better return than 
those bands currently enjoyed.  Scott simply believed the government had to pay the 
bands in they kept their money in band funds or if they bought war bonds, and he did not 
want to have to pay the extra 2% yield.  Using the Department’s Russian nesting doll 
logic -- that reserves are in Canada, and Canada is in the Empire, and the Empire is at war 
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-- in removing money from bands’ capital accounts, Victory Bonds, which were used 
directly to fund the war effort, seem as much if not a much more appropriate choice than 
CPF donations, which would support soldiers’ families, and a useful recruiting tool.  The 
Department of Indian Affairs, like government generally, was a cost-conscious entity, 
and Victory Bonds, while more beneficial to Native people than simply leaving their 
money in their capital funds, were more costly to the Government. 
Chief Inspector William Ditchburn of Southwestern British Columbia suggested a 
compromise that would allow Native people to participate in the Victory Loan Campaign, 
at least individually.  In the fall of 1918, the Inspector had observed that the Native 
people in his province “have been enjoying considerable prosperity for the past two 
years,” as the prices for their goods, such as fish, and their labour had increased.  As such 
Ditchburn believed they would “be in a position to purchase bonds when they are placed 
on the market” for the 28 October Victory Bond Campaign.125  Hoping to make this 
happen, the Inspector wanted his superiors in Ottawa to approve his “crusade” to 
advertise Victory Bonds to Natives in the province, and he asked for the necessary 
literature from the Victory Loan Committee.  If Native peoples outside of British 
Columbia had participated in previous campaigns, Ditchburn hoped to make full colour 
posters “showing to what extent the Indians outside of British Columbia helped when the 
last Loan was floated.”126  The Inspector hoped Native families would buy bonds using 
their growing incomes, rather than by drawing on band funds.  Although Indian Affairs 
Secretary John McLean liked the idea, and although the rate of return was the same on 
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Victory Bonds and Capital funds at five percent, nothing came of the plan.127  Just like 
the experience of Six Nations, the Department would not allow an organized attempt to 
buy Victory Bonds.  
 
Conclusion 
Beyond the question of Native nations’ relations with the Crown, Native 
donations altered their existing relationship with their Agents and the Department, and 
with other the wider Canadian population.  These donations also represent an attempt at 
(limited) financial freedom on the part of the Native councils and individuals, who lived 
uneasily under the gaze of their Agent.  When the Blood and Blackfoot made their 
financial contributions to the war, they insisted upon certain assurances in exchange for 
their contributions and used their influence as donors to push their respective interests 
with members of the Department, the CPF, and the CEF.  The Six Nations used the War 
Bonds program not only to advance their financial position but also as an assertion of 
control over their economic circumstances.  The Departmental officials’ criticism of the 
Six Nations’ employment of an outside lawyer to make their case directly to Ottawa, 
underlines that effort by both the government and the Six Nations’ to (re)negotiate their 
relationship, and the government’s advantage in that negotiation.   
The Department was a gatekeeper for Native donors, controlling the nature, 
amount, origin, and direction of most band councils’ contributions.  While many 
donations were accompanied by declarations that harkened back to (and sought to 
reinforce) nation-to-nation relationships, the process of donating and the exchanges 
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included, favoured a reality that privileged Indian Affairs as the steward of Native 
interests in Canada.  Chief F.W. Jacobs of the Kettle and Stony Points Chippewa was 
keenly aware of the Department’s hold on his peoples’ purse strings, as he asked if “the 
Tribes I represent would be allowed by the Indian Department to cast their mite out of 
their tribal funds…towards the enormous expenses bourne by Canada as help towards the 
Mother Country in its present struggle in Europe.”128  
The Department did more than allow such contributions, even reinterpreting the 
Indian Act to facilitate large donations, but prevented the purchase of war bonds.  From 
Native bands’ economic perspective, these two decisions make little sense, as the 
donations ate into capital funds, which money could only be made up by a substantial 
land surrender (or something of that nature), whereas war bonds would be repaid, and at a 
higher rate of return than the bands’ own capital funds.  Yet, from the Department’s view, 
donations displayed those bands’ commitment to the Empire’s interests.  By extension, 
the monies were sent to war funds, the donations could be interpreted as a step towards 
Native assimilation into Canadian civil society.  While purchasing war bonds could be 
interpreted in the same light, Scott saw this program as detrimental to governmental 
interests as it would impose a significantly larger cost upon the federal government than 
if bands purchased no bonds whatsoever.  The Department’s fundamental cost-
consciousness won out over any other consideration.  Thus, the Department disallowed 
attempts to participate in the War Bonds campaigns.    
As much as the Department sought to control Native donations to war funds, the 
decision to donate originated at the Council or individual level.  While most donations 
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were presented in pro-Empire language, and no doubt such sentiments were largely 
genuine and the product of the various relationships between Native nations and the 
British Crown, this is not the only dimension in which to consider Native contributions to 
Canadian war funds.  Within and underneath the patriotic and imperial pronouncements, 
bands used their donations a form of tangible exchange.  Band councils donated freely, 
but they expected this would buy them certain credit, whether that be the freedom to 
equal access such funds as in the case of the Blood, or exempt them from sending men to 
the front, as the Blackfoot proposed.  These two strategies, as well as the unsuccessful 
efforts to buy war bonds, represent Native councils’ and individuals’ efforts to control the 
nature and extent of their communities’ participation in the war itself – both in terms of 
what and how they would give, and what they would get back.  Native peoples attempted 
to protect and forward their interests as they stepped into the war, by ensuring they would 
have equal access to the benefits to non-Native peoples, in determining to what extent 
they would contribute to the war effort, and how they would spend their wealth. 
 61 
Chapter 2:  
Soldiering 
  
 Joseph Halkett left Lac La Ronge in Northern Saskatchewan in late March 1916 
when he joined the 107th Battalion, former Tory MP Glenlyon Campbell’s “cowboys and 
Indians” unit.1  Convalescing in England in the summer of 1918, Halkett wrote his former 
schoolmistress, Winifred Stapleton, of the Anglican school on the west shore of Lac La 
Ronge.  Although still in pain from an injury to his arm, Halkett assured Miss Stapleton 
“I am willing to go over again to France, when I am called up…what a lovely war isn’t 
it.”2  On 10 November 1918 while fighting in France, he wrote again.  Halkett spent the 
bulk of his letter regaling Miss Stapleton with his time sightseeing in London.3  Halkett 
also reflected on his other correspondents, including a woman named Caroline with 
whom “it will be all English talking now when I get back home, between her + me.  Noe 
[sic] more Cree.”4 
Joseph Hackett’s letter offers a glimpse into the lives of Native soldiers, a rare 
occurrence among the approximately four thousand Native soldiers who enlisted in the 
CEF.5  It was “the desire of the Department that Indians enlist.”6  This was more than 
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patriotic fervor however.  The Department of Indian Affairs encouraged men like Halkett 
to enlist because they believed it would teach Native men discipline, instill a sense of 
membership in the Empire and in Canada rather than nation-to-nation allegiances.7  In 
other words, the Department saw soldiering as a method of assimilating Native men and 
the communities to which they returned.  Scott expressed this belief in the Department’s 
annual report for 1918: “Undoubtedly, the experience and knowledge of the world and its 
affairs which will be gained by the Indians soldiers will, upon their return from the war, 
exert a progressive influence upon life on the reserves.”8  At first glance therefore, 
Halkett’s assertions would seem to confirm the Department’s hopes. Yet Native soldiers 
had at least two identities – as soldiers and as Native men – and the respective rights and 
obligations of each identity were not always complimentary.  The foray outside the 
reserve was a collectively ambiguous experience, where the restrictions of the Indian Act 
stood in direct contradiction to the promises of equality with their non-Native comrades.  
                                                                                                                                            
Indian (section 2(f) of the 1907 copy of the act), and many people who did not meet this legal definition but 
who were ethnically and culturally Native, and even living on reserve, were excluded.  Yet it is entirely 
likely that someone who self-identified as Native, and whom others (outside the Department) identified as 
Native, would be subject to the same racial stereotypes and barriers as status Indian men, and therefore 
ought not to be overlooked if examining the Native war experience.  Yet a researcher may find these men 
hard to identify based uniquely on CEF records (as there may/will not be records with the Department of 
Indian Affairs), which only document such signifiers as address, skin colour (which can be easily 
misinterpreted and vary depending on who filled out the attestation form), or religion, and none of these 
offer definitive proof that an individual was Native, Aboriginal or Métis (by the modern definitions).  
Therefore, it is likely that without a massive oral history and genealogy study of Aboriginal peoples, the 
record of all Native soldiers in the CEF will remain a vague approximation.  The figure of four thousand 
was a Departmental estimate from May 1918, and has generally been employed by historians. Secretary 
J.D. McLean to Indian Agent Renaud 28 May 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3. 
6 Indian Agent W.J. Dilworth to Secretary J.D. McLean 17 January 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 
452-13. 
7 Indian Agent Thomas Deasy to D.C. Scott 22 November 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13; 
Reverend Dr. Robert John Renison to Lt-Col. Cecil Williams, Chief Recruiting Officer for Canada 14 
December 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13; D.C. Scott to Inspector S.J. Jackson 9 February 
1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13; Sgt W.R. Taylor to D.C. Scott 11 April 1917 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6766 File 452-13. 
8 Dominion of Canada Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31 
1918 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1918), 14.  Scott declared this effort a success in his report a year later: 
Dominion of Canada Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31 1919 
(Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1919), 27. 
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This discussion of Native soldiers focuses on two streams to highlight the 
ambiguities of Native soldiers’ lives.  The first stream follows the structures, 
relationships and assumptions that both facilitated and hindered the recruitment of Native 
men.  The second stream analyzes the extension of the Indian Act’s influence over Native 
soldiers on questions of drinking and desertion.  The focus of these twin narratives is not 
on the experience of combat but the negotiations surrounding a Native soldier’s off-
reserve life.  Scholarly attention has already been paid to the social and institutional 
attitudes about and against Native men as soldiers that affected what forms of service 
were open to Native men, closed many avenues for promotion, and to the veterans’ 
pursuit of equality with the Canadian Government after the war.9  In practice however, 
Native soldiers occupied an ambiguous place between the reserve and the CEF, because 
they continued to carry some of the restrictions contained in the Indian Act. 
 
Getting into Uniform 
In December 1916, approximately one year after the CEF officially allowed 
Native men to enlist, Anglican Archdeacon Dr. Robert John Renison of Hamilton 
suggested to the Military “the possibility of utilizing the manpower of the Indians and 
half-breeds of Northern Canada for National Service” who “have never been given any 
opportunity of doing anything for their country.”10  Renison argued that the mostly Cree 
and Ojibway men (“which have similar language and temperament”) living in Northern 
Ontario and Quebec represented “the finest axemen in Canada” and were excellent 
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“packers” who would “be of special value in a construction battalion.”11  Renison 
believed that Native men from northern Manitoba and Saskatchewan could join this 
proposed unit, as “I think that Military Service if voluntarily undertaken by the younger 
and more adventurous might be of great service in making the next generation better and 
brighter Canadians.”12  Renison believed his experience as a reserve missionary would be 
useful in appealing to Native men, and he wanted to recruit them with the help of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company and Revillon Frères Fur Trading Company.   
A number of individual Native men tried to enlist at the war’s outset.  Some 
succeeded, but more suffered the emasculating embarrassment of rejection, despite being 
“strong, hardy men, who would have made excellent soldiers.”13  This official exclusion 
resulted from the fear among some Militia officers, specifically Surgeon-General Eugene 
Fiset, that Germans would not “extend the privileges of civilized warfare” to Native 
soldiers.14  Privately to Scott, Fiset cast doubt on some Native men’s potential as soldiers, 
particularly those of the British Columbian coast, who were “all the Coast Type,” 
principally fishermen, and who “would not be suitable as soldiers.”15 An officer in British 
Columbia disparaged of Native soldiers generally, arguing that he did “not think the 
Indians [sic] would make a good soldier, as the main trait in his character is, that he 
                                                
11 Renison was specifically in the area between the CPR, the Nelson River, and Hudson’s Bay, Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Assistant Deputy and Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs J. D. McLean to Surgeon General 
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14 Walker, 1-26. 
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Scott. DOC Military District No. 11 to the Secretary of the Militia Council 23 March 1916 LAC RG 24 
Volume 4662 MD 11 File 99-256.    
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cannot be depended upon.”16  This assessment was not universal, however, as the 
relatively junior Indian Agent Alex J. Duncan of Cape Croker was among those who 
challenged this prohibition on Native enlistment.  Duncan assured Ottawa that many of 
the men in his agency would have enlisted if possible – this was a great missed 
opportunity when “the country is asking for recruits.”17   
Need played an important role in reversing the Militia’s decision.  The initial high 
level of voluntary enlistment among Canadians dropped at the end of 1915, while the 
CEF’s losses on the battlefield mounted.  Prime Minister Borden doubled the CEF’s 
authorized strength from 250,000 in October 1915 to 500,000 for January 1916, but the 
casualty lists proved to Canadians that the war would be neither quick nor cheap.  Work 
was plentiful at home thanks to numerous war contracts, making eager new recruits a rare 
commodity.18   
The increase in the CEF’s authorized strength, and therefore in recruitment goals, 
coincided with an appeal from Dunnville, Ontario, MP F.R. Lalor to Minister of Militia 
Sam Hughes to recruit on the Six Nations’ reserve near Brantford, Ontario.  Hughes 
acquiesced to the request.19  While Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence Surgeon-
General Eugene Fiset, author of the original anti-Native enlistment circular, remained 
skeptical of Native soldiers’ potential, in early December 1915 recruiters were informed 
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they could enlist Native men generally.20 Renison’s suggested recruitment campaign 
mirrored the Department of Indian Affairs’ tactic of employing members of its Ottawa 
and Agency services, and its allies, most notably missionaries.21  The Militia recognized 
the Department of Indian Affairs as the chief authority over Native people, and the two 
government bodies established a partnership directed towards the recruitment of Native 
men.22  This relationship consisted of an exchange of information and personnel.  Indian 
Affairs forwarded the Militia the names and addresses of all its Agents, while recruiters 
sent those Agents recruitment literature in advance of their coming, and even help fill out 
attestation papers.23  
The Department did not approach all Native men equally, however preferring 
those who lived closer to non-Native populations, who spoke English and who were 
generally “more integrated in white society than many others,” particularly when 
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recruiting for combat units.24  For those Native men generally isolated from regular 
avenues of recruitment but not too isolated to remove them from consideration, an Indian 
Agent’s travels facilitated recruitment.  Lt. Joseph Jones, formerly the Agent at the 
Norway House Agency, accompanied a treaty payment expedition in northern Manitoba, 
as he believed it was the “most opportune time to meet the Indians.”25  Some Agents 
could even argue the Militia’s case in a Native language, adding another weapon to the 
recruiter’s arsenal.26   
While the Department encouraged its outside service, primarily its Agents, to help 
the Militia’s recruitment effort for combat units, these were largely ad hoc interventions, 
based on the appeals and the common interests of enthusiastic Agents and local Militia 
officers.27  In one limited exception, the Department sent Ottawa-based Iroquois 
translator Charles A Cooke to help Agents and officers recruit for the 114th Overseas 
Battalion, first at Six Nations and later in the communities along Georgian Bay and on 
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Manitoulin Island.28  The aid the Department offered to forestry and construction 
battalions was more organized and over a far broader territory.29  Perpetually doubtful 
about the potential of Native soldiers, Surgeon General Eugene Fiset suggested to Scott 
in January 1917 that “it might perhaps be possible to utilize Indians and Half-breeds, 
either in the Railway Construction or Forestry Battalions,” as the CEF desperately tried to 
meet its 500,000-man target.30  Scott suggested that some of their employees could 
dedicate themselves entirely to recruiting for these non-combat units.31  Scott chose 
Inspector Andrew Mann Tyson of the Northern British Columbia Inspectorate to enlist 
250 Native men in that province (for an unspecified unit), and Inspector Samuel Jacob 
Jackson of the Lake Manitoba Inspectorate to recruit throughout Manitoba specifically 
for Major Daniel Sprague of the 190th Overseas Battalion, based out of Winnipeg.32   
In eastern Ontario and western Quebec, the Department wrote a letter of 
introduction for Charles Cooke and Lt. Frank H.H. Williams of the 256th Railway 
Construction Battalion, “who are authorized to take charge of the recruiting of Indians 
and Half-breeds,” and created a Mohawk-language pamphlet for the unit.33  Similarly, 
Scott wrote an encouraging letter to the Chiefs of Treaty 5 (covering much of modern 
central and northern Manitoba, parts of Saskatchewan and Ontario) for the above-
mentioned Lt. Joseph Jones, explaining the honour and value in turning “the forests of 
                                                
28 McGowan and Lackenbauer, 103-107; McGowan, “In the Interests of the Indians.” 
29 Recruiters (Indian Affairs-based and not) sought Native men for both active and construction and 
forestry battalions, but James Walker argued that the shunting of Native soldiers into forestry, railway and 
construction battalions, rather than fighting units, was informed by pre-war Canadian racial attitudes 
reflected in the CEF. Walker, 1-2. 
30 Surgeon General Eugene Fiset to D.C. Scott 11 January 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13. 
31 D.C. Scott to Surgeon General Eugene Fiset 15 January 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13. 
32 D.C. Scott to Inspector A.M. Tyson 15 January 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13; D.C. Scott 
to Inspector S.J. Jackson 15 January 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13; D.C. Scott to Inspector 
S.J. Jackson 23 January 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13. 
33 D.C. Scott, circular to Indian Agents 7 February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13. 
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England and Scotland to the use of the Army in the Field.”34  Although it never employed 
Archdeacon Renison’s particular plan, Indian Affairs came to share his belief and 
enthusiasm for recruiting Native men for non-combat battalions – seeking out the Native 
men who fit Renison’s description as “the finest axemen in Canada.”  There was a 
general belief that whatever Native men did in their civilian lives, so too should they do 
as soldiers.  Although a similar trend existed for so-called “sportsman” battalions, and for 
other specialty units for non-Native soldiers, these were primarily meant to increase 
enlistment among non-Native men, and even those seeking to take advantage of non-
Native soldiers’ extant skill sets were not exclusivist and race-based.35   
Many officials of the Department and the CEF explained their belief that some 
Native men would make excellent snipers and scouts in terms of their “natural qualities” 
rather than because of their learned abilities as hunters and trappers.36  Their attitude is 
similar to the anti-modern expectations of Native violence that white audiences brought 
to the contemporaneous Wild West shows studied in Philip Deloria’s work.37  Although 
volunteers in a (largely) citizen army equipped with modern weaponry, the Department 
emphasized Native soldiers’ anti-modern qualities.  While many Native men believed 
they continued a warrior tradition, white observers reduced such sentiments to a question 
                                                
34 D.C. Scott to the Chiefs of Treaty of 5 22 May 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13. 
35 Brown & Loveridge, 60. 
36 Reverend George Prewer to Secretary J.D. McLean 16 January 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 3180 File 
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of deterministic biology, that the “old fighting is still latent in his [a Native soldier’s] 
nature.”38   
While some recruiters looked for certain skill sets in their soldiers, others 
considered the residential school students as potential enlistees, especially when drill 
formed a part of the curriculum.39 Lieutenant-Colonel Glen Campbell of the 107th 
Overseas Battalion appealed to Scott regarding the Indian schools at Elkhorn and 
Brandon “asking how many boys are there, approaching the age of eighteen years, who 
would enlist and who would be physically fit.”40  At the risk of offending worried 
parents, Campbell assured Scott that these boys “would be under closer and more kindly 
supervision” in his battalion “than in any other Battalion in the west [of Canada].”41  
Although Scott believed “there should be some good material at Elkhorn,” as the students 
“have had physical drill for some years,” the bureaucrat feared “serious complaint” from 
parents if the Department “used our influence” among students.42  While he was prepared 
                                                
38 Thomas Whitebeans to D.C. Scott 7 February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13; “Indians in 
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to yield to their concerns, Scott claimed that any “older Indians…actively engaged in 
preventing the youths from enlisting,” were “breaking their treaty obligations” of loyalty 
to the British Crown.43  Scott asserted that personal visits to reserves would be more 
successful than canvassing the residential schools.44  Yet in his capacity as official 
recruiter for the forestry and construction battalions in Manitoba, Inspector S.J. Jackson 
sought the cooperation of the principals of both the Portage la Prairie Indian Boarding 
School and the McKay School.45   
A year previous, Principal Reverend Brouillet of the Kenora Boarding School 
wrote to Ottawa requesting a discharge for an underage orphan who was being recruited 
from his school.46  The Department’s response suggests either deliberate 
misinterpretation or a constructive misunderstanding of the Principal’s request. Scott 
assured him the boy in question “may be given permission to enlist” if he is physically 
fit; other boys with parents should be similarly allowed to enlist if they passed the 
medical exam and their parents consented.47  Whereas the Principal believed having no 
parents was an impediment to enlistment, it seems his superiors saw this as one less 
hurdle to getting the boy into uniform.  In at least one case, Scott dismissed the efforts of 
one parent, J.K. Gabriel, who argued he had the right to disallow his son Charles’ 
enlistment “according to Indian law.”  Scott dismissed the father as “not well balanced” 
                                                                                                                                            
Elgin Industrial School, D.C. Scott to Principal S.R. McVitty 25 January 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 3180 
File 452, 124-1. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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and that his “facts and assertions are entirely wrong.”48  While Scott may have been 
prepared to accept a parent’s refusal in some cases, those refusals did not dissuade Scott 
and others from contemplating recruiting, and even pursuing, young Native men for 
military service.   
The Militia’s use of missionaries and Indian Agents to facilitate communication 
with potential Native recruits bears certain similarities to their approach to recruiting 
outside reserves.  At the war’s outbreak, Minister Hughes rejected the existing 
mobilization plan in favour of local Militia units’ recruiting in their localities.49  By the 
fall of 1915, the Militia expanded this locally focused recruitment policy when they 
authorized enthusiastic citizens and communities to raise battalions, assuming they could 
cover the cost of recruiting.50  The Militia relied on patriotic and influential civilians, 
including such officials as mayors, to disseminate their message: “Local Militia officers 
and CEF commanders called leading citizens together, told them what was needed, and 
suggested appropriate organizational strategies.”51  Therefore, the practice of employing 
Indian Agents on reserves can be understood as an extension of the Militia’s general 
approach of alliances with local authorities.  Yet, although a mayor or a minister might 
have a lot of sway with their listeners, an Indian Agent’s power on a reserve went much 
farther: it extended to the political, social, and economic spheres of Native peoples’ lives 
and blurred those lines when he stood and advocated for enlistment.  Although the Militia 
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followed a common pattern in their partnership with Indian Agents, the Indian Agent-
cum-recruiter blurred the lines between the government bodies in the eyes of their Native 
audiences. 
  This could be more than an overlap of authority figures – some councils and 
individuals used the agent-cum-recruiter to discuss disputes over questions of land, 
financial support or Indian Act-based authority.52  F. Onodeych Loft complained that a 
1911 amendment to the Indian Act that allowed for the removal of an Indian reserve 
when it is within a municipality of 8,000 or more presented “a serious obstacle to 
recruiting among the Indians.”  Loft asserted that in many of the communities he visited 
the legislation was “regarded with suspicion and mistrust” as a threat to their homes and 
land.53  Scott dismissed Loft’s assertion that this portion of the Indian Act was hindering 
recruitment.  Although he acknowledged that “a special officer,” likely the above-
mentioned Charles Cooke, asserted independently that this section of the Indian Act was 
mentioned as “one of the items of oppression which the Department was using towards 
the Indians,” at recruitment meetings, the results of these meetings belied the concern, as 
“we have been fairly successful in recruiting among the Indians.”54  Despite Scott’s 
dismissal, that the Indian Act came up in a recruitment meeting points to a negotiation 
around Native peoples’ participation in the war effort, where the CEF’s need for soldiers 
opened a potential opportunity to push for other interests.  Recruitment could become a 
form of exchange that played on the mixture of authority Departmental authorities-cum-
recruiters, where some Native listeners framed the need for volunteers in terms of 
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specific civilian concerns such as road maintenance or broader legal questions of land 
claims.55 
 Many councils sought the Department’s protection against recruiters, asking the 
gatekeepers to close the doors against unwanted visitors who wanted take their sons 
away.  The Blackfoot appealed to the Department in this manner, as discussed earlier.  At 
the Parry Island Council Meeting of 2 April 1917, John Nenomeneesec and Elijah 
Tabobingdong forwarded the resolution that “the Indian Department be asked to use their 
influence that the Indians be not coerced to enlist as volunteers and go to the front.”56  
Chief John Jacobs of the St. Regis argued with his Agent, F.E. Taillon, over whether the 
Department or the Chiefs could prevent men from enlisting.57  Taillon told the Chief that 
no one could stop someone from volunteering, and then tried to shame the Chief (“arouse 
his patriotism”) with stories of other bands who donated money to wartime charities. 
Jacobs insisted he would take his protest against recruiting on his reserve to the Governor 
General if necessary.58  The Chief at the Pas in Manitoba told his people “they should 
wait for word from the Department before joining,” and explained to the Indian Agent-
turned-recruiter Sgt W.R. Taylor that their treaty dictated they would be asked to fight 
“only when the king was hard pressed.”59  While Taylor dismissed the treaty discussion 
as a remnant of the “old heathen days,” the recruiter asked Scott for a circular from the 
Department for Agents and Chiefs alike to encourage enlistment.60   
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58 Ibid. 
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At meeting of Chiefs at Cook’s Ferry, British Columbia, attendees expressed 
displeasure over the recruitment of “mere boys…without the knowledge of either the 
Chiefs or their parents.”61  As a result, the Officer Commanding Military District No. 11 
(British Columbia) published an order “directing that no Indians are to be enlisted 
without first obtaining the consent of the Chiefs of the tribes to which the Indians 
belong.”62  When Indian Affairs Secretary J.D. McLean informed Agent John F. Smith of 
the order, he warned the Agent that this policy “places considerable trust in the judicious 
judgment and patriotism of the Chiefs.”63  Desirous that Native leadership should not 
seriously undermine recruitment, McLean instructed Smith to “make it clear to them that 
the responsibility resting upon them in this matter is not slight and that they should be 
very careful not to abuse it.”64   
The acknowledgement of the Department’s protective role extended to individual 
Native soldiers.  Robert Franklin appealed to the Department “as a ward of the 
government,” to facilitate his transfer from the 139th Overseas Battalion to another unit 
where he could continue to play in the brass band.65  Franklin felt the Department “will 
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certainly help me out,” as without intervention he would not obtain the transfer.66  Many 
other Native soldiers appealed to their Agent, or to the Department generally, to relieve 
them from service, although very few of these sorts of appeals fell on sympathetic ears.67 
 Native men did not always perceive Indian Affairs authorities as a friendly 
middleman.  William Louis Kahgee, James Williams, Mrs. Laura Shawbedees, Elijah 
Morie, Joseph James, Mrs. Bertie Besite, and Mrs. Martha Stevens all sent appeals to the 
Department and to Lord Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, asserting that their Agent 
had threatened men in the Saugeen Agency with imprisonment or refusal of treaty monies 
if they would not enlist in the 160th Overseas Battalion.68  Lord Grey sent all the petitions 
back to the Department, with the assurance “no doubt you will take such action as may be 
necessary in the matter.”69  This was not the first sign of hostility against recruitment in 
the Agency, as Agent Thomas A. Stout had complained two months prior that Chief 
George Fisher of Muncey had “been the means of disturbing the Indians,” when the Chief 
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offered and was paid to release any Native soldiers from service.70  The Department 
officials suggested to Stout that he ask Fisher to leave the reserve within 24 hours or risk 
being fined or imprisoned under Section 124 of the Indian Act.71  This fear of Indian 
Agents/recruiters occurred in the Norway House Agency as well, as the Chief of the 
Island Lake band specifically requested that his Agent, Dr. Norquay, “not bring down 
anyone to recruit their young men” when the Agent distributed treaty payments.72  On 
that same treaty-payment journey, Norquay found “the Indians were rather slow about 
coming to meet us until they were assured that we were not recruiting.”73  Some 
perceived Indian Agents involvement in recruitment as conflicted authority that could 
coerce young Native men into uniform. 
The Department estimated that “4,000 odd” Native men enlisted in the CEF.74  
These men may have enlisted because they wanted to prove and exercise their manhood, 
like John Redbean, who chided his un-uniformed friend that service was where you 
proved “you had two stones on you like a man,” or if they were like William Cleary of 
Pointe Bleue, who was “plein de bravoure au Coeur defendre son Roi contre l’ennemi,” 
or for the promise of “giving them [Native veterans] the right of the franchise or any 
special concession on government lands,” or even the promise of war trophies and the 
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continuance of the warrior tradition.75  Ultimately the decision to enlist rested with Native 
men themselves, in spite of the Departmental gatekeepers of Agents, Inspectors, and 
sympathetic missionaries who delivered the CEF’s message on reserves, and despite the 
rare incidents of coercion.  Although Indian Affairs played a critical role in the way 
Native men were recruited, fundamentally the choice was their own. 
 
Alcohol and Native soldiers 
One of the starkest points of difference between the restrictions imposed on 
Native soldiers in comparison with the freedoms of non-Native soldiers centered on the 
consumption of alcohol.76  The Canadian government had established a complete 
prohibition of alcohol for Native peoples almost immediately after they took control of 
Native Affairs from the British in the mid 19th century.77  The government asserted 
Native men had to be sober to become Canadian citizens, but other citizens were not held 
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to this standard.  The race-based regulation of drink and drinking spaces became a 
physical and legislative barrier between Native and non-Native peoples.78  Yet as Native 
men left the reserve for the battlefield, these boundaries became blurred, and questions of 
enforcement emerged. 
In January 1918, a police officer in Kamsack, Saskatchewan, inquired of the 
Department if he should treat local Native soldiers as “Indians or British subjects.”  In 
particular, the officer wanted to know if Native soldiers were allowed to drink 
“intoxicating liquor.”79  Secretary McLean assured the police officer that “Indians who 
enlist still retain their status as Indians, and are subject to the provisions of the Indian 
Act,” and hence could not drink alcohol.80  
This was a consistent Departmental response to a persistent question.  In June 
1916, Chief Charles Jacobs of Walpole Island received a letter from some of the enlisted 
men of his reserve who were in England with the 149th Overseas Battalion, claiming, 
“they are not equally treated as the Whites.”81  The men attested they had enlisted with 
the promise of equal treatment and rights as white soldiers; “the understanding in the first 
place we was to be treated in every respect as another soldier in Canada,” which they 
claimed had been broken.82  The men pointed to their exclusion from public hotels 
because “we were Indians,” as proof of this unequal treatment and “if we do not get those 
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privileges [of white soldiers] We will take the Kings [sic] uniform off.”83  The men 
asserted their situation was so untenable they would live in England according to their 
nation’s original treaty with the Crown, abandoning any association with the Canadian 
government.   
The legal prohibition and social prejudice against Native drinking displayed the 
Indian Act’s ability or intent to keep Native men separate from the rest of the CEF.  
Indian Affairs Secretary McLean asserted that the Walpole Island men’s impression that 
“because they have donned the uniform, they would be privileged to obtain liquor from 
bars,” was mistaken as “it is still an offense to under the Indian Act to sell liquor to an 
Indian even if in uniform.”84  McLean assured Agent McCallum that the Department 
would take up any serious complaints with the Native soldiers’ Commanding Officer, 
“but the charges would have to be definite and consider sufficient importance to take this 
action.”  Being banned from pubs and bars did not have “sufficient importance.”85  
McLean believed the alcohol prohibition contained within the Indian Act ought to be 
maintained regardless if a Native man had joined the CEF – a Native man in uniform was 
an Indian first, and a soldier second. 
The social prejudice against Native men was illustrated in one extreme case.  
James Chum, a Cree man from Missanabie, Ontario, and a member of the 227th Overseas 
Battalion, went to Hearst, Ontario, to recruit other Native men on 3 June 1916.  On 5 
June, while Chum was entertaining another Native man, “prospective recruit” Robert 
Shesheguan in his room at the Hearst Hotel, two men not in uniform, Constable W.E.B. 
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MacDonell, a deputized employee of the Canadian Pacific Railway and former member 
of the Royal North West Mounted Police, and Robert Golightly, an Ontario game 
warden, broke into Chum’s room. They demanded to know where Chum and Shesheguan 
obtained their whiskey.  The two had a bottle of wine, although reports varied 
significantly as to the degree of their drunkenness, from complete sobriety to utter 
intoxication.86  MacDonell had apparently received a tip from an Anglican curate named 
Heaven that there were drunken Native men around Hearst, and he brought Golightly 
with him to the Hearst Hotel because “I know of old what trouble was always had in 
arresting an Indian when he is full of booze.”87  Chum identified himself as a member of 
the “King’s Men,” but Golightly struck Chum on the head with a billy club.  Chum was 
able to force the two men from his room, but the altercation continued in the hallway, 
where Chum kicked or attempted to kick Golightly, who hit the soldier as many as six 
times around his head.  The local doctor, who attested that Chum’s wounds were very 
serious but that he was not drunk, dressed Chum’s wounds while Chum was handcuffed 
in the hotel kitchen.  MacDonell and Golightly then walked or dragged Chum through 
Hearst to the local rail yards and handcuffed him to a binder wheel, either kneeling 
(according to Chum’s commanding officer Lieutenant Lyness) or lying down (according 
to MacDonell himself) until a railroad official ordered Chum removed several hours 
later.88   
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In what Lieutenant Lyness decried as “a grave injustice,” Chum was found guilty 
of assaulting Golightly.  Lyness described a veritable comedy of errors at the trial, where 
a confused Chum (whom both a doctor believed and a later medical examination 
confirmed was suffering from a concussion) needed a translator to explain the charges 
(which Lyness believed the soldier still did not understand after translation), and the only 
evidence was entered was Chum’s own admission (made at the trial) that he kicked 
Golightly.89  Conversely, MacDonell defended the trial, as “the Indian was proved guilty 
of his own admission and it was not necessary to bring in any evidence.”90   
Despite the month Chum spent in the hospital at Chapleau after the trial, at first 
Lyness was the only authority figure willing to defend the soldier, as “a peaceful 
citizen.”91  There was significant variation in how those involved in the affair described 
each other and the events in question.  MacDonell swore that not only was Chum not the 
peaceful citizen that Lyness claimed, but that Chum had been previously arrested several 
times, and had remarked when handcuffed that “the last ones I had on were brass ones.”92  
Similarly, although MacDonell was a deputized CPR employee and Golightly was a 
game warden, MacDonell described Golightly as a “police constable,” and Chief 
Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police A.P. Sherwood described both as “peace 
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officers.”93  Commissioner Sherwood also suggested Lyness was “perhaps…disposed to 
put too much in confidence [and] is therefore not very reliable.”94 
 Unfortunately for Chum, the Deputy Ministers of Militia, Justice and the 
Department of Railways and Canals initially sided with MacDonell’s version of events.95  
Neither MacDonell nor Golightly found any whiskey, and therefore their initial incursion 
into Chum’s room proved unjustified.  Nor did the clear savagery of Golightly’s beating 
alter the authorities’ decision to side with his attackers.  What is apparent is that Chum 
and Shesheguan had alcohol in their possession, the popular tonic Turner’s Invalid Wine, 
which was either deemed analogous to being drunk or to necessarily leading to that 
possibility.  Regardless of the true motivation, the presumption allowed two men of 
dubious authority to arrest Chum and Shesheguan as violently as necessary.  The 
suggested threat of a potentially intoxicated Native man seemed to demand the most 
severe response.   
Only the evidence of the doctors at Chapleau eventually swayed the observers.  
For the sake of completeness, Surgeon-General Eugene Fiset requested a report from the 
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hospital in Chapleau, where Chum had stayed from 10 June after his trial until 5 July.96  
Dr. S.A. Wilkinson reported that Chum had been admitted with a severely swollen head 
and three scalp wounds of between one and two inches in length, two of which were 
emitting “considerable discharge.”  The doctor asserted Chum was in “serious condition” 
when admitted, and is “fortunate in making such a successful recovery.”97  Based on this 
evidence, the Deputy Minister of Justice informed Chief Commissioner Sherwood, “this 
Indian [Chum] must have received pretty severe treatment at the hands of the police, and 
it is very doubtful in my mind whether they [MacDonell and Golightly] were justified by 
the necessities of the case in going to far.”98  Yet as Chum had not been sent to jail for the 
assault, the deputy ministers and officers concerned, Lyness excepted, were prepared to 
leave it in Chum’s hands any decision to prosecute MacDonell and Golightly.   
 Painted in stark terms, James Chum’s ordeal demonstrates how race trumped the 
rights and opportunities of the citizen soldier.  This tension between both the legal 
definition of and the social assumptions about the Indian and the soldier, the former 
trumped the latter, as manifested in how Native men were recruited, what service they 
were thought capable of, and what they were allowed to do once in uniform.  Just as in 
the case of war funds and Victory bonds, the Indian Act placed Native people in a 
different position from non-Native peoples, restricting their behaviour and directing them 
towards outcomes the Department preferred.  This concern on the part of Indian Affairs 
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to use soldiering as means to direct Native men’s behaviour is also clear in their pursuit 
of Native deserters. 
 
Desertion 
While the restrictions contained within the Indian Act followed a Native soldier 
off the reserve, Stephen Shawkeence and Joel Pewaush of Kettle Point hoped the 
Department would keep the white soldiers away from their reserve.  Unlike the Blackfoot 
who wanted to keep recruiters away however, the soldiers who concerned Shawkeence 
and Pewaush entered Kettle Point looking for a very specific target: the deserter Moses 
Wolfe.  Wolfe had enlisted in the 149th Overseas Battalion on 28 December 1915, and 
was described as of “very good” in “conduct and character.”99  When at home on leave in 
the fall of 1916, Wolfe found his baby very ill and his wife apparently dying.  He decided 
to stay with his ailing family after his leave ended.  When the soldiers arrived on the 
reserve in early November to arrest Wolfe, they shot the reticent now-deserter in the 
shoulder. One witness claimed a soldier shot Wolfe as the result of a confrontation, while 
The Globe reported that Wolfe had been shot while the soldiers pursued him.100  Later 
evidence suggested Wolfe and the two officers spoke to Wolfe at his home for at least an 
hour and a half, in perfect peace.  When Wolfe continued to refuse to leave the reserve, 
Pte Robert Finnigan drew his revolver.  Frightened, Wolfe ran and Finnigan shot him 
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through the shoulder. Wolfe was able to get away and when he returned home wounded 
(and still free), Wolfe laid complaint against Finnigan.101 
In the wake of the shooting, Shawkeence and Pewaush demanded to know from 
the Department whether “an Army officer or Private from some company or Regiment 
have any rights to enter into [an] Indian Reservation to shoot an Indian Private or to force 
an Indian to go with them overseas.”102  The two men considered the soldiers’ actions an 
unacceptable breach of the separation between reserves and the rest of Canada, and of the 
century-old agreement between the Chippewa and the British Crown that the latter would 
never force the former to go to war.  They asserted “we don’t want a white man or any 
other man to enter into our reservation to shoot Indians like beasts,” or like the 19th 
century Indian hunters of the United States, to chase Native men like prey.  To emphasize 
the violence of this violation, they lamented that the soldier’s bullet “is inside of the 
Indians body yet” as a physical reminder of the soldiers’ trespass.103  Shawkeence and 
Pewaush demanded an explanation from the Department as to why the soldiers claimed 
they had the authority to enter the reserve and shoot a member of the band.  Why had 
Wolfe been treated like a white deserter, and the constitutional protection of the reserve 
been denied to him?  
Upon hearing of this “serious” matter, McLean insisted on a report from his 
Agent in Sarnia.  Subsequently, in January 1917, McLean informed Shawkeence and 
Pewaush that “the fault lay partly with Moses Wolfe himself,” for an enlisted soldier 
                                                
101 “Soldier Shot Indian Deserter From 140th Bn,” The Globe 20 November 1916 p.3. 
102 Stephen Shawkeence & Joel Pewaush to the Department of Indian Affairs 7 November 1917 LAC RG 
10 Volume 3180 File 452,124-1A. 
103 Ibid. 
 87 
“must conform to the laws and rules under which he lives” as a member of the CEF.104  
While Finnegan might have overreacted, McLean asserted Wolfe was still at fault as a 
deserter.  Finnegan was to be tried in a civilian court however, and McLean asserted 
“there was not [an] excuse for their [the soldiers] acting in this manner, and no doubt the 
court will mete out to them such punishment as is just and right.”105   
Finnegan was tried for the shooting – not for entering the reserve.  Therefore the 
trial only dealt with the most extreme of Shawkeence and Pewaush’s concerns.  The trial 
failed to address the foundational questions of the separation of Native and non-Native, 
and of who could act as gatekeeper between those two worlds.  Unfortunately for Wolfe, 
when he attended Finnegan’s arraignment in November two weeks after Shawkeence and 
Pewaush wrote to the Department, the Provost Marshall of the London military camp 
arrested him for desertion.  Both Finnegan and Wolfe were held at the military camp in 
London.106   
The Department did not endorse Wolfe’s desertion, regardless of his motive.  
However, Departmental officials believed that meddling white people -- one of a set of 
common refrains used to explain away Native resistance to Departmental authority -- or a 
Native agitator incited Native soldiers to desert, rather than genuine familial concerns, or 
even simply a dislike of service and homesickness. While there is no complete record of 
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the reasons why individual Native soldiers deserted, limited evidence suggests common 
motives: the pressing family concerns they found at home while on legitimate leave (as in 
the case of Wolfe), dissatisfaction with life in the CEF, and confusion about the nature of 
their commitment to the CEF (for example, some deserters believed they could stay home 
to seed their fields and would return when that was done).107  There is little evidence that 
these motives were unique to Native soldiers, and because this evidence is scant, it would 
be inappropriate to make a conclusion about a general pattern of Native desertion.  
Moreover, military authorities pursued very few of these deserters.  Additionally, unlike 
many of those on the battlefront, none of these Native deserters was sentenced or shot for 
leaving the service, whereas 222 Canadian soldiers were sentenced to death for desertion 
or cowardice and 25 were shot.108  This suggests a certain lax approach among the 
military authorities towards Native deserters, and that the wounding of Private Wolfe was 
an unfortunate exception. 
Indian Affairs nonetheless actively sought to stop Native soldiers from deserting.  
In September 1916, McLean sent a circular to the Department’s Indian Agents to 
counteract the rumors spread by “ill-disposed persons” that “Indians who have enlisted 
are not bound as whitemen to continue in the service.”109  A number of Native volunteers 
had left their battalions and McLean asked his Agents that they “make [it] known 
amongst your Indians that any such idea is erroneous, and that Indians are subject to the 
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same penalties for desertion and with be punished accordingly.”110  Indian Agents did not 
have the power to arrest deserters, but their position within the Native communities did 
allow them to spread information about the penalties for desertion and collect data on 
deserters themselves.111  Two months later Inspector W.E. Ditchburn of Southwestern 
British Columbia had heard “a number of Indians from one of the eastern provinces,” had 
deserted from their units and been prosecuted.  Ditchburn understood that Indian Agents 
or Native-hired counsel argued that as wards Native men were “not considered 
responsible persons,” under the law, and ergo they could not be considered guilty of 
desertion.  Ditchburn disagreed with the line of argument but he found that the military 
authorities in his province refused to prosecute Native deserters.112   
Scott also rejected the deserters’ wardship defense on the basis that the Indian Act 
only applied on the reserves, and that any action a Native person took off reserve was 
outside the Indian Act’s jurisdiction.113  This was in contradiction to the stance that the 
Department took on the issue of Native soldiers going to pubs.  Yet, although the 
question and answer might have been different, that the Indian Act (specifically the 
Department’s interpretation of that document) and the limitations it placed on Native 
soldiers influenced how war programs worked on reserves.   
In December 1916, the CEF declared that it would pardon deserters, “provided 
they surrender themselves to the officer commanding the unit to which they belonged,” if 
still in Canada and otherwise to the district commanding officer of any of the country’s 
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military districts within two weeks, by 15 December 1916.114  When Indian Affairs 
translator and clerk Charles Cooke was recruiting for the 256th Railway Construction 
Battalion among the Iroquois of southern Quebec in the winter of 1917, he collected 
information about deserters living around both Caughnawaga and St. Regis, and 
approximately forty living in the United States.  Agent Taillon at St. Regis believed these 
men were willing to surrender and join a Railway Construction Battalion, although 
Cooke later admitted he only heard of these men from their families and could not be 
certain of either their locations or intentions.115   
The ever pessimistic and disparaging Surgeon-General Fiset pointed out, “as they 
have specified [joining] a non-fighting Unit it would not appear that they are imbued with 
a great amount of courage.”116  Reluctantly, Militia authorities agreed to adjust the 
Militia’s policy and deadline on the deserter amnesty specifically for Native men to join 
Construction, Railway or Forestry Battalions “where there is evidence of a bona fide 
intention on the part of any Indians, now deserters, to return to the Service.”117  Cooke 
found few with any “bona fide” intention to rejoin the service, for while he “did all I 
could as becometh an officer of the Department in trying to get these men acquainted 
with the fact of the amnesty, but my offers either failed to reach them or were 
deliberately scourned [sic].”118  At St. Regis only one man, Angus Lazore of 
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Caughnawaga, took advantage of the amnesty and joined the 256th Railway Construction 
Battalion, while two men, Frank Muscle and Joe Hall, fled to the United States’ side of 
the reserve rather than reenlist.119  Muscle and Hall were arrested as deserters, but were 
released after paying ten dollars – it is unclear if this was bail or a fine – because no 
military representatives appeared at their hearing.  Two men at Caughnawaga, Joe Jacobs 
and Peter Bourdeau, sought out the amnesty, while five other known deserters living and 
working around Oka, including two working at the munitions factory at Lachine, knew of 
and refused to take the amnesty.120   
Cooke attributed this general disinterest in the amnesty to “the rebellious and 
impudent attitude of the Oka Indians who goad these men on to continue to defy the law 
of the land by desertion.”  This was not only a dangerous attitude due to the penalties 
deserters could face if caught.  It also represented a general disregard for Canadian law, 
which Cooke believed eroded the Department of Indian Affairs’ authority at Oka and 
therefore he argued,  
it would be in the interest of the Department…to have these deserters 
apprehended and dealt with by the proper military authorities.  Such a 
course of action on the part of the authority of the Government in the 
minds of these Indians…[would] bring back their senses to respect the law 
of the land.121 
 
Peter Delisle of Caughnawaga also welcomed prosecutions for deserters, but as he 
explained to Lt. Smith of the 256th he wanted a Native soldier tried as a “test 
case.”  Delisle argued this individual would be a minor under the law – according 
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to the Indian Act – and should therefore be “exempted from carrying out the 
obligations of his attestation papers on enlistment.” 122  
Delisle wrote directly to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs Roche, 
explaining that he and like-minded individuals at Caughnawaga wanted a judicial 
opinion on the status of Indian men, as wards or minors, in Military service “to 
test this case once and for all.”123  However, Scott argued that Native peoples’ 
status as wards of the Government, under the care of Indian Affairs, did not have 
an effect on their responsibility as military volunteers.  Instead, Scott stated that it 
was “impossible” for the Department to defend those Native men who “are not 
amenable to military discipline after having enlisted and taken the required oath 
of allegiance.”124  However, Fiset believed it would be “useless” to prosecute 
deserters at Caughnawaga as the military officials believed they would be unable 
to collect any evidence against the deserters among the population.125  
Try as it might, the Department could not wash its hands of Native deserters.  
Chief Skeet of No. 60 Rat Portage had three sons who deserted from the 141st Overseas 
Battalion.  Both he and Agent R.S. McKenzie had tried unsuccessfully to convince the 
three boys to return to their unit at the end of their furlough.  McKenzie projected this 
failure uniquely on Chief Skeet, however, whom the Agent assessed “does not appear to 
have any control over them [his sons].”126  Now Agent McKenzie wondered if the Skeet 
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brothers could collect their treaty payments while on the lam from military officials.127  
Technically the Indian Act contained no provision that would deny an entitled Indian his 
treaty payments if he deserted from the CEF, but McLean warned that all deserters 
should nevertheless take advantage of the amnesty.128   
In the summer of 1916, Frank Ennis, originally of Perth, New Brunswick, 
deserted from the 140th Overseas Battalion.  A year later, Ennis was living with six or 
seven other Native deserters in Caribou, Maine.  Agent Wotten, under whose jurisdiction 
Ennis’ family fell, believed “it would be much better for the families of these men if they 
were allowed to return home, and earn a living.”129  The Department would have to 
support their families if the deserters did not return home and to work. Yet, a year later, 
Florence Ennis wrote to Scott begging for his help.  Her husband Frank had been 
arrested, and she had lost her separation benefits, “but that is not my fault and I must 
have some food for myself and my small family.”130  Agent Wotten had done nothing to 
help Frances and her six children, so she looked to Scott, for “the only help I can get is 
from the Indian Department.”131  McLean confirmed that Frank Ennis had deserted, and 
his wife was now without any support outside what the Department could offer.132  Other 
women and Agents appealed to the Department with similar dilemma.133  The disruption 
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of loosing a breadwinner was further exacerbated when that breadwinner left the forces, 
and the only safety net was the Department. 
 
Conclusion 
A soldier by the name of Johnson wrote to Secretary McLean from France in 
December 1917.  After two years at the front, Johnson wanted the Department to bring 
him home to Canada to see his wife and children.  Johnson told McLean “I think I 
deserve consideration on the ground that I am not a Citizen of Canada but an Indian a 
ward of the Government.”134  Johnson’s plea for an early release from service derived not 
only from his homesickness and disillusionment with life at the front, but also from his 
belief that as a ward of the Government, his legal status made him different from non-
Native soldiers, and thus should not be held to the same standards of contractual service.   
Native soldiers found themselves caught between a pre-military identity as 
Indians living on reserve and their new role as Canadian soldiers.  When the rights and 
restrictions contained in theses two identities clashed, Native men discovered their Indian 
identity trumped their position as soldiers. When someone found themselves on the 
wrong side of the Indian Act, their uniform provided little or no protection, as 
demonstrated in the case of James Chum.  Others, both Native and non-Native, looked to 
the Indian Act’s provisions to protect themselves from unwanted outsiders, whether those 
intruders were seeking recruits or hunting deserters.  These two responses to the 
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opportunity to leave the reserve as an enlistee highlights a tension between the hope for 
equality within the CEF and the separateness of Indian-ness, from those who sought to 
shirk their different status and those who sought it as a protection.  Although these goals 
are almost oppositional, the Indian Act’s prominence in the resolution of both conflicts 
underlines that legislation’s central role in defining Native participation in the new 
challenges and opportunities the war offered, as it did in questions over donations to war 
funds.  Native men in uniform were Indians first, and soldiers second. 
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Chapter 3:  
Support for Soldiers’ Dependants 
 
James Cope, a Mi’kmaq inventor living in Truro, Nova Scotia, created splints to 
facilitate basket weaving among his “other improvements on other Indian works.”  His 
white neighbours considered the “very intelligent” James to be among “a better class of 
Indians” in the province.1  Since the declaration of war, Cope had turned his enterprising 
mind to the development of innovative weaponry about which he wrote to the 
Department of Indian Affairs, the Patent Office in Ottawa, and the War Office in 
Washington.  Cope reported to the Department his work on a bulletproof vest, and 
offered his drawings for further development; additionally, Cope mused, “could not a 
very high powered magnet be made and employed to deflect or change the course of 
torpedoes”?2  Nothing came of Cope’s ideas, and he enlisted in December 1915.   
On 7 December 1915, Joseph Cope and his sons James, the inventor, and John 
joined the 106th Overseas Battalion, the Nova Scotia Rifles.3  James wrote to the 
Department again in January 1916; James wanted something he could wear on his 
uniform to identify himself, and presumably his brother and father, as Native, and he 
asked if Native soldiers had any special privileges.  Indian Affairs Secretary J.D. McLean 
explained to the soldier “there is no distinctive badge that the Department of Indian 
Affairs could give you.”  Native soldiers should not expect special treatment, but “you 
                                                
1 E.A. Saunders, Secretary of the Halifax Branch of the Canadian Patriotic Fund to the Secretary of the 
Department of Indian Affairs 27 May 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
2J.C. Cope to the Department of Indian Affairs, 7 November 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 3180 File 452,124-
1; E.A. Saunders, Secretary of the Halifax Branch of the Canadian Patriotic Fund to the Secretary of the 
Department of Indian Affairs 27 May 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
3 Joseph Cope (715125), Attestation Paper, LAC RG 150 Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1982-50.; James 
Cope (715126), Attestation Paper, LAC RG 150 Accession 1992-93/166 Box 1982-40; John Peter Cope 
(715560) Attestation Paper LAC RG 150 Accession 1992-93/166 Box 1982-48. 
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will be treated with the same courtesy and consideration as other members of the 
regiment to which you belong.”4  While some Native soldiers might have disputed this 
claim , McLean applauded the Copes’ decision to enlist and hoped that the three would 
enjoy “favourable” records in the service.5 
With the Copes family so well represented at the front, Sarah, Joseph’s wife, and 
the rest of the Cope children needed help from the Militia’s assigned pay and separation 
allowances.  The Cope family – like so many Native families who said goodbye to their 
husbands, fathers, and sons – found themselves relying on both the Department of Indian 
Affairs and the Department of Militia and Defense.  The former was responsible for 
Native peoples’ welfare generally, but when a Native man enlisted, his family also 
entered the Military’s own, albeit temporary, support system.  These new arrangements 
reinforced the Departmental role as a gatekeeper for both information and money, 
balanced between unwanted overseer and sought-after protector.  These new supports 
also highlighted the contradiction between Indian Affairs’ structures that forced 
dependency on its Agents, and its stated concern to encourage self-sufficiency among 
Native peoples. 
The Cope family’s effort to sustain themselves throughout the war illustrated 
common elements of many Native families seeking support while their husbands and 
sons were overseas.  The family fought with multiple government and charitable 
organizations to improve their condition; the Copes present a superbly documented case, 
and their story contains pieces of hundreds of other Native families experiences.  They 
are not so much exceptional, but exceptionally well-recorded example of the many 
                                                
4 Secretary J.D. McLean to J.C. Cope 11 January 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 3180 File 452,124-1. 
5 Ibid. 
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difficulties and resultant arrangements between Native families, the Departments of 
Indian Affairs and the Militia.  An Indian Agent controlled the Cope family’s Militia 
support payments, and to receive them the Copes opened themselves to serious outside 
scrutiny.  The matriarch of the Cope family, Sarah, openly challenged her family’s 
treatment at the hands of the government as contrary to the patriotic language and 
promised equality for Native soldiers and their dependants.  The Cope family’s struggles 
detail the cooperation between the Departments of Indian Affairs and Militia and Defense 
on the issue of soldiers’ dependents, juxtaposed with the negotiations Native women and 
families performed to try to survive the war intact.  
 
Support for Soldiers’ dependants  
Historian Robin Brownlie argues that although it was “mostly illusory,” Indian 
Affairs provided a “rudimentary safety net” in exchange for certain economic, social, and 
political freedoms – although the floor was low, it did exist.6  The Department designed 
this floor with specific goals in mind.  Hugh Shewell argues the Department’s 
paternalistic control of funds and relief structures served as a method of control and 
assimilation, the reserve system produced dependency by undermining economic 
independence, and suppressing Native peoples’ cultural and political identity.7  The 
Department controlled band funds, and the flow of relief for infirmity, illness, or extreme 
poverty, in order to direct Native peoples towards thrift as a moral as well as economic 
virtue, individualism, and by association away from any form of resistance to 
                                                
6 Brownlie, “‘A Better citizen than lots of white men’,” 33. 
7 Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep them Alive,’ 4-5, 9. 
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Departmental control.8  Both the Military’s soldier dependent support payments and the 
Canadian Patriotic Fund encouraged and maintained single families as economic units, 
even as the latter pooled donations to support these families.  This goal for all recipients 
(Native and non-Native) overlapped with the Department’s effort to push Native peoples 
towards nuclear family economies rather than communal wealth.  Both the CPF and the 
Department associated thrift with morality and, inversely, poverty with moral corruption.  
Additionally, the Department linked the economic control of Native peoples’ lives with 
other such restrictions, most notably on mobility and alcohol, as parallel initiatives 
directed towards “the eradication of ‘heathen’ cultural practices.”9  The new soldiers’ 
dependents’ supports matched Indian Affairs’ goal of controlling Native peoples’ 
economic activities as a method of changing their behaviours. 
The war disrupted the economic situations of families and communities across the 
country, but uniquely for Native families, access to new supports needed to be negotiated 
within an existing debate over the character of relief.  While historians have considered 
the social implications of the temporary programs instigated for soldiers’ families’ 
maintenance, the situation for Native women cannot be separated, either in its ideological 
considerations and its practicalities, from the Department’s pre-war economic policies.10  
Wartime supports largely mirrored Indian Affairs’ pre-war mixture of economic controls 
and social restrictions meant to recast Native women as men’s dependents.  Both war-
                                                
8 Ibid., 89-95. 
9 Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep Them Alive,’ 91; Tough, 199, 217-8, 233; Campbell, 105-126; Brownlie, A 
Fatherly Eye, 99, 123, 143.  The rhetoric against the potlatch reflect the Department’s linkages between 
Native cultural practices and unacceptable economic and moral behaviour, Loo, 139-141, 143. 
10 Examples of these studies include: Alison Prentice et al, Canadian Women: A History (Toronto: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1988), 203-207; Veronica Strong-Boag, The New Day Recalled: Lives of Girls and 
Women in English Canada, 1919-39 (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1988); Joan Sangster, “Mobilizing Women for 
War,” in Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown, ed. David 
MacKenzie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), p. 157-193, 158; Morton, Fight or Pay. 
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related support and Indian Affairs’ work was informed by the presumption that Native 
women were easily morally corruptible, and that it was the Department’s job to correct 
this.11   
 As discussed in chapter one, the Department of Indian Affairs did not want to 
alienate Native peoples, particularly potential recruits, by giving the impression that their 
families would be denied access to the sources of temporary support for white soldiers’ 
families.  Additionally, as discussed in chapter two, the Department hoped that enlisting 
Native men for military service would provide a new mechanism for assimilating them 
into Canadian society.  Support for Native soldiers’ families presented an excellent 
recruiting tool.  The Department sent a circular to its Agents detailing military Separation 
Allowance payments of $20 a month and CPF payments of up to $42 per family per 
month depending on the number of children under 15.12  Agents reassured Native men 
that their status as soldiers would be “the same as the white men…they will receive the 
same benefits and consideration.”13  Equal support was an important promise, as 
evidenced in chapter one by the Bloods’ fight for parity of access to the CPF.  
 Even under ideal circumstances, support for soldiers’ families was conditional on 
a variety of factors.  The Fund’s Assistant Secretary Philip Morris informed Scott that the 
figures the Department had forwarded to its Agents were the CPF’s maximum payments.  
Morris assumed or believed that because of Native peoples’ pre-existing dependent 
                                                
11 Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye, 141-144; Joan Sangster, “Criminalizing the Colonized: Ontario Native 
Women Confront the Criminal Justice System, 1920-60,” Canadian Historical Review 80.1 (March 1999): 
32-62, 34; Perry, 49, 52; McGrath & Stevenson, 37-53. 
12 Circular from D.C. Scott 12 February 1916 (regarding pensions to be paid to soldiers’ widows, families) 
LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-4; To All British Columbia Indian Agents from D.C. Scott 1 February 
1917; Militia Circular for Separation Allowances of Forestry Battalions 1 February 1917; Circular to Indian 
Agents from D.C. Scott 7 February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13. 
13 To All British Columbia Indian Agents from D.C. Scott 1 February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 
452-13.    
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relationship with the Canadian government, “the conditions under which the Indians of 
Canada live are, of course, exceptional,” and given their circumstances, without 
husbands, brothers or sons, “it is quite improbably that allowances at that maximum rate 
would be made to their families.”14   
Native soldiers’ concern for equal access to Militia-based support for their 
families was not only a question of familial feeling, but part of their contractual 
entitlements as members of the CEF.  When Joseph Cope and his son James enlisted on 7 
December 1915, and a second son, John Peter, on 30 December, all in the 106th Overseas 
Battalion, they could expect a wage of $1.10 per day, $1.00 pay plus a 10 cent field 
allowance, as privates.15  This was more than four times a British private’s pay, the 
equivalent to a Canadian quarter, but only half of the daily earnings of average Canadian 
labourer. James, despite his inventions, entered his occupation a labourer on his 
attestation papers, as did his father; John Peter Cope declared himself a farmer.16  Under 
the CEF’s pay regulations, a soldier could divert or “assign” up to half of his pay to his 
family – hence the term assigned pay.17 Initially at least, all three of Sarah Cope’s 
soldiers, her husband and two sons, intended to assign her the maximum of fifteen dollars 
of their monthly pay while overseas.18  
                                                
14 Assistant Secretary CPF Philip Morris to D.C. Scott 15 February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 
452-13. 
15 James Copes, 715126, Attestation Papers LAC RG 150 Accession 1992-93/166 Box 1982-40; John Peter 
Cope, 715560, Attestation Papers, LAC RG 150 Accession 1992-93/166 Box 1982-48; Joseph Cope, 
715125, Attestation Papers, LAC RG 150 Accession 1992-92/166 Box 1982-50; Morton, Fight or Pay, 23, 
29. 
16 Morton, Fight or Pay, 23, 29. 
17 Ibid., 30. 
18 Mrs. Sarah Cope to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs 26 January 
1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61; Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm to Secretary J.D. McLean 27 
November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
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While a soldier could assign a portion of his pay to anyone he chose, on 4 
September 1914, the federal government approved a Separation Allowance program 
separate from a soldier’s pay, meant specifically for wives and widowed mothers, to be 
run through the Militia: a private’s wife would receive twenty dollars, going up to sixty 
dollars for a Major-General’s wife.19  The rush of paperwork and a lack of qualified staff 
meant that the first wave of soldiers’ dependents waited months for payments, and thanks 
to Minister of Militia and Defence Sam Hughes’s preference for locally-based recruiting 
paymasters were slow to be appointed and trained. Thus payments could be slow in 
coming to soldiers’ dependents.20  To obtain a Separation Allowance for their mothers, 
unmarried sons had to prove they were their widowed mother’s only support, and that 
they had no family of their own.  Whereas a soldier could divide his assigned pay to 
multiple family members, a soldier could obtain only one Separation Allowance.21 After 
1 April 1915, however, non-commissioned ranks whose dependents received a separation 
allowance would automatically have half their pay assigned to their dependents as well.22    
Additionally, the government looked to the Canadian Patriotic Fund, a private 
charity, administered through local branches and run largely by members of Anglo-
Protestant Canadian society, to make up the difference between what they provided and 
what soldiers’ families needed.  These local volunteers made up the relief committees 
that evaluated, or failed to evaluate, the Blood women’s claims for support, as discussed 
in chapter one.  The CPF needed to create a monthly payment scale “that would not 
                                                
19 Separation Allowances were initially denied to those who maintained their civilian salaries, and the 
allowance was only open to those soldiers overseas, not those serving in the Home Service.  Home Service 
soldiers were also not eligible for help from the CPF.  Morton, Fight or Pay, 32, 37 
20 Desmond Morton, “Supporting Soldiers’ Families: Separation Allowance, Assigned Pay and the 
Unexpected,” in Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown, ed. David 
MacKenzie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), pp. 194-229, 200-201, 207-208. 
21 Morton, Fight or Pay, 39. 
22 Morton, “Supporting Soldiers’ Families,” 205. 
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demoralize the poorer class nor impose too many restrictions on the customs of those 
who had lived at a higher standard,” which they eventually deemed to be $30 for a wife, 
$7.50 for a child between the ages of 10 and 15, $4.50 for a child ages 5 to 10, and $3 for 
a child under 5, and $35 for a widowed mother.23  The CEF and CPF worked closely 
together, and receipt of separation allowance eventually became required for the receipt 
of CPF money, which actually reduced the amount that a woman received from the CPF 
$30 to $25.24  The CPF for most of the war ignored the difficulties inflation caused; only 
in 1918 did it increase a woman’s monthly entitlement to $50.25  Cost of living varied 
across the country, and so too did the support from the CPF, so that payments could vary 
significantly from city to city.26  Unfortunately, these differences could not make up the 
loss of a breadwinner to the cost of living, and the difference between CPF and military 
benefits and the estimated cost of living ranged from as low as 70 cents a month in 
Ontario and Quebec, to as high as $13.66 a month in British Columbia.27  According to 
{who made the calculation that Morton is citing} Mrs. Cope’s fellow Nova Scotian 
soldiers’ wives’ support fell an average of $3.44 short of their needs.28 
In early 1917, Joseph Cope contracted a severe cold, which left him with partial 
paralysis and rheumatism.29  Joseph was subsequently invalided out of the CEF on 7 
February 1917 and his assigned pay ended.  Sarah was left with a husband unable to work 
and at least four children to care for – officials’ estimates varied significantly from four 
                                                
23 Morris, 30  
24 Morton, “Supporting Soldiers’ Families,” 199, 205. 
25 Morris, 32. 
26 Morton, “Supporting Soldiers’ Families,” 199; Morris, 31. 
27 Morton, “Supporting Soldiers’ Families,” 218. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Mrs. Sarah Cope to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs 26 January 
1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61; Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm to Secretary J.D. McLean 27 
November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
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to eight, between the ages of fourteen and infancy – on the thirty dollars she received 
from her two sons fighting overseas.30 To put this thirty dollars into some perspective, 
according to immediate pre-war (1914) statistics, and therefore not taking into 
consideration wartime inflation (which reached almost 20% nationally) and internal 
variation, a pound of beef cost 24 cents, a pound of butter cost 35 cents, a loaf of bread 
cost 5 cents and a quart of milk cost 10 cents.  The Copes found the Department of Indian 
Affairs unwilling to help their fight for sufficient support while their primary 
breadwinners were in France.  The Department of Indian Affairs officials in Ottawa were 
hesitant, even resistant, to aid the Copes to influence the Militia.  These officials doubted 
both the degree of the Copes’ need and of Joseph Cope’s infirmity.  The family did not 
stay on one reserve or in one agency, and the Department chastised the family both for its 
nomadic lifestyle and for a perceived failure to live thriftily.     
Initially, the Department of Indian Affairs told the CPF that they had no 
arrangement with Native people that would affect CPF support for Native soldiers’ 
families.31  Yet the Department’s role in Native peoples’ lives, particularly its Agents’ 
ability to control the financial lives of their reserves and their ability to collect 
information in these remote locations segued easily with the needs and responsibilities of 
both the Militia and the CPF.  Agents evaluated Native soldiers’ families’ need and 
eligibility for a separation allowance, and dispensed these supports.  Control over both 
information and funds – essentially as a middleman – reinforced the Department’s place 
                                                
30 Dr. W. B. Moore, Kentville Nova Scotia (certificate of discharge for Joseph Cope) 7 February 1917 LAC 
RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61; Department of Indian Affairs Accountant F.W. Paget to D.C. Scott 22 
February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61; Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm to Secretary J.D. 
McLean 27 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
31 Assistant Secretary for the CPF Philip H. Morris to D.C. Scott 27 August 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6762 File 452-4; D.C. Scott to Assistant Secretary for the CPF Philip H. Morris 30 August 1915 LAC RG 
10 Volume 6762 File 452-4. 
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in Native peoples’ lives even in these temporary Militia-based programs.  Managing the 
Militia’s payments suited the Department’s dual efforts to direct Native peoples’ lives 
and activities and to save money; when dolling out separation allowances, they spent the 
other department’s money while furthering Indian Affairs’ policy agenda.  Yet Sarah 
Cope, like many Native women, did not sit idly by as her present circumstances and the 
survival of her family hung in the balance.  Sarah used her sons’ participation in the war 
as a tool to challenge the authorities controlling her financial situation. 
 
Native Families in Need 
 Indian Affairs’ officials were deeply suspicious of both Joseph’s inability to work 
and the Cope family’s general degree of need.  D.C. Scott received a doctor’s report that 
authorized Cope’s discharge and which argued in favour of giving him a pension, but 
which also indicated that his rheumatism might be cured with a few months’ treatment.32  
After having met the family however, Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm of Halifax County 
emphasized Cope’s disability and his family’s need.33  While the family resided near his 
agency in Kings County Nova Scotia, Indian Affairs instructed Indian Agent C.E. 
Beckwith not to “give relief to this family” while they received the thirty dollars of 
assigned pay.  Based on his own observation however, Beckwith gave the family half a 
barrel of flour and an unspecified amount of pork.34   
                                                
32 Department of Indian Affairs Accountant F.W. Paget to D.C. Scott 22 February 1917 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6773 File 452-61; Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm to Secretary J.D. McLean 27 November 1917 
LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
33 Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm to the Department of Indian Affairs 27 November 1917 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
34 Indian Agent C.E. Beckwith to the Department of Indian Affairs 12 February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6773 File 452-61; Department of Indian Affairs Accountant F.W. Paget to D.C. Scott 22 February 1917 
LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61; Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm to Secretary J.D. McLean 27 
November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
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Reluctantly, McLean endorsed Beckwith’s support, although he instructed 
Beckwith that the value of the supplies should not exceed ten dollars a month, and that 
these supplies should “consist of necessaries” only, and emphasized that  “payment for 
luxuries will not be made.”35  The Department of Indian Affairs stood staunchly against 
any plan that extended beyond “a few months,” particularly any form of soldier’s pension 
for fear that “[Joseph] Cope will take it for granted that he is entitled to receive aid from 
this Department for the rest of his life in view of the fact that he enlisted for military 
service.”36  Though a military pension was considered a possibility, Joseph’s recovery 
was the department’s preferred solution; it rejected the entitlements promised to citizen 
soldiers in favor of the goal of instilling thrift and discouraging dependence.37  McLean 
asserted, “it is not clear to the Department [of Indian Affairs] why this family should 
require any assistance” when they received thirty dollars from the Department of Militia 
and Defence.38  Despite Beckwith’s assurances, McLean suggested that Joseph Cope was 
not ill enough to “prevent him exerting himself towards supporting his family.”39  That 
the Copes might consider any money an entitlement was unthinkable for those who 
sought to wean Native people from their support – McLean argued “if he [Joseph] knows 
that he will be assisted whenever he asks for help no doubt he will continue to remain 
                                                
35 Secretary J.D. McLean to Indian Agent C.E. Beckwith 28 February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 
452-61. 
36 Department of Indian Affairs Accountant F.W. Paget to D.C. Scott 22 February 1917 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6773 File 452-61; Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm to Secretary J.D. McLean 27 November 1917 
LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
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Volume 6773 File 452-61; Secretary J.D. McLean to Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm 15 November 1917 
LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 




idle.”40  McLean did not want the Copes to rely on aid, but rather “if possible the Copes 
should be made to support themselves.”41 
A separation allowance provided a solution to the Cope family’s need that 
respected the Department of Indian Affairs’ desire to limit their permanent assistance to 
the Copes, and all Native peoples, and to save money, as it was a temporary payment 
made through the Militia’s coffers.  While Sarah Cope received thirty dollars in assigned 
pay from her two sons, she did not receive any separation allowance.  McLean suggested 
to the Department of Militia and Defence’s Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay 
Branch that the Copes be allowed a separation allowance from at least one of their sons.  
McLean encouraged the Militia to cover the cost of the Copes’ maintenance, although 
regardless of which government body paid, McLean suggested his department ought to 
administer the funds.42  McLean did not discuss his previous belief that Joseph was able 
to work, as any bread-winning ability on Joseph’s part would ruin the family’s chances of 
receiving such an allowance.  The Militia agreed to allow Mrs. Cope an additional 
twenty-five dollars as a separation allowance from her older son James, the inventor.43 
 The Copes were not the only Native family who found themselves in dire 
circumstances during the war.  Despite best intentions, once soldiers left the country, 
many deserving families did not receive full support from the separation allowances and 
assigned pay system.  These failures represented the practical problems of the new Militia 
support networks, as families slipped through the cracks in the system.  Mrs. Jemima 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Secretary J.D. McLean to the Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay Branch of the Department of 
Militia and Defence 21 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61; Secretary J.D. McLean to 
the Director of the Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay Branch of the Department of Militia and 
Defence 23 March 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
43 Secretary J.D. McLean to Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm 3 May 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 
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Tanner of the Keeseekoowenin reserve in Manitoba received a letter in May 1917 that the 
CEF was terminating her assigned pay and would only pay her twenty dollars in 
separation allowance in future.44  Coupled with the news that her husband John Tanner of 
the 107th Overseas Battalion was in hospital, this was both financially and emotionally 
crippling.  After investigating on Mrs. Tanner’s behalf, Secretary McLean explained to 
her that “in many cases it was found that men had assigned such a large portion of their 
pay” to their families that the soldiers “were left without any ready cash to meet their 
requirements while overseas.”45  McLean suggested to Mrs. Tanner that she write to her 
husband “if you find it impossible to get along on the separation allowance alone,” to 
“arrange with him to have a smaller portion of his pay reassigned to you.”46   
 Other individuals found their separation allowances or assigned pay stopped for 
less bureaucratic reasons.  Privates Louis and John Jacobs of Caughnawaga had both 
assigned their pay and allowances to their mother, but in early 1918 she passed away. 
Now Louis and John’s father Nolan found himself without any form of financial 
support.47  Secretary McLean acted as a go-between for Nolan’s interests, as the 
bureaucrat contacted both Private Louis Jacobs and the Director of the Separation 
Allowance and Assigned Pay in the Militia Department, to whom McLean appealed to 
change the recipient of the Jacobs boys’ assigned pay.  Louis could redirect his assigned 
pay and if he was slow in his response, his officers could force the issue.  McLean even 
arranged to have the Department of Indian Affairs forward Nolan Jacobs five dollars 
                                                
44 Lake Manitoba Inspector S.J. Jackson to D. C. Scott 18 May 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 3181 File 452, 
124-1A. 
45 Secretary J.D. McLean to Mrs. Jemima Tanner 26 May 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 3181 File 452,124-
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46 Secretary J.D. McLean to Mrs. Jemima Tanner 26 May 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 3181 File 452,124-
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3181 File 452,124-1A. 
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from the Caughnawaga band funds to allow him to travel back to the reserve; the 
secretary suggested that the Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay Branch could repay 
the Department from Nolan Jacobs’ first assigned payment.48   
Several Native soldiers’ families had their separation allowances and assigned pay 
stopped, or supports promised but never paid.49  Jack Lute of St. Regis had two brothers, 
Richard and Thomas, in the service.  Unable to support himself, Jack initially received 
fifteen dollars a month from both brothers, but he lost half his support when Richard died 
overseas.50  Jack’s Chief, John Jacobs, found the now destitute Jack Lute a home near his 
own while Indian Agent Taillon and McLean appealed to the Militia to secure Jack a 
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RG 10 Volume 6777 File 452-168; Indian Agent Charles Perry to Secretary J.D. McLean (regarding the 
parents of Albert Leighten) 3 March 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6778 File 452-191; Secretary J.D. McLean 
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LAC RG 10 Volume 6778 File 452-200; Mrs. Isaac Paul to “Sir” 22 April 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6778 
File 452-203; Mrs. Mathilda Nash to the Department of Indian Affairs 16 November 1918 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6779 File 452-206; Mrs. John Debasige to Secretary J.D. McLean 27 May 1918 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6779 File 452-212; Pte Ben Simcoe to Secretary J.D. McLean 24 July 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6782 File 452-303 
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separation allowance from his remaining living brother, Thomas.51  Unfortunately for 
Jack, whose case McLean described as a “deserving one,” the Separation Allowance and 
Assigned Pay Branch rejected his appeal because their regulations “do not make any 
provisions for brothers.”52  This case underlines the gendered nature of support during the 
war.  McLean was aware of that Lute might fall through a gap in the Separation 
Allowance Program, as “I know this case does not come strictly within the legal wording 
of your regulations,” but he still hoped there might be something to do for Lute as “it 
seems to me a deserving case.”53  
The Militia authorities did not interpret their responsibilities for Jack Lute in the 
same terms as the Department of Indian Affairs, and they stuck to the strict interpretation 
of their mandate that did not include such male relatives as brothers.  Agent John 
MacDonald was frustrated with a similar failure to help Peter Francis, soldier Peter J. 
Francis’ grandfather, living on Lennox Island, PEI.  Agent argued that “there are persons 
in receipt of Separation Allowances who are not in so much need,” and that if such a 
grant could not be made, “I think the whole system needs revision.”54  This was not a 
question of lack of compassion however, but a gendered prejudice within the policy.  
Fund administrators (public and private) defined women and minors as the primary 
supportable dependants, and implicitly men as the normal sources of familial support; 
these boundaries were impermeable.  Jack Lute’s or John MacDonald’s need, no matter 
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how deserving they might be, did not fall under the Militia’s support system because an 
adult male did not fit its definition of a dependant. 
In some cases, a family’s appeal for help from an errant soldier reflected a 
preexisting family breakdown, and feminized poverty.  Mrs. William Ginnish had to 
survive on five dollars a month from the CPF, as her husband, who enlisted under the 
assumed name of James Muwes, “does not wish to support his wife.”55  Samuel Chapais 
refused to support his wife as he believed she was unfaithful, as she had already had a 
child with another man before their marriage; Acting Agent Godprey defended Mrs. 
Chapais as chaste and “deserving of better treatment by him whatever she may have done 
before her marriage.”56  Godprey generally thought little of Chapais, whom the Agent 
described as “a wild and selfish man.”57  The Rolands of Six Nations provided an 
exceptional spousal conflict; Jack told all the Ohsweken grocers not to supply his wife 
Maggie and threatened to cancel her Militia pay.58  Maggie fumed that Jack’s behaviour 
“is now unbearable,” and argued, “this allowance belongs to the wife and family of a 
soldier and not to the soldier at all.  In stopping this money he will not get a cent of it, 
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while it will injure me and cause his little children to suffer want and hunger.”59  
Although Maggie correctly identified the Militia’s goal in creating these supports, control 
over these supports, particularly assigned pay, was not nearly as assured as Maggie 
argued, as evidenced in the above struggles.   
 
Agents and Assigned Payments 
Among all the above-discussed Native families, there were two common 
denominators: their hope of obtaining aid from the Militia’s support programs and their 
appeal for help to the agents of Ottawa office of the Department of Indian Affairs.  Indian 
Agents played a central role in managing information and money between these 
dependants and the Militia, which reinforced the Department of Indian Affairs’ role as 
middleman between Native peoples and the outside world.  As Militia authorities and 
officers appealed to the Department of Indian Affairs for help enlisting Native men (see 
chapter two), members of the Militia’s Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay Branch 
utilized the Department’s reach into Native communities to collect information.  The 
Militia appealed to the Department of Indian Affairs for baptismal and marriage 
certificates, addresses, and evaluative conclusions about an individual or a family’s 
degree of need, which could influence decisions over separation allowances and the 
direction of assigned pay.60  This assessment was particularly important for obtaining a 
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separation allowance, as the Militia could deny such a payment if the soldier in 
question’s father was still alive and considered able to earn a living.   
The Agents’ and Department’s subjective powers were evident in the case of the 
Copes, where the two Agents concerned and the Department debate the character of 
Joseph Cope’s illness and whether he was unable or unwilling to work.  If they decided 
against him, and informed the Department of Militia and Defence that Joseph was able to 
work, his family would not be eligible for the Separation Allowance, which increased 
their economic resources significantly.  The Agents’ and the Department’s control over 
information about Native people – crucial details that informed Militia decisions over 
Native soldiers’ dependants – easily translated to practical control over the dependants’ 
financial supports. 
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Although he was much more willing to believe Joseph Cope was disabled and the 
family in need, Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm, near whose Halifax County jurisdiction 
the family lived in November 1917, shared many of the Department’s negative views 
about Native peoples’ spending habits.  While Chisholm sought to increase the amount of 
money the Militia sent the Copes, he asserted to his superiors that, “I have always noted 
that an Indian with cash has no conception of economy.”61  The Agent had a solution to 
the incongruence between the Copes’ need and his prejudice against giving money to 
Native peoples.  Chisholm suggested the Militia send the Cope soldiers’ assigned to the 
Department rather than Sarah Cope directly, and the Agent could then establish an 
agreement with a “reliable” local merchant to supply the Copes with the necessities of 
life.62  McLean endorsed Chisholm’s plan – he wanted to stop the Copes’ “flagrant 
mismanagement” of their money  (which McLean believed was demonstrated by their 
mobility, that they “frequently applied for relief,” and “have been a source of trouble”) – 
and requested this change of the Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay Branch of 
Militia and Defence.63  After a brief resistance, the Separation Allowance and Assigned 
Pay Branch agreed to pay both Mrs. Copes’ separation allowance and assigned pay to the 
Department of Indian Affairs.64   
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McLean authorized Agent Chisholm to furnish relief supplies for the Cope family, 
and instructed Chisholm that, “this Department leaves it to your judgment to decide as to 
the amount of assistance which should be afford monthly on behalf of the Cope 
family.”65  McLean told the Agent “it was most desirable” to economize as much as 
possible so that the rest of the Militia pay could create “a small reserve fund” the 
Department could hold for the family “for future use.”66  This was not a unique 
arrangement, as McLean explained to Indian Agent Edwin Beattie of Moravian of the 
Thames a few months later that, “it is quite within the power of the Militia Department to 
pay separation allowance, assigned pay, &c. through this Department, and in many cases 
it is done.”67   
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While Agents’ control over separation allowances, assigned pay, and even CPF 
payments fell short of a declared policy, there was a distinct pattern of behaviour.  Agents 
were the Militia’s primary information gatherers, and were the chief distributors of non-
war-related moneys and aide within the reserves.  The war-related supports often flowed 
down preexisting structures cut in Native peoples’ economic lives.  Although 
occasionally the Department took over control of a Native family’s Militia pay because 
of a specific transgression, in other cases an Agent simply decided whether a dependant 
wife or mother was “capable of managing her own affairs,” and if she spent her family’s  
“money judiciously for food and clothing.”68   
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Both government and private organizations deferred to the Department’s 
knowledge about and authority in Native communities.  W.B. MacCoy of Nova Scotia’s 
Returned Soldier Commission exemplified this attitude of acquiescence in discussion 
with J.D. McLean: “I quite agree with you that as a rule it is probably better for the 
Department to make arrangements for the maintenance of Indians who may be entitled to 
Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay.”69  These benefits, tied to the decision to enlist, 
often served to reinforce the intimate and lopsided relationship between Native peoples 
and their Agents.  Where Agents were not present, other pre-war support networks, 
namely fur trade companies, substituted.  In the case of James Bay in Northern Ontario, 
one recruiter had his volunteers give him power of attorney over their accounts and 
arranged to have their separation allowance and assigned pay sent to the Revillon Frères, 
the primary white employer and supplier for the families of the soldiers in question, at the 
company headquarters in Montreal.70   
Therefore, while separation allowances and assigned pay sought to maintain the 
male breadwinner economic family structure across Canada, it similarly reinforced pre-
existing economic relationships on reserves and in Native peoples’ lives.  Controlling an 
individual or a family’s financial circumstances was a method of directing their 
behaviour through restriction.  McLean’s insistence that Joseph Cope might simply be 
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idle and therefore did not deserve support can be construed as part of this Departmental 
effort to control Native peoples’ behaviour with purse strings.  
While the Department watched Joseph’s physical condition carefully, mothers and 
wives in reserves across the country were similarly subject to significant scrutiny of their 
moral and economic behaviour.  The separation allowance and CPF programs sought to 
substitute for absent male breadwinners, but also encouraged patterns of behaviour, or 
rather punished others, usually defined in a middle class milieu and applied to working 
class families (as discussed in chapter one).71  Yet whereas non-Native women faced 
examination from middle class volunteers, Native women faced their Agents.72  The 
enforcement of the male breadwinner economic family structure on reserves during the 
war fit within the Department’s assimilative vision for Native women as dependents of 
Native men.73  An Indian Agent could threaten women who failed to act accordingly with 
punishments ranging from financial deprivation to imprisonment if they moved around 
too much or sought to divorce their husbands.74  Indian Agent MacDonald of the Pas in 
Manitoba connected the war’s disruption of the family unit with an increase of 
problematic female behaviour under his purview: “the wives of the enlisted men from the 
reserve seem to be the worse, in nearly all cases, all money received is simply squandered 
around the town and with a few exceptions, very little of the money goes for 
necessities.”75  The Agent dismissed prison as “absolutely useless as a corrective method, 
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as any that go are worse when they get back,” and he suggested instead they be sent to 
the Salvation Army Home of Correction.76   
Indian Agent Edwin Beattie told his superiors in Ottawa that his reserve on the 
Thames River in Ontario was flooded with liquor whenever the Militia checks arrived; he 
suggested that Indian Affairs take over the administration of separation allowances and 
assigned pay to control the recipients’ behaviour.77  Beattie had Catherine Jacobs in 
mind, who he argued was “not expending her separation allowance and assigned pay to 
advantage.”  McLean and Beattie felt they should control Catherine Jacob’s money “in 
order that we may see that the money is properly expended.”78  Beattie believed 
withholding her Militia payments had a “good effect on [the] Reserve as a whole,” 
including Mrs. Jacobs, who “since then has been more discrete and careful.”79  Similarly, 
Superintendent John McDonald of Prince Edward Island decried Mrs. Joseph Tuplin’s 
behaviour, who “like a good many others,” had “quit work entirely” as soon as she 
received her Militia and CPF payments, and moved to Dorchester, New Brunswick to 
better spend her money.80  Indian Agent Lennox of Cape Croker and McLean sought to 
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divert Mrs. Ed Akewenzie’s Militia payments to her children’s grandfather, Phillip 
Proulx, with whom the children lived after their mother left the reserve for Owen 
Sound.81  The Department wanted to hold the money Akiwenzie sent his wife in trust for 
her children.  They interpreted the money as exclusively for the maintenance of the 
Akiwenzie family, intact and on the reserve, as Scott wanted to ensure “the children of 
men who are overseas should be properly cared for and well-treated during their 
absence.”82  D.C. Scott instructed Agent Lennox to ascertain the number of children with 
fathers overseas, the amount of money their mothers received, and, importantly to 
“instruct the mothers that, if proper care is not taken of the children, the Department will 
take steps to remove them [their children] from their control.”83 
The Copes presented the Department with a problem in terms of delivering aid as 
the family did not live in one agency.  In the winter of 1917-1918 they lived at Windsor 
Junction because a physician in Bedford was treating Joseph Cope for his rheumatism – 
the family was able to secure “shelter” at Windsor Junction while their patriarch received 
treatment.84  McLean interpreted the family’s living conditions not as a medical necessity 
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File 452-61. 
 121 
but that “these people have wandered from one Agency to another and they have 
frequently applied for relief and have been a source of trouble.”85 
Many Native families were denied support, either from the Militia, the 
Department of Indian Affairs, or the CPF for what observers deemed inappropriate 
behaviour.  Conversely, if an Indian Agent felt an individual was worthy, he could 
campaign in support of the soldier’s dependent’s quest for support.  Agent Taillon of St. 
Regis, Quebec, appealed to his superiors in Ottawa to help his obtain either CPF or 
Militia payments for Mrs. Louisa McDonald, whom he described as “a good Christian 
woman and I think deserving of some assistance.”86  An Agent’s intimate knowledge of 
the lives of those in their agencies informed how they approached soldiers’ dependents, 
both in favour and against financial support. 
 
Patriotic Language and Native Soldiers’ Dependents 
 In an attempt to defend her right to support as a soldier’s dependant, Sarah Cope 
engaged in a form of moral suasion.  In an extremely forceful letter to the Department of 
Indian Affairs, she challenged their authority to take her money:  
I dont think you [the Department of Indian Affairs] have any authority to 
bother yourself what I am getting and therefore if you think that I have no 
right to that money you tell the Department of Militia and Defence to 
transport my boys home.87 
 
                                                
85 Secretary J.D. McLean to Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm 15 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 
File 452-61. 
86 Indian Agent F.E. Taillon to Secretary J.D. McLean 9 December 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 6781 File 
452-293; Indian Agent F.E. Taillon to Secretary J.D. McLean 8 January 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 6781 
File 452-293.  Other examples include: Indian Agent C.F. Bertrand (on behalf of James Gaspé) to Secretary 
J.D. McLean 18 May 1915 LAC RG 10 Volume 6781 File 452-295. 
87 Mrs. Sarah Cope to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs 26 January 
1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
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Sarah Cope’s protest intimated that if her boys could not support their family while in 
service as white men could, they ought not to be expected to fight.  Mrs. Cope took her 
challenge a step further, emphasizing her sons’ patriotism and sacrifice juxtaposed with 
her and her family’s suffering here in Canada.  Sarah Cope underlined that “my poor 
boys” were in France “fighting for Canada and they [sic] King and willing to die for the 
cause of freedom.”88  
 Sarah Cope resisted any external attempt to control her finances; she even 
appealed to the Canadian Patriotic Fund’s Halifax branch, although she did not mention 
to them the Departments of Militia and Defence and Indian Affairs’ arrangement to 
provide supplies to the Copes but not to pay them directly.89  Her complaint to the CPF 
sparked an investigation into her family’s circumstances.  Suddenly dismissing her right 
to ask anything of the Department, Agent Chisholm described Sarah as “a white woman,” 
although he did not clarify if she was ethnically Native or had obtained her status through 
marriage. In addition to questioning her ethnicity, Chisholm derided Sarah as thinking of 
herself as “a lay lawyer.”90  Additionally, and somewhat paradoxically, Chisholm 
asserted Sarah did not want the Department’s help.  Chisholm claimed he was able to talk 
Sarah out of her conviction, although she continued to dispute Agent Chisholm’s control 
over her finances to authorities outside the Department of Indian Affairs.91  McLean did 
not forget this exchange however, and told the Nova Scotia Returned Soldiers 
Commission that she had “given considerable trouble” to those who wanted to help her 
                                                
88 Ibid. 
89 Secretary E.A. Saunders of the Halifax Branch, Canadian Patriotic Fun d to Secretary J.D. McLean 27 
May 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
90 Indian Agent Daniel Chisholm to Secretary J.D. McLean 10 June 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 
452-61. 
91 The Secretary of the Board of Pension Commissioners for Canada to Secretary J.D. McLean 29 July 
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family (the Department of Indian Affairs) and suggested she fell into the group of 
“Indians [who] are extremely difficult to please, and prone to grumble.”92 
 The rhetoric of sacrifice provided those Native families and communities with a 
tool to challenge unequal treatment.  Their sons, husbands and brothers had joined the 
CEF on a supposedly equal footing with non-Native Canadian men; why should their 
dependants be treated differently than non-Native dependants?  Agent Dilworth and the 
Bloods employed this argument when they challenged the MacLeod CPF branch’s refusal 
to even consider appeals for money for Blood families, as discussed in chapter one.  The 
Blood community had been so generous to the CPF that the MacLeod branch could not 
justify continued denial of Blood claims.  In an appeal to the Governor General, 
Lieutenant John R. Stacey, originally of Caughnawaga, argued the Militia worked hard to 
convince “my people” to enlist but then refused to compensate either those soldiers or 
their families on an equal footing with non-Native soldiers.93  Not only had the Militia 
violated its contract with Native soldiers, but Stacey argued that Native people carried an 
inordinate burden compared with Francophone Canadians, and that “lot of people in 
Canada are doing nothing…I see myself in [the] city [of] Montreal and here to 
Cornwall.”94   
Approximately a dozen women from the James Bay area were temporarily 
relocated to Elk Lake to ensure they could receive separation allowances and assigned 
pay directly rather than through the Revillon Frères or HBC.95  These women found 
                                                
92 Secretary J.D. McLean to W.B. MacCoy, Secretary of the Nova Scotia Returned Soldier Commission 20 
September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6773 File 452-61. 
93 Lieutenant John R. Stacey to the Governor General of Canada, 10 August 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6762 File 452-4. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Captain C.M. McCarthy to Dr. W.J. Roche, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs 21 August 1916 
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themselves the subject of severe prejudice from their new neighbours.  Painted as 
immoral, physically dirty, harbingers of disease both sexual and otherwise, with little if 
any evidence to substantiate such accusations, the town’s prejudice did not translate into 
scrutiny, the James Bay women challenged their accusers’ patriotism and therefore their 
right to act as judges,  
all the Indians at the front, and all married Scotchmen in Elk Lake that 
should of been at the front…We promised to stay in Elk Lake until out 
[sic] husbands come home and James Bay Indians are just as clean as 
anyone in Elk Lake…If our husbands was here we wouldn’t need any 
money from anyone.  By rights all white men should have went to the 
front before the Indians.96 
 
The women at Elk Lake inverted the racial stereotypes used against them.  If Native 
people were truly lesser people, with a weaker sense of responsibility, morality, and 
propriety, why did they volunteer before the white people of Elk Lake?  Further, the 
women emphasized that the only reason they were in Elk Lake, and needed Militia 
support, was because their husbands had enlisted, their position of financial need was 
borne uniquely of temporary separation rather than any perpetual poverty. 
Ben Simcoe of Rama married his wife after he enlisted in January 1916, which 
caused infinite confusion with the Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay Branch.97  
Simcoe refused to return to camp from furlough at the end of the summer of 1916 as the 
Militia had yet to sort out his wife’s financial support; when he did return to Camp, 
                                                                                                                                            
LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13; D.C. Scott to Captain C.M. McCarthy 1 October 1917 LAC RG 10 
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Simcoe was arrested as a deserter.98  Agent Charles Myers came to Simcoe’s defence, as 
he explained to McLean that Simcoe had not intentionally deserted but instead had 
decided stayed home to protest the Militia’s repeated failure to produce his wife’s 
promised separation allowance.99  Although Myers described this protest disparagingly as 
“Indian like” in its ill humour and self-centeredness, the Agent considered “Simcoe has 
been very harshly dealt with, and it made a bad impression with the Indians here.”100  
Given that the Department wanted Native populations engaged in the war effort, Myers 
believed his superiors ought to both help the soldier out of prison and affirm his wife’s 
separation allowance.101  In addition, Myers lamented that “the Military Authorities 
should make some allowance for an Indian as it seems nature for him to sulk and not be 
aware that this is a serious action in war time.”102 
McLean followed Myers’ suggestion and forwarded the Agent’s information if 
not necessarily his opinion to the Militia.  The two government bodies sorted out the twin 
issues by December 1916.103  While this was by no means a quick turn around, Simcoe 
had Agent Myers as an advocate, which no doubt added significant weight to the 
Private’s arguments – Sarah Cope fought both the Department of Indian Affairs and the 
Militia Department.  She was not however the only individual who challenged an Agent’s 
decisions.  Mrs. Robert A. Solomon of Chippewa Hill wrote to the solicitor A.G. 
                                                
98 Pte. Ben Simcoe to Secretary J.D. McLean 24 July 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 6782 File 452-303; Lt.-
Col. i/c 157th Overseas Battalion to Indian Agent Myers 5 September 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 6782 File 
452-303. 





103 Secretary J.D. McLean to the Secretary of the Militia Council 25 September 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6782 File 452-303; Lt.-Col. Ingall for the Director of the Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay Branch 
of the Department of Militia and Defence 29 December 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 6782 File 452-303. 
 126 
Chisholm of London, Ontario in November 1918 for help as her Indian Agent, Thomas 
A. Stout, the same Agent some men had accused of forcing or attempting to force them 
into service, (see chapter two), had withdrawn her separation allowance and assigned pay 
for neglecting her children.104  She wanted her children back and needed the financial 
support her Agent withheld; Mrs. Solomon denied ever neglecting her children, and 
Chisholm assured military authorities “the agent makes no charge against her of any 
other misconduct.”105   
Chisholm appealed the Department’s decision to deny Mrs. Solomon her 
separation allowance, assigned pa, both of which the Militia informed him were paid to 
Indian Affairs, and annuity money, as he argued “it scarcely seems fair to deprive her of 
everything, even the interest money which belongs to herself.”106  Chisholm applied 
again to the Department of Indian Affairs just over a week after his first letter to obtain 
Mrs. Solomon’s annuity payments as she was in great need by the tenor of her letters to 
her lawyer, and “you can determine afterwards how far you will go in withholding her 
S.A. [separation allowance] from her.”107  Chisholm told the Separation Allowance and 
Assigned Pay Branch in a separate correspondence that he had heard “some rather 
surprising stories” about the Agent’s treatment of soldiers’ wives at Chippewa Hill “from 
different sources,” shedding some doubt on the Agent’s negative evaluation of Mrs. 
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Solomon and on his continued stewardship of Militia payments for his reserve.108  Mrs. 
Solomon also appealed to the law firm Robertson and McNabb in Walkerton to argue her 
case with the Department of Indian Affairs, presumably because after three months 
Chisholm had yet to provide any results.109 
Agent Stout defended his control over Mrs. Solomon’s money as a mutual 
decision between the two of them.  Stout claimed that Mrs. Solomon had approached him 
at the beginning of July 1918 to say she was leaving the reserve and would need someone 
to take care of her children.  Stout had found homes for her children, whom he claimed to 
have found in a pitiful state, and used Mrs. Solomon’s militia pay to support her family in 
her absence; he found what many Native and non-Native families had discovered, that “it 
takes the separation allowance and more too, to keep them going.”110  Additionally, and 
somewhat contradictorily, Stout wanted to economize as much as possible so that 
Solomon would come home to a nest egg, and “Mrs. R. A. Solomon would spend every 
cent and then she would have nothing.”111   
Stout claimed authority over the Solomon children based on their father’s 
instructions against leaving them in their mother’s care.112  Unfortunately for Mrs. 
Solomon, Stout had McLean’s personal assurance that “the course which you have 
adopted in this case is considered to be in the best interests of the children, and it [is] 
therefore approved.”113  McLean echoed this assessment to Mrs. Solomon’s two lawyers, 
                                                
108 Solicitor A.G. Chisholm to the Director of the Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay Branch of the 
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and added, “I am not inclined to give much credence to Mrs. Solomon’s sentences,” 
given the disparity between her version of events and that of Stout (McLean gave the 
latter preference).114   
While Chisholm asserted he had never seen Mrs. Solomon himself, he raised 
doubt about any investigation Agent Stout might make into herself or her children as 
biased and unreliable, and therefore questioned Robert Solomon’s desire to have his 
children out of his wife’s care, which he attributed to the Agent’s dubious reports.115  The 
lawyer questioned the Agent’s refusal to pay Mrs. Solomon her annuity money without a 
proper investigation to ensure the case warranted this measure allowed to the 
Superintendent General under section 92 sub-section c of the Indian Act.116  McLean 
dismissed this appeal to the legislation as Agent Stout claimed Mrs. Solomon told him 
she was leaving the reserve and therefore had passed through the permeable barrier 
between the world defined by the Indian Act and the outside.117   
 
Conclusion 
 The tension between the Indian Act’s authority structures that encouraged 
dependency and the Department of Indian Affairs’ goal to limit Native peoples’ 
dependency is evident in the debates around the practical application of support for 
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Native soldiers’ dependants.  In theory, as Native soldiers had hoped, their families ought 
to have had equal access to separation allowances and assigned pay as their non-Native 
comrades.  Reality proved significantly more complicated.  Native families had to prove 
themselves to both their Agent and the Militia or the local CPF to receive the aid to 
which they believed themselves entitled.  This meant navigating an additional structure to 
the Department’s “rudimentary” safety net system, with all the pre-war stereotypes of 
their inherent lack of economy, moral corruptibility, and inborn idleness.  The Copes 
faced all these assumptions, and found that even those prepared to advocate on their 
behalf did so only to a limited extent – Agents may have been prepared to give them 
provisions, or seek a separation allowance but they were not about to allow Sarah Cope 
the ability to control the money her sons sent her.   
 Sarah and others fought to protect and defend their access to Militia pay.  The 
Agents reinforced their own position in Native peoples’ life through their control on 
information and monies traveling between families and the Militia.  This was partially the 
result of the Department’s physical and informational infrastructure.  If the Militia 
needed baptismal certificates or a description of someone’s family circumstances on a 
reserve, the simplest method of collecting this information was to approach Indian 
Affairs. Additionally, many Native peoples appealed for help through the Department or 
its Agents.  This was likely in part a question of familiarity and expediency, as the 
Department and its employees provided Native people with the easiest, most direct link 
with the government.  Regardless of the motive however, these mutual appeals from 
inside and outside reserves reinforced the Department’s place in Native peoples lives, 
through the temporary war policy of separation allowances. 
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 Unfortunately for the Copes, neither son James nor Sarah survived the war.  
James was killed in action in July 1918 and Sarah succumbed to influenza in October of 
that year.118  In the wake of these tragedies, the family’s circumstances remained so poor 
that the Department of Indian Affairs successfully petitioned the Director of the 
Separation Allowance and Assigned Pay Branch to transfer Sarah’s Militia pay from her 
remaining son to Joseph, as “the family are badly in need of these allowances.”119  To 
improve his family’s financial circumstances, and to secure regular payments for himself 
and his family, Joseph applied for a military pension.120  Although he described Joseph as 
“a chronic complainer,” McLean assured the Board of the Pension Commissioners that 
“this man is really incapacitated, as we have received several medical certificates to that 
effect,” although he insisted, based on passed precedent, that Joseph’s pension be paid to 
the Department of Indian Affairs, to be held in trust for the Copes.121   
The Militia awarded Joseph (who still supported five children) fifteen dollars a 
month, to be paid through Indian Affairs.122  His son’s war-ending inventions may have 
come to little, but that did not douse his desire to serve.  While his mother’s fighting 
spirit was directed towards her family’s preservation, she and the male members of the 
Copes all fought and wanted their sacrifice appropriately rewarded.  That tenacity, it 
seems, may have paid off in the end as a pension. 
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Chapter 4:  
The Native Fight against Conscription1  
 
 In late November 1917, the Tsimshian of Port Simpson and the Nisga’a on the 
Naas River (present day Nass River) sent identical petitions directly to Prime Minister 
Borden, leader of the opposition Wilfrid Laurier, and the Department of Indian Affairs.  
The two bands used their status as Indians under the Indian Act to protest their inclusion 
in the Military Service Act.  Individually, men in the two bands could apply for 
exemption from military duty as fishers, farmers, as workers in other essential industries, 
or if they had significant family responsibilities.  They could not apply for an exemption 
because they were Native men – wards of the Crown without the rights (and obligations) 
of citizenship – a situation the petitioners denounced as unjust.  
The Port Simpson and Nisga’a protesters decried the Military Service Act’s 
inclusion of Native men on the constitutional ground that Native peoples were 
unrepresented in Canadian governance. “At no time”, they wrote in their petitions, “have 
our Indians had any say in the making of the laws of Canada.”2  In addition, the Nisga’a 
argued specifically, as wards of the Government, that “Department at Ottawa” had been 
wrong to apply the Military Service Act “to the Indians in the same manner as it does to 
White people who are British subject[s].”  If they were to be conscripted, the petitioners 
wanted some reciprocal move towards citizenship and away from Indian Act-based 
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2 Petition of the Port Simpson Band to Prime Minister Robert Borden, Wilfrid Laurier and the Indian 
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dependency, and they “beg[ged] the Government to open the Door for us to come 
forward and to fulfill our duty to our King and Country.”3   
These protests against conscription must be understood in the context of these 
communities’ prewar challenges to the Department of Indian Affairs and the authority of 
the Indian Act.  The members of the Naas Agency were not the only Native protestors in 
British Columbia, but they were a focal point of the political activity that informed much 
of the debate against conscription in Native communities.  The chapter illustrates the 
importance of an historical perspective in understanding the conscription debate, and 
reveals how the contents and contours of that debate shaped the larger struggle over 
Native administration and land ownership in British Columbia.  Its focus on Native 
groups not among His Majesty’s Indian Allies also offers a detailed counterpoint to the 
usual historians’ narrative that emphasizes Native groups’ appeals to traditional 
relationships between themselves and the British Crown to justify their political 
positions. 
Tsimshian and Nisga’a peoples living along the Naas River had resisted white 
encroachment on their land as well as the authority of the Department of Indian Affairs 
for a generation prior to the introduction of conscription in 1917.  The government 
insisted that Native men were subject to conscription; Native peoples countered with the 
specific legal status of Indian described in the Indian Act, or with treaties that prohibited, 
or seemed to prohibit, forced military service.  The Nass and Port Simpson protests 
belonged had no basis in treaty language because they had no treaties.  They deployed the 
discourse of the Indian Act to test the Military Service Act.  This was both offence and 
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defence from the perspective of Native political activists, who acted to protect what rights 
and privileges they could claim against the very real threat of forced overseas military 
service, and simultaneously sought to expand or legitimize other claims, particularly 
aboriginal land title unsecured by treaty.   
The Port Simpson Tsimshian and Nisga’a argued that Indians under the Indian 
Act should not be obliged to perform the duties of citizenship, even in times of war, if 
they were denied all of its privileges.  The petitioners used their unresolved appeal for the 
recognition of Aboriginal title as an exclamation point to their conscription protests.  The 
two bands asserted that their “land case” had languished in the Government’s hands for 
“a very considerable time” without any result or resolution.4     
A broad spectrum of groups and individuals across Canada contested conscription 
with a range of arguments that usually followed existing fault lines within Canadian 
society.  Whether examining wartime relations between French and English Canadians, 
urban and rural dwellers, residents of different Canadian regions, or labour and capital, 
historians have typically couched these battles over conscription in terms of the powerful 
or influential dictating to the weak.5  James Walker has noted that Native peoples nearly 
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universally opposed conscription, regardless of their participation in other war programs, 
on the basis that they were disenfranchised and were parties to treaties that prohibited 
conscription.6  Yet, the asymmetries contained within the Indian Act predated the war, 
and the Port Simpson and Nisga’a petitioners used conscription as a new platform from 
which to address and press long-standing grievances.   
 
Two Generations of Political Culture and Protest in the Naas Agency (1880-1915) 
 The Port Simpson and Nisga’a arguments against conscription were part of a 
generation-old effort by the Native peoples along the Naas and Skeena Rivers to protect 
both their land against white encroachment and their rights against non-Native 
authorities.  Beginning in the 1880s, groups from both nations sent delegations to major 
non-Native centres of power.  These parties included Nisga’a Chief Mountain’s protest to 
Victoria in 1881, and that of the three Tsimshian Chiefs – John Tait, Edward Mathers and 
Herbert Wallace – who along with missionary William Duncan met with Prime Minister 
Macdonald in Ottawa in 1885 to discuss the question of their land ownership.  Petitions 
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from the Chiefs of both the Nisga’a and Tsimshian demanding that non-Native authorities 
recognize Aboriginal title, sign treaties with Native bands, and allow for and recognize 
the establishment of self-government among these bands drew the federal-provincial 
Commission to Inquire into the State and Condition of the Indians of the North West 
Coast of British Columbia to Kincolith, Naas Harbour and Port Simpson in 1887.  There, 
Native witnesses argued unsuccessfully for equal treatment with white men under the law 
because they were already equal in God’s eyes.7     
This mixture of Christianity with Aboriginal political activism illustrated 
missionary influence in the area before the growth of white settlements in the late 19th 
century.  The original missionary model settlements of Metlakatla, Greenville 
(Laxgalts’ap) and Kincolith (Gingolx) entrenched a Christian presence in the area that 
would become the Naas Agency.8  Anglican missionaries established the Nisga’a 
language (and later English) newspaper Hagaga: The Indians’ Own Newspaper, at 
Aiyansh in 1891.  Over time, the paper’s staff included a growing number of local 
Nisga’a, and Hagaga offered local white and Nisga’a writers an avenue for discussing 
issues of local interest, while encouraging English proficiency among the Nisga’a.9   
While those along the Naas and Skeena rivers adjusted to the changing social and 
religious world, their physical world was being redrawn over one thousand kilometers to 
the south in Victoria.  Governor Sir James Douglas created reserve allotments in the 
1850s, but British Columbia’s colonial administrators significantly reduced those initial 
                                                
7 Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia,  1849-
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land parcels in the two decades before Confederation.  The ten acres per family policy of 
the colonial government was inconsistent with the Dominion’s promise of 160 acres per 
family in the numbered treaties signed across the Prairies.10  British Columbia and 
Canada began an awkward dance over jurisdiction.  The two governments clashed over 
who controlled reserve land, who was entitled to resources found on or under reserves, 
and who should decide how much territory could and should be allotted to the province’s 
original inhabitants.11   
Forty years after British Columbia joined Canada and its Native populations were 
brought under the jurisdiction of the Indian Act, Native people living in the Naas Agency 
asserted that they were “beginning to see,” the reserve system and non-Native authorities’ 
ways and methods in ways their grandparents had not.12  A new generation of political 
organizers sought to combine Native interests and tradition with their better understating 
of non-Native authorities’ attitudes and practices.  Disappointed and frustrated in dealings 
with the various levels of government, Charles Barton of Kincolith established the 
Nisga’a Land Committee in 1907, to represent multiple Nisga’a clans through a rotating 
leadership.  Although Barton and the Committee members were committed to 
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maintaining Nisga’a traditions, they wore business suits in an effort to command 
attention from non-Native authorities; this showed the Nisga’a awareness of their 
adversary, and an effort to overcome or challenge any negative expectations white 
authorities’ had about Native peoples.13   
The Nisga’a Land Committee worked with the neighbouring Port Simpson 
Tsimshian to defend Native ownership and use of land as the town of Prince Rupert grew 
around the Agency.14  Building on this collaboration, members of the Nisga’a Land 
Committee also looked to nations away from the Naas River for allies, and with the Coast 
Salish formed the Indian Rights Association in 1909.15   
 
Immediate Pre-Conscription Attitudes about Land and Identity at Naas 
In 1915, two years before the introduction of the Military Service Act, Chief 
Nelson of the (Tsimshian) Kitsumkalum stood among his fellows and faced the BC Royal 
Commission on Indian Affairs (hereafter, the McKenna-McBride Commission, 1912-
1916) during their visit to the Naas Agency.  Nelson demanded one simple thing of the 
assembled provincial and federal representatives: “a paper saying that this land is yours 
and here is your title, and when you want to dispose of this land you can sell it to anyone 
who wants to buy it.”  Nelson wanted to own his land “just like a white man”; he did not 
want a reserve, and he certainly did not want the Government to hold his land in trust for 
him.16  The Kitsumkalum’s life on the reserve was “not [a] free life,” and another band 
                                                
13 Tennant, 86. 
14 Ibid, 87. 
15 The Nisga’a Land Committee did not cease to exist with this new institution and although they were 
actively involved in the Indian Rights Association, the Nisga’a remained committed to their own issues as 
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member demanded that the Commissioners “let us be free; that is what we want because 
God gave us and to live on.”17  According to Nelson, the separate legal, economic, and 
physical existence that the Indian Act and the Department had created was unjust and 
harmful to Native peoples’ present and future success.  The Chief’s declaration 
challenged the McKenna-McBride Commissioners' goal of confirming permanently the 
sizes of reserves across British Columbia, and undermined the authority of Indian Affairs 
administration as immoral, illegal and unwanted.18   
Many residents of the area between the south bank of the Skeena and the 
headwaters of the Naas River rejected reserves as an infantilizing and restrictive method 
of managing their lives and affairs.  One Native witness who spoke before the McKenna-
McBride Commission at Port Essington remarked that the reserve system might work 
elsewhere in the country but he certainly did not think it worked at the Naas Agency.  
Rather he believed that living on reserves kept Native peoples “babies all the time.”  “We 
want to grow,” he told the commissioners, “and these reserves are a hindrance to our 
growth.”19   
                                                
17 Ibid., 2. 
18 The Royal Commission on Indian Affairs in the Province of British Columbia’s work arose from a dual 
assumption that Aboriginal title was extinguished and that the needs of British Columbia’s Native 
populations on reserve would not increase in the future (suggesting both governments’ faith in the 
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adjustments as per the Indian Act.  Given the Commissioners’ direct authority from the Governor General 
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19 Transcript of the Hearings of the Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British 
Columbia, Naas Agency, 6.  These anti-Indian Act or Indian Affairs’ sentiments were not unique tot he 
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William Leighton of Metlakatla pointed out that he and his fellow Native men 
could not vote and that Native peoples were not recognized as persons under the Indian 
Act.  When the Commission Chairman pointed out that Native people enjoyed several 
unique privileges under the Indian Act, such as not having to pay taxes, Leighton 
asserted that the burdens of non-enfranchisement far outweighed such benefits, and that 
he believed members of his community were generally too poor to pay taxes.20  The large 
bureaucratic system of the far-off Department of Indian Affairs that had been so recently 
imposed on British Columbia’s Native peoples, with its reserves of ever-changing 
borders and dubious legitimacy, did not have the historical antecedents of reserve 
elsewhere in Canada, or the legal foundations of the numbered treaties.  When Chief 
Nelson asked for a piece of paper, he spoke for a people who knew that they were the 
original occupants of the land, but who had no treaty or document to define and defend 
their title. 
Frustratingly for numerous witnesses across British Columbia who attempted to 
raise this issue, the Commissioners would not even discuss Aboriginal title.  Angered by 
this refusal to address what indigenous people perceived as the fundamental issue of land, 
one witness dismissed the Commission as futile: “We are sorry that we expected to go 
more fully into the land question but seeing that they [the Commissioners] are not 
                                                                                                                                            
Naas Agency.  Residents of the Babine Agency requested the Government repeal the Indian Act, and they 
challenged the idea that the Government held their land in trust in the form of reserves, as “we know the 
Reserves are only temporary and don’t belong to us and they go back again to the Government.” Transcript 
of the Hearings of  the Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British Columbia, Babine 
Agency, 15 April 1915, p. 1 LAC RG 33 M104 78903/15. 
20 The issue of taxation here ought to be clarified; they were discussing principally point of sales tax as 
personal income tax had yet to be introduced in Canada. Transcript of the Hearings of  the Royal 
Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British Columbia, Naas Agency, p. 27-28 LAC RG 33 
M104 78903/15. 
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empowered to do so it would be useless for us to say any more on the subject.”21  At Port 
Simpson, disaffected and disappointed witnesses proved so reticent to answer the 
Commissioners’ questions that the Chairman concluded the hearings with the warning, 
“if members of this Tribe later on discover that some of the other Tribes have faired [sic] 
better than they themselves at the hands of the Commission,” it was their own fault “for 
not having answered our questions more clearly.”22   
One group of anonymous petitioners from the Naas Agency argued that they were 
“the lawful and original inhabitants and the possessors of all the lands” along the Naas 
River, “from time immemorial.”  Appealing to the recognition of Aboriginal claims to 
land by the British in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, they believed they were “standing 
well within…[their] constitutional rights,” to “forbid” the non-Native authorities staking 
“off land in this valley, and do hereby protest against your proceeding further into our 
country with that end in view.”23  The petitioners insisted their circumstances differed 
from those in other areas covered by treaties, rendering baseless the authority of the 
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Department of Indian Affairs in British Columbia.  While Chief Nelson wanted to own 
his land outright rather than have it administered by another party, the anonymous 
petitioners argued that any discussion of land between Native peoples and the 
Government in the Naas Agency was based on a false foundation and ignored Native 
peoples’ rights as original occupants.  Both complainants wanted to take back control of 
the land, and challenged the federal and by extension provincial government’s right to 
dictate how land was distributed and the restrictions the government placed upon Native 
peoples’ legal rights within the province.   
The debates over land ownership and rights extended beyond the Naas Agency.  
Anticipating the McKenna-McBride Commission’s report, Andrew Paull, political 
organizer and community leader from the Squamish reserve North of Vancouver, held a 
conference on his reserve in June 1916 at which sixteen Native groups (from both the 
coast and interior) formed the Allied Indian Tribes of British Columbia when they united 
the Indian Rights Association with the Interior Tribes.24  They immediately sought to 
bring land claims through the Canadian court system to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council in London, arguing the existence of Aboriginal title and seeking treaties 
with Canada and self-government within their own communities. 25  Therefore, the 
McKenna-McBride Commissioners arrived in communities that were already 
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participating in inter-nation political activism with the goal of achieving and expanding 
their title and land rights. 
 
Conscription and the Naas  
In the spring of 1917, Prime Minister Borden determined to supplement Canada’s 
over-extended volunteer soldiers with conscripts.  In July, Parliament passed a selective 
service (conscription) bill, the Military Service Act.26  Over the summer and fall of that 
year, beginning before the act passed into law, Native Chiefs, Councils and other 
interested parties flooded the Department of Indian Affairs, the Department of Militia and 
the Department of Justice with petitions, inquiries and opinions about whether Native 
men were subject to the Military Service Act.27  It was a necessary question, since 
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November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Indian Agent Charles Cox (Alberni, BC) to 
D.C. Scott 13 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Indian Agent Graham (Lytton, 
BC) to D.C. Scott 13 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt 1; Indian Agent George 
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Deputy Minister of Justice Edmund Leslie Newcombe explained to D. C. Scott, that his 
ministry had not considered Native men when it drafted the Act.  Now faced with 
argument that Native men ought to be exempt because of their unique status as wards 
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Mohawks to King George 2 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Parry Island 
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1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Chief John Prince (Clandeboye) to D.C. Scott 27 
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within the Indian Act, and/or because of specific treaty provisions, Newcombe sought 
Scott’s advice.28   
Scott told Newcombe that despite Native peoples’ status as wards of the Crown, 
“the policy of the Department [of Indian Affairs] is that the [Military Service] Act should 
apply to Indians,” and “there are no existing treaties which promise immunity from 
military service.”29  Scott argued that the law applied to all British subjects, into which 
category he placed Native men.  Although he assured one of his Agents that “the officers 
of this Department are not responsible for the enforcement of the [Military Service] Act,” 
Scott sent the Military Service Council a list of all his Agents, their addresses and 
estimates of the number of eligible men living in their respective agencies to facilitate the 
process of conscripting their wards.30   
Native men were expected to register with the military authorities, as were all 
other Canadian men, by 17 November.  Native men between the age of 20 and 45 
(initially) were to fill out a form available at the local Post Office, present themselves to 
the local Medical Board to be evaluated for combat readiness, and (if they could) present 
to the local tribunal their case for a domestic, work or conscientious exemption from 
combatant service.31  The Ministry of Justice eventually extended the deadline for Native 
registration to 1 February 1918 in response to a series of miscommunications with Agents 
                                                
28 For examples of specific appeals based on one or both of these two issues, please see the above footnote 
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WWI File 10-47 A. 
 145 
and difficulties overcoming the practical problems of language barriers, the geographic 
isolation of reserves (a particular problem in many of the remote areas of British 
Columbia), and the fact that many Native men worked as hunters and loggers in far-flung 
corners of the country.32  Indian Affairs informed its Agents “it is not practicable and you 
are therefore not expected to take any special action to call in the Indian hunters who are 
maintaining themselves in their aboriginal way.”33  Through all these practical difficulties 
and against Scott’s determination to silence Native protests, Chiefs and band members 
across the country engaged in fierce legal and moral battles with government officials 
over whether they and their men could be forced to fight for Canada. 
A week before the Port Simpson signatories posted their petition, Naas Agency 
Indian Agent Charles Perry told Scott that he had received death threats over the possible 
imposition of conscription (which he dismissed as common during land claim debates on 
the Agency).34  Regardless of his feelings about the threats against him, Perry admitted 
the feeling around the Agency was “very bitter.”35  Members of the Naas Agency had left 
their work in the lumber camps of Swanson Bay, where they cut spruce timber for 
military airplanes, and returned to home in apparent anticipation of conflict over 
                                                
32 “Circular No. 86: Circular Memorandum to Registrars and Deputy Registrars” from the Department of 
Justice Military Service Branch 16 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Such 
concerns were raised by Indian Agent Hogan (Thessalon Ontario) to Secretary J.D. McLean 13 November 
1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Indian Agent Bosse (Bersimis Quebec) to Secretary J.D. 
McLean 11 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Indian Agent Bastien to 
Secretary J.D. McLean 8 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Indian Agent Pitre 
(Restigouche Quebec) to D.C. Scott 7 October 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Indian 
Agent Taillon (Lake of the Two Mountains Quebec) to D.C. Scott 10 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Indian Agent Wright (Fort Frances Ontario) to D.C. Scott 8 November 1917 LAC 
RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1. In an attempt to better understand all these concerns, Scott sent a 
general letter to all agents over whether they had been able to convince their Indians to register and claim 
exemption if necessary, D.C. Scott to all Indian Agents 12 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 
452-20 Pt. 1. 
33 Memorandum from D.C. Scott to all Indian Agents 31 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-
20 Pt. 1. 
34 Indian Agent C.C. Perry to D.C. Scott 11 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1. 
35 Ibid. 
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conscription.36  The Agency was a hive of anti-conscription activity, with “frequent and 
lengthly [sic] meetings,” whose participants made “statements [that] are quite hostile and 
drastic.” 37  Attendees asserted that their Indian status excluded them from the Canadian 
political process, and hence from conscription. Talk even turned to conspiracy theories 
that “the war was started on purpose [so] that the Government might bring the Indians 
into it and kill them.”  The assembled men said they would rather fight against the British 
forces than for them, if this assertion were true.38   
The strong reaction against conscription in the Naas Agency communities 
contrasted with previous, more enthusiastic participation in other aspects of the war 
effort.  As early as November 1914, Native women in Metlakatla were “busy making 
socks for the troops,” in cooperation with the local non-Native women’s Auxiliary, socks 
meant for the Prince Rupert Canadian Patriotic Fund.39  At a March 1916 Metlakatla 
band meeting, which (a not disinterested) Perry described as marked by “a spirit of 
dignified loyalty,” “leading Indians” spoke of the Canadian and Imperial governments 
with “most graceful and pleasing sentiments throughout.”40   Perry took credit for this 
enthusiasm, that “to date the response has been most loyal where it has been possible for 
                                                
36 Inspector W.E. Ditchburn to D.C. Scott 20 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1. 
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38 Indian Agent C.C. Perry to D.C. Scott 11 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1.  
This was not the first time members of the Naas Agency asserted the government sought to kill them off 
through soldiering.  While on a Native-specific recruiting trip, former Indian Inspector A.M. Tyson 
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39 On 21 November 1914, despite a bad year of tuberculosis, the Metlakatla band resolved to donate $50 
from its band funds to the CPF, in addition to $90 the women of the reserve had already collected at a 
village basket social.  Indian Agent C.C. Perry to Secretary J.D. McLean 23 November 1914 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6762 File 452-2 Pt. 1; Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended 
March 31 1915 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1915), 332. 
40 Indian Agent C.C. Perry to D.C. Scott 17 March 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-2 Pt.1. 
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me to interest the Indians” in the wider Canadian war effort.41  Because some speakers 
expressed a desire to place the money they donated to the war effort and the baskets and 
socks the band’s women had produced literally at King George’s feet, Perry sought some 
“imperial acknowledgment,” as he believed the band wanted recognition of their 
generosity.  Perry took personal amount of credit for this enthusiasm, that “to date the 
response has been most loyal where it has been possible for me to interest the Indians” in 
the wider Canadian war effort.42  Despite the self-congratulatory nature of his statement, 
Perry’s report suggests that the Agency’s activities were legitimate and sincere evidence 
of sympathy for the war effort.  
The Metlakatla donations, and the associated patriotic pronouncements, were 
mirrored elsewhere in the province.  The Department recorded $5,047.36 from British 
Columbia and $1,140.00 from the Naas Agency.43 From Bella Coola, Indian Constable 
Charles Tucker for Bella Coola claimed “several” young men in the area had asked him 
what they could do “towards helping King George in this fight.”44   Yet, enlistment 
among Native peoples in British Columbia drew mixed reactions from several sources.  
As mentioned in chapter two, several military officials disparaged Native men in the 
province.  In the Department’s 1919 report, Scott wrote that Native peoples in the 
                                                
41 Indian Agent C.C. Perry to Secretary J.D. McLean 17 March 1916 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-2 
Pt. 1. 
42 Ibid. 
43 The additional $1,090.00 from the Agency went to local Patriotic Funds [caps because this is a proper 
noun].  The Department’s records overlooked individual donations that went unrecorded or unnoticed by 
Agents.  For instance, the Department recorded no donations from the Maritimes.  Dominion of Canada 
Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended 31 March 1919 (Ottawa: King’s 
Printer, 1919), 25-26. 
44 Indian Constable Charles Tucker to Secretary J.D. McLean 24 November 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6762 File 452-20 Pt. 1.  Other examples of British Columbian bands’ willingness to contribute funds 
include: Indian Agent Halliday to Secretary J.D. McLean 11 September 1914 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 
File 452-20 Pt. 1; Ahousaht Band to the Department of Indian Affairs 25 December 1917 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6762 File 452-2 Pt. 2; George E. Darby, Medical Superintendent of the Bella Bella Rivers Inlet 
Hospital to D.C. Scott 18 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6762 File 452-2 Pt. 3.  
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province were “somewhat less warlike in character than those of the plains and in the 
eastern provinces, and are by nature averse to leaving their homes upon any unfamiliar 
venture.”45  However, the report provided contradictory evidence in its descriptions of the 
two soldiers: Distinguished Conduct Medal winner Pte George McLean from the Head of 
the Lake band, and Military Medal winner Dan Pearson of the 143rd Overseas Battalion 
from Metlakatla, who had died of pneumonia.  There was discussion of a possible all-
Native Brass Band from the province.46  Inspector Andrew Mann Tyson traveled the 
province seeking (at least) 170 Native volunteers for a Forestry Battalion in the spring of 
1917.47  Tyson visited the Naas Agency among others, but found attitudes about 
soldiering among the Native men less than encouraging.  He reported that some of those 
he encountered on this trip believed the government wanted Native men to enlist so that 
they might die overseas, but he attributed this conviction to the work of white agitators.48   
Resistance to enlistment is compatible with donating to war funds.  Active service 
in the military represented a greater demand on and invasion into Native peoples’ lives 
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Inspector Graham to D.C. Scott 8 February 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6766 File 452-13. 
 149 
than financial or other in-kind contributions, and some Native communities in British 
Columbia and across the country offered donations in lieu of sending men, as discussed 
in chapter one.49  Foreshadowing future problems, Indian Agent Loring of the Babine 
Agency expressed thanks that he and Tyson had only had to deal with recalcitrant elders 
and “met with none of the usual contexts on the line of the loss of their land and similar 
refrains,” although a month later he complained that “the general question on their land 
‘taken away’ had been cited” at a recruiting meeting.50  Tyson praised Indian Agents 
Perry, Loring and McAllan for helping his work, but he could convince few members of 
any Agency in the province – and he recorded none from Naas - to enlist, and had marked 
success only at the Stuart Lake Agency.51  Officials of Military District 11 (British 
Columbia) cancelled his efforts in June 1917 as Tyson had enlisted only seventeen men, 
mostly from Stuart Lake, and his journeys to remote reserves proved too expensive for 
such paltry results.52   
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Opposition to conscription, however, was nearly universal among the native 
people of the province.  The Kwakwaka’wakw at Alert Bay asked why “they should be 
called on to fight for their country,” when Canada was not their country but “their 
country has been taken away from them.”53  Other members of the Allied Tribes of 
British Columbia sent petitions to Borden, Laurier and the Department in November and 
December of 1917, objecting to the MSA in words very similar to those used by the 
petitioners from Port Simpson and Naas: “that at no time have our Indians had any say in 
the making of the laws of Canada.”54  While not explicitly self-identified as part of an 
organized effort, the similarity in language between the petitions, the travels of J.A. Teit, 
the secretary of the Allied Tribes around the province, and meetings held at his home in 
Spences Bridge, all point to a level of collective interest and concerted action articulated 
through earlier-established links among the Native groups of British Columbia.55  The 
Prime Minister’s office and the Victoria Colonist both received a similar but more 
general petition from the Committee of Allied Tribes of British Columbia.  This petition 
argued that given British Columbian Native peoples’ outstanding land claims and their 
status as Indians, conscription would be equal to enslavement - and warned that any 
attempt to enforce conscription on Native men would “probably cause bloodshed.” 56  
                                                                                                                                            
had of leading his men into battle in France.  Major Reynolds Tite for the OC 23rd Infantry Brigade to AAG 
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54 Albert Argyle, Solomon Brown, James Lewis, Samson McDonald, William Lewis and Joseph White of 
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The petition further argued that the British Empire’s stated rationale for the war – 
{repeat this rationale succinctly here to remind your readers} -- was in direct conflict 
with Canada’s oppression of a “weak race.”57  The Committee of Allied Tribes contrasted 
patriotic language against the war’s practical and unpleasant realities; how could a 
government committed to fighting oppression and militarism force a small, 
disadvantaged and disenfranchised population into uniform?  Beyond the legal arguments 
against conscripting people who were the Crown’s wards, the Committee petition argued 
that conscription was culturally foreign to the Coastal peoples – even “repulsive to the 
Indian mind” – as it clashed with the practice of chiefly power that was based on 
persuasion rather than coercion.58  A Chief would not and could not force his warriors to 
fight against their will, hence the general support (or at least toleration) of voluntary 
enlistment even if the Chiefs preferred that their men not enlist.59  Committee secretary 
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J.A. Teit held a number of private meetings with “leading Indians” and several public 
meetings on unspecified reserves, at which Teit claimed that he had not encountered one 
individual among the Coastal peoples who was in favour of conscription.60   
 
The Institutional Response to the Conscription Ultimatum 
This was primarily a political and legal dispute between Native peoples, and by 
extension the Committee, and the Department, rather than strictly a question of military 
necessity at a time of war.  Despite its auspicious name, Scott believed that the 
Committee of Allied Tribes was less representative of British Columbia Native people’s 
opinion than its members claimed it to be.  Deputy Minister of Justice Newcombe 
received a telegram from a Victoria lawyer on behalf of fourteen unnamed chiefs who 
neither endorsed the Committee’s petition nor supported its violent threats and who 
generally did “not want to be associated with the matter.”61  In rebuttal, Committee 
secretary Teit speculated that these Chiefs might have separated themselves from the 
Committee’s petition because they disagreed with the threatened violent resistance to 
conscription, pointing out that the Cowichan “do not believe in bloodshed” of any kind.62  
Scott disagreed with the Committee of Allied Tribes’ claim that “[their] land 
question [is] not settled and [their] citizenship [is] withheld,” and he defended the 
McKenna-McBride Commission’s conclusions, which he thought presented “a very fair 
offer…and they are aware of the proposed terms of settlement,” even as he attributed the 
report’s dilatory implementation to the slow movement of both the provincial and 
                                                
60 J.A. Teit to D.C. Scott 20 December 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1. 
61 Deputy Minister of Justice E.L. Newcombe to D.C. Scott 21 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 
File 452-20 Pt. 1. 
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dominion governments.63  In a further effort to discredit the Committee of Allied Tribes’ 
work, Scott questioned the authenticity of its Chairman, P.R. Kelly and Teit as voices for 
Native people.  The Department chose to ignore the fact that Kelly was a Haida, and 
instead identified him as (tacitly white) Methodist Minister and teacher on Vancouver 
Island; they emphasized that Teit was only married to a Native woman and not Native 
himself.64   
This ad hominem attack on members of the Committee’s leadership as a method 
of delegitimizing the content of the organization’s protests was in keeping with the 
government officials’ penchant to blame white interference for Native activism in 
British Columbia and elsewhere in Canada. They attributed such interference either to 
organized efforts or occasional contact with “loggers, fishermen, and foreigners.”65  
Scott gave little credit to petitions sent from various bands echoing the concern 
expressed by the Committee but bearing the signatures or marks of band members.66  
Similarly, Scott ignored Agent Perry’s warning of the growing unrest over conscription 
and the concentration in the Naas of frustrated young men home from work in the forest 
and angry over conscription. 
Perhaps due to his proximity to the issues at hand, Southwestern British Columbia 
Inspector W.E. Ditchburn was far more open to the Committee’s concerns.  Ditchburn 
allowed that the land question was “far from settled at present,” and genuinely feared a 
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violent outcome.  As the Indian Act necessitated that a majority of adult male band 
members approve any land sales (including those recommended by the McKenna-
McBride Commission), the Inspector believed “it would be in the national interest that 
when Indians had registered and asked for exemption [from conscription], this exemption 
should be granted.”67  Scott rejected Ditchburn’s argument for a general exemption due to 
the British Columbia bands’ “alleged claims against the Crown,” because “it would 
savour of an acknowledgement that they occupied a different position from the other 
Indians of the Dominion.”68   
Southeastern British Columbia Inspector A.E. Megraw suspected that the Indian 
Rights Association (the precursor to the Committee of Allied Tribes) was spreading anti-
conscription “propaganda” among his Agencies, and was “responsible for much of the 
unrest among the Indians.”69  At the Allied Tribe meetings in Spences Bridge, an 
informant claimed that secretary Teit had encouraged his listeners to refuse to register, 
regardless of any possible exemptions.  The Inspector argued unsuccessfully for the arrest 
of members of the Committee under the British Defence of the Realm Act for inciting 
Native people to disobey a Canadian law designed to ensure “public safety in [a] time of 
war.”70  Instead Teit was allowed to continue to advocate on behalf of Native men in 
uniform (although on an individual basis) until the McKenna-McBride Commission’s 
report emerged on the provincial legislative agenda in 1919 and Native political 
organizations shifted their attention accordingly.71 
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Regardless of the talk about legal status and historical relationships, Scott 
privately told Newcombe that since Native men in the province – including the Naas 
Agency – were largely fishermen, their work was important enough to the province’s 
economic livelihood that they would likely largely be exempt from conscription.72  Yet to 
cede to Native demands openly, and to acknowledge the legitimacy of their pre-war 
arguments, meant appearing to collapse in the face of Native threats.  He might have been 
“besieged by letters, telegrams, and applications for exemption,” but Scott would not 
yield.  He wanted all Native men of eligible age and fitness to register with the Military 
authorities. 
Despite the protests Scott received from the Naas Agency, British Columbia, and 
other regions of the country -- “naturally the Indians apply to me for advice,” was how 
Scott put it -- it was not the Department of Indian Affairs’ responsibility to implement the 
Military Service Act.73  Indian Affairs was still responsible for civilian affairs of Native 
peoples, however.  Scott used this power to urge compliance with the Military Service 
Act.  With the men home from the lumber camps, and therefore not drawing salaries, late 
year floods had seriously interrupted the fishing activities crucial to the livelihood of the 
Native families at Naas.  Knowing of their economic distress, Scott relayed a message 
through the Allied Tribe secretary Teit to the population in the Naas Agency.  The 
Department was sending help and Scott told Teit, whose organization’s petitions attacked 
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the nature of Native-government relations, “I hope they will realize what it means to 
them to have the Department to appeal to under circumstances of this kind.”74     
The questions the Naas and Allied Tribe petitioners raised over conscription 
extended to the wider question of Native peoples’ place in the Canadian legal system, and 
the role of the Department of Indian Affairs in their lives.  Scott’s help to the Naas 
Agency residents shows how dependence on the Government was both a method and an 
outcome of the effort to assimilate Native peoples and to suppress their independence.  
When given the opportunity at the McKenna-McBride Commission hearings, members of 
the Naas Agency had lamented how reserves infantilized them, and they took advantage 
of the debate over conscription to challenge the Department’s authority in their lives.  Yet 
when the Agency faced serious economic upheaval, the Department offered aid, albeit 
with Scott’s assertion that he “hope[d] they will realize what it means to them” to have 
the Department to give such help.  While the Committee of Allied Tribes’ petitions 
challenged both the power of the Indian Act (specifically the legal status of Indian) and 
the Military Service Act, Scott responded by emphasizing the rudimentary safety net the 
Indian Act provided. 
 
Conclusion  
On 17 January 1918, the Clerk of the Privy Council published an Order in 
Council, P.C. 111, that alluded to the overwhelming volume of petitions and inquiries 
that Native peoples and their advocates had sent to various government bodies, “pointing 
out that in view of their [Native peoples] not having any right to vote,” so Native men 
should “not be compelled to perform military service.”  P.C. 111 also cited a dispatch 
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from 14 October 1873 during the negotiations of the North West Angle Treaty that 
exempted Native people from service in the military.  This was a rare acknowledgment of 
treaty agreement as a form of legal precedent and repudiated Scott’s previous dismissal 
of treaties to the conscription debate.75   
Unless they were enfranchised (the proclamation included Japanese- and German-
Canadian residents without the right to vote as well as Native men), Native men in 
Canada could not be compelled to serve overseas, although the exemption still left home 
service open as a possibility for Native conscripts.  However, as a method of ensuring 
that only those under the jurisdiction of the Department of Indian Affairs – Indians – 
could claim this exemption, the proclamation insisted that Indian Agents would make the 
exemption applications on behalf of Native men on their reserves (see chapter five).76  
Therefore, although they were not forced overseas, Native men still had to register with 
their Indian Agent, rather than individually with the Military authorities.  Because the 
exemption only applied to status Indians, Indian Agents and their treaty pay lists became 
crucial arbiters of exemption from conscription.  It was a man’s inclusion in the Indian 
Affairs’ legislative umbrella rather than his heritage that determined eligibility for an 
exemption from conscription as an Indian.77   
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the process of obtaining exemptions and occasionally brought the Department and the Militia in conflict 
over differing interpretations of PC 111, but in the end the Agents’ power to decide who was and was not 
eligible for this exemption from conscription remained intact.  Circular to Indian Agents 30 January 1918 
LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; D.C. Scott to Captain Tyndale, Secretary of the Military 
Subcommittee 20 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6778 File 452-197; D.C. Scott to All Indian Agents 
(Circular) 22 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Secretary J.D. McLean to All 
Indian Agents (Circular) 23 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Memorandum to 
D.C. Scott 3 July 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 3181 File 452,124 – 1A; Secretary J.D. McLean to the 
Secretary of the Military Service Council 16 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3; 
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 Scott curtly informed Teit on 23 January 1918 that (status) Indians were now 
exempt from conscription for overseas service.  Native groups, individuals, and outside 
advocates forced a debate on conscription after the Department had made their initial, 
although Scott thought final, decision that Native men ought to be eligible for 
conscription.  Importantly, band councils and individuals challenged Scott’s rationale and 
even advanced their interpretation of Native people’s place in Canada and the country’s 
legal system.  The sheer number of band members who independently, persistently, and 
clearly articulated arguments centered on Indian status and treaties, eventually achieved 
their desired ends. 
Petitioners from the Naas Agency challenged conscription using the language and 
logic of Indian status and the Indian Act.  Yet by their success – because achieving the 
exemption, reversing Departmental policy and avoiding forced overseas military service 
was certainly a victory – petitioners reinforced those aspects of the Indian Act that they 
had so long and vociferously denounced.  Considering the Naas’ repeated appeals over 
two generations against non-Native encroachment and control of their lives and land, 
clearly articulated by the witnesses at the McKenna-McBride Commission, the 
conscription question’s resolution was bittersweet.  True, they would not loose any sons 
to overseas combat; but they were still to be counted among Canada’s population, still 
under the Indian Act and yet still without “any say in the making of the laws of Canada.”  
The exemption from conscription for Native men was a partial victory for those 
who sought to challenge the Indian Act.  Three years prior to P.C. 111, at the McKenna-
McBride Commission hearings at the Naas Agency, Benjamin Bennett of Port Essington 
                                                                                                                                            
Secretary J.D. McLean to Chief Peter Strength 20 August 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 
3. 
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declared, “this reserve is no good to us,” because while “we are living on a reserve we 
cannot make any money -- we are under the Indian Act.”78  The conclusion of the debate 
over conscription confirmed -- rather than undermined -- this assertion.  Although the 
Committee of Allied Tribes, and other petitioners’ claims that they suffered from 
“citizenship withheld,” the specific plan laid out in applying the exemption from 
conscription for Native men, that they would have to apply through their Agent, 
reinforced the importance of the Indian Act and the Department of Indian Affairs.  This 
protection from conscription (and the aid for the flooded Naas Agency), underlined the 
ambiguous reality of what it meant to live “under the Indian Act.”  More than any war 
program before it, the Native response to conscription and the eventual exemption clearly 
reinforced the role of the Indian Act and the power of Indian status for Native people. 
 
                                                
78 Transcript of the Hearings of  the Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British 
Columbia, Naas Agency, p. 5, LAC RG 33 M104 78903/15. 
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Chapter 5:  
Applying the Conscription Exemption on Reserves 
 Chief Meshakepeness (Meeshe Keepinais) and the Councilors of the Swan Lake 
Reserve, in South Central Manitoba, wrote to D.C. Scott in July 1917 to protest their 
inclusion in the Military Service Act, about which they had learned from newspaper 
reports.  The Swan Lake Chief and Councilors argued “according to our treaty agreement 
with the Government we are not compelled to go to war for the Government and we 
object to having our young men taken to the war.”1  This protest was initially ineffectual, 
as discussed in chapter four.  In November 1917 Indian Agent A. Ogletree and the 
Winnipeg Military Service Registrar E.R. Chapman arranged to register the estimated 
275 men between ages 21 and 65 living on the reserve during the Agent’s annuity 
payment trip.  No registrar or tribunal would otherwise be available to the remote Native 
populations under his purview, so Agent Ogletree advanced the trip from March to 
January.2   
As the registration/annuity party traveled the Portage La Prairie and Manitowapah 
Agencies (of which Swan Lake was a part), Chief Meshakepeness and the Councilors 
demanded to know if the Department “had given any authority [to] our Indian Agent 
Ogletree to conscript Indians.”3  The Swan Lake Council heard that Ogletree asked boys 
from the Roseau and Roseau Rapids to join, but “off [sic] course he hasn’t been here yet 
                                                
1 Chief Meshakepeness/Meeshe Keepinais, Councilors Geesis Pomesett, John Daniels (Interpreter George 
Tanner) to D.C. Scott 2 July 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1. 
2 Indian Agent A. Ogletree to Secretary J.D. McLean 23 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 
452-20 Pt. 1; D.C. Scott to Captain J.D. Jenkins, Military Service Council 29 November 1917 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1: Deputy Minister of Justice E.L. Newcombe to D.C. Scott 3 December 
1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1; Indian Agent A. Ogletree to Secretary J.D. McLean 12 
December 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1. 
3 Chief Meshakepeness and Councilors of the Swan Lake Band to D.C. Scott 31 December 1917 LAC RG 
10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2. 
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in Our reserve.”4  Rumors spread so quickly through the Agencies that Ogletree found the 
process of registration incredibly difficult.  Even after the exemption’s introduction, band 
councils “would not allow any of the young men to appear before me,” and some Chiefs 
and Headmen tried to block the entry of Registrar’s medical board and exemption 
tribunals into their community.5   
While Agents could not conscript men on reserves, as the Swan Lake Council 
feared, they were the officially recognized adjudicator of Native men’s applications for 
exemptions and the chief distributor of exemption certificates.  The Order in Council 
exempting Native men from conscription did not so much remove them from the scope of 
the Military Service Act as it gave them a new category from which to apply for an 
exemption.  Unlike those exempt from conscription because of their work (farmers, 
munitions workers, i.e.) or because of domestic concerns, however, Native men did not 
have the authority to apply for this exemption themselves, or the responsibility to appear 
independently before exemption tribunals.  The Ministry of Justice’s exemption for 
Native men specified that Indian Agents were responsible for applying for exemptions for 
“any Indian attached to the Reserve over which such Agent has jurisdiction,” and the 
Registrar would issue exemption certificates based solely on the Agent’s information.6   
The Department informed the Military that “any application made by an Indian 
Agent may be taken as correct,” and that any individual applying without the 
intermediate Indian Agent ought to have their cases routed through the Department – to 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Indian Agent A. Ogletree to Secretary J.D. McLean 26 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-
20 Pt. 2; Indian Agent A. Ogletree to Secretary J.D. McLean 26 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 
File 452-20 Pt. 2. 
6 Order in Council from the Governor General of Canada in Council (signed by the Clerk of the Privy 
Council) 17 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Circular to Indian Agents 30 
January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2. 
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Ottawa and thence to the Agent in question and back again.7  McLean asserted that only 
those who came under section 2 (f) of the Indian Act (1906) could be included on the lists 
for the exemption to conscription.8  The Order in Council’s exemption saw Agents 
employing the Indian Act as a standard of determining who could or could not be exempt 
from conscription as a “bona fide Indian” – the exemption relied not on local or ethnic 
definitions of Native but the legal category of Indian as described in the Indian Act.   
Despite the Swan Lake band’s suspicions of the Department’s motives, many 
individuals and reserve communities sought to take advantage of the exemption since 
“we received word that the Indians could not be conscripted.”9  While this is not 
                                                
7 D.C. Scott to Captain Tyndale, Secretary of the Military Subcommittee 20 February 1918 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6778 File 452-197; D.C. Scott to All Indian Agents (Circular) 22 January 1918 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Secretary J.D. McLean to All Indian Agents (Circular) 23 January 1918 
LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2. 
8 McLean was likely referring to the 1906 Indian Act (An Act Pertaining to the Indians) as it is the only one 
where section 2 (f) details who qualifies as an Indian.  The Act states that an Indian is a male member of a 
(regular) band, their legitimate child or a woman married to such a man.  Such a band, as detailed in section 
2 (d) of the same act are those that “share alike in the distribution of any annuities or interest moneys which 
the Government of Canada is responsible,” and who own or are interested in Indian lands “in common, or 
which the legal title is vested in the Crown.”  A non-treaty Indian however may be of Native heritage, 
belong to an irregular band (who have no reserve land, possess no common fund managed by the 
Government or have no treaty with them) or who “follows the Indian mode of life.” The Indian Act (An Act 
respecting Indians) R.S. c. 43 s. 1 (1906) Assented to 13th July 1906.  Secretary J. D. McLean to Councilor 
Frank Pelletier 8 March 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2. 
9 Individuals appealed to Indian Agents and the Department to be included in the exemption as Indians.  
The following include examples for across the country where individuals and communities identified as 
Indians according to the Indian Act to take advantage of the exemption. Daniel Otter (on behalf of his 
grandson) to the Department of Indian Affairs 20 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 pt. 
2; Indians of Onion Lake Saskatchewan to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs 19 January 1918 
LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Chief Councilor Alfred Adams of the Massett Reserve, to 
Indian Agent Thomas Deasy 2 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Chiefs of the 
Kenora area to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs 4 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 
File 452-20 Pt. 2; Indian Agent W.J. McAllan (on behalf of the Stuart Lake band) to Secretary J.D. McLean 
5 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Inspector S. J. Jackson (on behalf of a 
delegation of chiefs from around Lake Winnipeg) to D.C. Scott 27 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 
File 452-20 Pt. 2; Indian Agent Denis Herbert to Secretary J.D. McLean (regarding Becancour, Quebec 
reserve) 26 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Indian Agent Reverend A.R. 
McDonald (on behalf of the members of Grand Narrows, NS) to D.C. Scott 30 January 1918 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Indian Agent John F. Smith (regarding members of the Cook’s Ferry and 
Lower Nicola Band) to Secretary J.D. McLean 2 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 
2; Indian Agent Van Loon (on behalf of members of the Mississauga of New Credit) to D.C. Scott 7 
February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Chief John George McBride to Secretary J.D. 
McLean 13 May 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Indian Agent W.M. Halliway 
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surprising given the number of protests against conscription, it had significant 
implications.  When Native men appealed to be recognized as Indian and therefore 
exempt from conscription, they embraced “Indian” as more than simply a social or ethnic 
identity: they accepted, tacitly or otherwise, their place as part of the legislative régime of 
the Indian Act.  
While Scott hoped “a blanket exemption” effectively “deals with the Indians’ 
complaints,” the reality of the exemption’s application proved problematic.10  This was 
most evident at moments when the community’s definition of membership and that of the 
Agent were at variance.  The following chapter considers how individuals and 
communities tried to negotiate this (re)enforcement of Indian Act-based identity.  These 
individuals wanted to take advantage of the exemption, but found that their understanding 
of Native identity did not match the Indian Act’s Indian status.  
Five cases illustrate the wide variation in definitions of identity.  These challenges 
include individual appeals for protection at Maniwaki; an internal dispute over band 
membership at Parry Island; the conflict between band-defined and legislative identity at 
Fort William, including the question of status mothers and non-status fathers; the 
Department and the Militia’s conflict over whether residents of Gibson, who could vote, 
were eligible for an exemption meant for the disenfranchised; and an appeal from an 
Aboriginal community outside Edmonton.  These cases distinguish between ‘Native’ and 
                                                                                                                                            
(regarding members of Camp Mudge) to Secretary J.D. McLean 7 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Waniente Jacks to D.C. Scott 25 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 
452-20 Pt. 2; Chief Peter Strength to D.C. Scott 19 March 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 
2; Chief Ernest Couchia to the Department of Indian Affairs (regarding obtaining a certificate to indicate 
being a treaty Indian) 29 March 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; John D. Paul (regarding 
Peter Joe Silleboy) to Superintendent A.J. Boyd 10 May 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; 
Stoney of Maple Creek to Secretary J.D. McLean 13 June 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 
2. 
10 D.C. Scott to Sir [circular to Agents] 22 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2. 
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‘Indian,’ the latter specifically derived from the Indian Act.  Importantly, these conflicts 
were not universally between Native communities against the government or tradition 
against legislation, but instead involved individuals and groups seeking a definition of the 
limits of different identities.  The common thread, however, was the question of who 
determined identity and what grounds decision-makers used when they decided who was 
a member of the reserve community.   
 
Individual attempts at exemptions on the Maniwaki Agency  
In November 1917, former constable and sub-chief Leon Bernard of Maniwaki 
expressed concerns over the local white officials’ recent behaviour.  Both an unnamed 
priest and the Indian Agent Ernest Gauthier of the Maniwaki Agency were “causing 
trouble,” in their mutual insistence that the Agency’s men sign Military Service papers.  
Bernard felt assured that he and his fellow Algonquin had no business signing those 
papers “as we are not enfranchised.”  Bernard asserted his Chief was “too ignorant” to 
advise his people, for “although he [the Chief] had the Indian Act,” he “does not attend to 
the provisions of [the] said act.”  The Chief’s failure to protect his people from the threat 
of conscription, by inattention or by inability, forced Bernard to appeal to Scott directly 
and demand “the Full protection of the Indian Affairs Department as provided in [the] 
Indian Act.”11  While Bernard’s complaint predated Native men’s exemption from the 
Military Service Act, the exemption’s implementation hinged on the conflict Bernard 
                                                
11 Leon Bernard to D.C. Scott 17 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1. At this 
point in time, the Department was not exempting Native men based on their legal identity and McLean 
informed him as much; Secretary J.D. McLean to Leon Bernard 21 November 1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6768 File 452-20 Pt. 1. 
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identified in his complaint – the legal distinction of Indian and its associated protection 
from the Department as defined in the Indian Act.  
Before he received news of Native men’s exemption from compulsory active 
service, Agent Gauthier appealed the local Military Tribunal’s rejection of several 
Maniwaki men’s exemption applications, and sought the discharge of two men already 
conscripted and in training.12  With introduction of the Indian exemption, Gauthier and 
the men of his Agency had a specific set of criteria upon which they could avoid forced 
military service.  Yet, in employing the conscription exemption, the legal definition of 
Indian and the personal and public identification as Native at Maniwaki diverged sharply.   
Victory Bodge lived at Maniwaki with his widowed mother where he pursued his 
studies and supported his family through logging and trapping.  These were common 
economic activities at Maniwaki.  Up to a third of the reserve’s able-bodied adult men 
were involved in hunting and trapping during the war years, and Gauthier identified the 
importance of logging, both in the lumber camps and driving logs, for the reserve 
economy.13  The annual march of men, including Bodge, into the forests to support their 
families through hunting or waged work marked a pattern of life among those at 
Maniwaki.  In the spring of 1918, Victor returned from the bush to find he had been 
considered a deserter for missing his call to compulsory military service.   
Bodge applied for an exemption as an Indian, but while he and his family lived on 
the reserve and his neighbours recognized him as part of their community, Agent 
                                                
12 Indian Agent E.S. Gauthier to D. C. Scott 25 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2. 
13 Dominion of Canada Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year ended March 31, 
1914 (Ottawa: King’s Press, 1914), 103; Dominion of Canada Annual Report of the Department of Indian 
Affairs for the Year ended March 31, 1915 (Ottawa: King’s Press, 1915), 103, Part II 22; Dominion of 
Canada Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year ended March 31, 1916 (Ottawa: 
King’s Press, 1916), 95; Dominion of Canada Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the 
Year ended March 31, 1917 (Ottawa: King’s Press, 1917), 25. 
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Gauthier could not apply for Victor’s exemption because he was “a non-treaty Indian.”14  
Suddenly Bodge was distinctly separate from his fellows, singled out as not Indian 
enough, legally speaking, to be exempt from conscription.  Gauthier was sympathetic to 
Victor’s plight, but the young man would have to apply for an exemption from military 
service on domestic rather than legal grounds.15  Secretary McLean intervened on 
Victor’s behalf to a limited but important extent, appealing to the Military Registrar in 
Hull to cancel the arrest warrant for Bodge.  McLean supported Bodge’s assertion he was 
in the bush at the time he was called up and therefore was a deserter by accident rather 
than intent.16 
 Like Bodge, Camille Descartie (or Decantie) received his notice to appear before 
the Military Tribunal too late to avoid getting in trouble.  Again similar to Bodge, he was 
able to apply for an exemption on domestic grounds as the sole supporter of his mother.  
Unlike Bodge however, Descartie was arrested as a deserter in September 1918.17  
Although Descartie lived on the Maniwaki reserve most of the time and met the Indian 
Act’s qualifications of “Indian,” Agent Gauthier had not included Descartie in his list of 
eligible Native men entitled to the exemption, likely because he was working off reserve 
at the time.  Descartie languished in prison.18  In Descartie’s case, a failure on the part of 
the Agent translated into practical conscription.  Secretary McLean assured the Military 
                                                
14 Secretary J.D. McLean to Indian Agent Gauthier 12 June 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 
3. 
15 Indian Agent Gauthier to Secretary J.D. McLean 12 June 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 
3. 
16 Secretary J.D. McLean to Military Registrar Labelle 12 June 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 
Pt. 3. 
17 Secretary J.D. McLean to Registrar Labelle 18 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 
Pt. 3. 
18 Registrar Labelle to Secretary J.D. McLean 20 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 
Pt. 3. 
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authorities that regardless of their Agent’s information, Descartie was “a bona fide 
Indian,” and therefore exempt from conscription.19   
The Military authorities accepted Indian Affairs’ description of Descartie’s legal 
status, released him from jail and issued him an exemption certificate.20  Home safe again 
in early October, Descartie thanked McLean for the bureaucrat’s intervention on his 
behalf.21  Yet, another member of the Maniwaki reserve, Louis Cooko, was conscripted 
in October 1917.22  He was imprisoned throughout October 1918.23  Cooko appealed to 
Indian Affairs for some document to prove he was Indian and that he should be released 
from compulsory service.24  Although Gauthier was prepared to defend Cooko’s identity 
as an Indian man, the Agent raised doubts about Cooko’s activities, particularly whether 
he had voted in the last general election, which the wording of the exemption within the 
Order in Council suggested might exclude him from the exemption (see the discussion 
below).25   
Agent Gauthier applied for exemptions for those under his authority caught by 
Military authorities, but his comments and omissions in Descartie and Cooko’s cases are 
                                                
19 Secretary J.D. McLean to Registrar Labelle 18 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 
Pt. 3. 
20 Registrar Labelle to Secretary J.D. McLean 20 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 
Pt. 3; Secretary J.D. McLean to Indian Agent Gauthier 25 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 
452-20 Pt. 3. 
21 Camille Descartie to J.D. McLean 2 October 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt, 3. 
22 Louis Cooko, 3037785, “Attestation Papers,” RG 150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 1959 – 10. 
23 Louis Cooko to the Department of Indian Affairs 21 October 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-
20 Pt. 3.  
24 Louis Cooko to the Department of Indian Affairs 21 October 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-
20 Pt. 3; Captain Bond, Military Service Act Officer for the Officer Commanding 1st Depot Battalion to 
Indian Agent Ernest Gauthier 29 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 9235. 
25 Assistant Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs S. Stewart to Indian Agent Ernest Gauthier 4 
November 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3; C. Leslie Wilson, Ontario Registrar to Indian 
Agent Ernest Gauthier 29 October 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 9235; Indian Agent Ernest Gauthier to C. 
Leslie Wilson, Ontario Registrar 2 November 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 9235. 
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telling.26  Despite his defense of non-treaty (not status) individuals living on his reserve, 
Gauthier’s failure to include individuals who were on the treaty pay list because they 
were not currently in residence underlines the importance of the barriers between reserve 
and off-reserve life.  Leaving the reserve could expose Native men to scrutiny over their 
identity, particularly when they did not have any proof of their exemption from 
conscription as a “bona fide Indian.”27 
Two members of Maniwaki Agency were riding the train to Gatineau when 
Military authorities approached them and demanded to see their registration papers, 
which they did not have.  The two men were arrested and brought to Ottawa to be 
detained because they did not have the necessary paperwork to prove they were either 
                                                
26 Besides the above-discussed examples, Gauthier applied for individual exemptions for “treaty Indians” 
James Chabot, Paul Descantie and Moise Beaudoin, in addition to the over 100 able-bodied men of the 
Maniwaki population.  Notice of a Hearing For James Chabot at Tribunal 305 at Maniwaki, 22 November 
1917 LAC RG 10 Volume 9235; Indian Agent Ernest Gauthier to F.A. Labelle, Deputy Registrar, Hull 20 
June 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 9235; Mrs. Vaughan to D. C. Scott 11 April 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Secretary J.D. McLean to Captain Tyndale, Secretary of the Military Service Sub-
Committee (re Pte. Charles Eagleman) 20 June 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3. 
27 Other examples of men caught off the reserve and requiring direct intervention include: John D. Paul (for 
Peter Joe Silleboy) to Superintendent for Eastern Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island A.J. Boyd 10 May 
1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Superintendent Boyd to Secretary J.D. McLean 16 May 
1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Indian Agent John E. Campbell to the Department of 
Indian Affairs 4 July 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3; Dominick Bradford (on behalf of 
his brother) to the Department of Indian Affairs 14 May 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; 
Waniente Jacks to Deputy Minister of Justice E.L. Newcombe 25 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 
File 452-20 Pt. 2; Secretary J.D. McLean (on behalf of Pte Louis Vatache) to the Office Commanding 2nd 
Depot Battalion 16 April 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; M. Rene Amalécite to the 
Department of Indian Affairs 5 October 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3; Indian Agent 
J.A. Renaud (on behalf of Peter Hunter) 9 April 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; 
Secretary J.D. McLean (on behalf of Frank Day) to Brigadier-General T.D.R. Hemming, Officer 
Commanding Military District No. 3 22 March 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Secretary 
J.D. McLean (on behalf of Pte. J. Lavalley) to the Officer Commanding 2nd Depot Bttn 18 May 1918 LAC 
RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Director of the Military Service Branch Colonel Machin (on behalf 
of Victor Loyie) 9 October 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3; South Saskatchewan 
Inspector W.R. Graham to D.C. Scott 10 June 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3; D.C. Scott 
to Chief Matt Bernard (regarding Vasseau Ambine) 25 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-
20 Pt. 2; Reverend G. Leonard, Principal of the Indian Industrial School (Camperville, Manitoba) (on 
behalf of Arthur and Charles Dufault) to Secretary J.D. McLean 26 January 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 
6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Overseer J.H. Thompson, Overseer at Wood Mountain Indian Reserve (on behalf of 
Jim Wounded Horse) to Secretary J.D. McLean 2 February 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 
2; Secretary J.D. McLean to Chief Whetong (regarding Albert Taylor of Mud Lake) 30 January 1918 LAC 
RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2; Director of the Military Service Branch Colonel Machin (on behalf 
Samuel Laroque) 7 August 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3. 
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exempt from conscription, and or that they were legally Indians.28  The Military refused 
to release the men because had no proof that they were Indians and not simply of Native 
ancestry.  An anonymous complainant to the Department argued “unless Indians are 
supplied with some certificate showing their status they are going to get into continual 
trouble the moment they step off the reserve.”29  This observer suggested the Department 
issue small certificates printed on linen for Agents to issue to those under their 
jurisdiction.30 
The concept behind the proposed linen identity card – the identification with the 
Indian label – became a major dividing point inside reserves in the wake of conscription’s 
application.  If the fight to gain exemption affirmed the authority of the Indian Act across 
the country, the implementation of the exemption solidified and affirmed the difference 
among Native peoples, separating those who fell under the Indian Act’s definition of an 
Indian and those who did not.  Unlike the cases in Maniwaki, not all those Native men 
who suddenly found they were not Native enough, or rather not an Indian, found 
sympathy from a nearby Indian Agent, the Department of Indian Affairs, or even their 
fellows on reserves.  
 
Factions clash over identity and exemption on Parry Island 
 During the debate over conscripting Native men, Stanley/Starling Kelso Ritchie 
protested conscription on behalf of the Parry Island band Council.  Ritchie demanded to 
                                                
28 Anonymous letter to D.C. Scott, 3 July 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3;  Unsigned 
Memorandum to D.C. Scott3 July 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 RG 10 Volume 3181 File 452,124-1A. 
29 Anonymous letter to D.C. Scott, 3 July 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3. 
30 Anonymous letter to D.C. Scott, 3 July 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 3; Chief Ernest 
Couchia of the Nipissing Reserve similarly asked that the Department issue his band certificates to prove 
they were “treaty Indians,” although Couchia sought these documents as a safeguard against the Agent’s 
interference.  Chief Ernest Couchia to the Department of Indian Affairs 29 March 1918 LAC RG 10 
Volume 6768 File 452-20 Pt. 2. 
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know “if the fair and just terms of their Treaty Agreements were still respected by the 
present Administration.”31  Balanced with this pointed legal question, Ritchie asserted the 
Parry Islanders did not believe the government was capable of taking “extreme measures” 
against the “diminishing Indians by depriving them of their young Males,” through 
conscription.  If the government did conscript Parry Islanders however, it would stir their 
“awakening and silent wrath,” as these men were “wards of Canada and it is the sacred 
duty of the Administration to protect them.”32 
Ritchie warned that if the Government persisted in its plan to conscript Native 
men, the country would be publicly shamed on the international stage as “the helpless 
Indian population will raise their voices before all nations of the World, to acknowledge 
what treatment they have received from the Administration.”33  While Ritchie challenged 
the federal government’s treatment of Native men, he dismissed the promise of franchise, 
which was “a dead letter to the Young Indian mind today.”34  Ritchie insisted the vote 
was for the affluent and well educated, and was out of reach of the regular wage-earning 
Native men.  He simply wanted the treaties recognized and followed. 
Unsatisfied when McLean rejected his treaty argument, Ritchie consulted the 
solicitors’ firm Weeks and Jackson in Parry Sound.  They in turn asked the Department to 
explain why the Native treaties did not apply to the question of conscription, for “as you 
probably are quite well aware, they [the Native peoples of Parry Island] are very loyal but 
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extremely jealous of their ancient rights and privileges.”35  The band had contributed one 
hundred dollars to the 23rd Regiment’s Contingent Fund as a recognition and celebration 
of Parry Islander Francis Pegahmagabow’s decision to enlist in that unit.36  The lawyers 
forwarded Ritchie’s reproductions of Alexander Morris’ Treaties of Canada with the 
Indians (1880), particularly the North-West Angle Treaty (later cited in the Order in 
Council that exempted Native men from the Military Service Act), to the Department for 
its consideration and opinion.37  McLean instead suggested to the solicitors that the 
documents contained “certain additions made by the copyist.”38  Regardless, the 
Department firmly stated that the North-West Angle treaty did not apply to the Parry 
Islanders.39   
Despite its strong language and threats, Ritchie’s protest was not significantly 
different from the throng of protests and petitions Native bands and individuals sent to 
the Department at the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 before the passage of P.C. 
111 (the exemption).  Ritchie’s arguments about the role of treaties, the government’s 
duty of care, and the threat of exposing the contradictions of Canada’s war aims through 
its treatment of Native men represented a wide range of the protestors, whom in their 
volume and content had forced the exemption of Indian men.  Yet Ritchie himself found 
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himself a victim of the consequences of Native peoples’ success in arguing their status 
differentiated themselves from Canadians. 
As he and his solicitors inquired about the Parry Islanders’ treaty rights, Ritchie 
actively sought to strengthen his political protests against conscription through a union of 
bands along Georgian Bay.  From late November to early December 1917, Ritchie 
traveled to Wikwemikong on Manitoulin Island as a representative of the Union Council 
of Parry Island.  He attended the Council meeting on 3 December regarding a petition 
against conscription, and he promised Chief Peter Megis of Parry Island that the Chiefs 
and Councilors at Wikwemikong “are doing their best to helpu [sic] us to carry that 
question to a successful end.”40  Agent R. Lewis attended the same meeting and 
complained to his superiors in Ottawa that he was unable to impress upon the gathered 
band members the importance of registering with Military authorities.41  Instead, the 
assembled Chiefs, Councilors, and individuals declared their intention to present the 
Department with a resolution requesting a general Native exemption from conscription.42  
Lewis encountered Ritchie on Manitoulin and, according to Ritchie, the Agent “tried to 
snub” him “with hot question[s],” but Ritchie told Lewis he was the acting Secretary of 
Chief Peter Megis, President of the Parry Island Union Indian Council and was traveling 
under Megis’ instruction.43  
Ritchie had misplaced his trust however, as Chief Peter Megis disputed Ritchie’s 
work, his authority to act as a Parry Island advocate and even Ritchie’s identity as a 
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Native man.  A month after Ritchie’s trip to Wikwemikong, Megis explained to Scott that 
neither he nor the Union Indian Council had authorized Ritchie’s trip, his anti-
conscription petition, or the collection of funds to fight the Military Service Act, and the 
Chief indicated Ritchie had amassed a significant (undisclosed) amount for his 
campaign.44  The Chief claimed that he and the Council had been entirely unaware of 
Ritchie’s plans and his discussions with Weeks and Jackson.  Beyond this 
misrepresentation, Megis dismissed Ritchie as only “a nontreaty Indian living on my 
reserve.”45   
This distinction became particularly important to Ritchie and Megis after the 
government introduced the exemption from conscription for Native men.  In February 
1918, Megis wrote to Scott again warning that Ritchie was on his way to Ottawa but “he 
has no authority from me or [the] Indian Agents” to act as an advocate for Parry Island or 
the Union Indian Council.  Ritchie “has no authority to interfere,” and the Chief asked 
Scott to “please tell him [Ritchie] you have given all Indian Agents authority to look after 
there [sic] Indians.”46  Besides the acknowledgment of the Department’s legitimacy in 
life on the reserve, Megis’ effort to undermine Ritchie’s efforts to Scott matched a similar 
exclusion occurring on Parry Island.  Parry Island had forty-two Christian Island band 
members living on the reserve in 1916.  The Department had hoped to amalgamate them 
into the Parry Island Band.  Twenty years earlier, the Parry Island Council had decided to 
let the Christian Islanders stay on the island but not incorporate them into the Parry Island 
band.  An increased population would have meant a drop in the band payments for each 
of the band members while eviction would mean the Parry Islanders would have to 
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compensate the outgoing non-band members for any improvements they had made.47  
The question of membership in the Parry Island band was a long-simmering issue among 
the Native population on the Island, and now the conscription exemption further 
distinguished those residents of the Island who belonged to the band and received treaty 
money from the Department through the reserve’s Agent, and for those whose occupancy 
did not translate into belonging to that band. 
Agent Logan warned the Department that Cape Croker and Christian Islanders 
living on Parry Island and Shawanaga Reserves intended to refuse to identify themselves 
for any military purpose, even to receive the Indian exemption.  A rumor circulated on 
the Island that the Militia planned to conscript Native men as non-combatants after they 
had received exemptions from active service.48  Ritchie told the Military Registrar in 
Ottawa that it was unjust to cede the authority for exemptions on reserve to Indian 
Agents, and asked if there were “any special instruction given for them to show partiality 
to certain Indians living upon the Reserves.”49  Ritchie asserted that certain individuals 
living on the Parry Island reserve could not obtain exemption certificates depending on 
the will of the Agent.  This might not have been nefarious, as the families from Christian 
Island and Cape Croker living on Parry Island were neither members of that band nor 
collecting treaty money from Agent Logan.  As a result, it was not Logan’s responsibility 
to apply for these men.   
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The Ontario Registrar dismissed Ritchie’s accusations against the Agents, and 
replied that those Native men not living under an Agent’s jurisdiction would have to 
apply individually for an exemption and prove they were indeed a Native person to the 
satisfaction of the local Military Tribunal.50  Yet, Military officials in Ottawa presented 
Ritchie’s complaint to the Department of Indian Affairs, with concerns about his 
assertion that Agents were playing favourites with exemption certificates.51  If the 
Christian Islanders or Cape Croker members decided to register however, they would 
have to appeal to the Agents of their home reserves, underlining the link between identity 
and place contained within the structure of the Indian Act.  If Ritchie was not on any 
treaty list, Agents would not have to bend the rules to excuse their failure to exempt him 
– he simply would not be eligible for the Indian exemption.  For Chief Megis and the 
Parry Islanders, who were concerned with reinforcing band membership, conscription 
reinforced the relationship between Agents and those within their specific agencies.   
 
Community-defined identity at Fort William  
Across the country, the power of determining who was a “bona fide Indian” fell to 
the Department’s employees.52  In the face of such a top-down, formalized test of 
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membership across Native communities, the Fort William Band Council collectively tried 
to explain to the Department that they understood membership in their band differently.  
The Fort William Band Council did not reject the exemption, but wanted it applied based 
on their definition of who belonged to their band. 
Less than a week after the Order in Council exempted Native men was passed, the 
Fort William Band Council wrote to the Department.  The Council balanced an excellent, 
if draining, record of voluntary enlistment that “practically fifty per cent of the young 
men have volunteered and gone to the front.”53  The Council requested, “full 
information” on the new Order in Council, as “we wish to observe the law in every 
particular.”54  This desire to follow the law did not mean the Council wanted to loose 
more of their precious young men, who “perform our necessary tasks” and “provide for 
the old and infirm people who have sons now at the Front.”55   
The Order in Council did not provide the protection than the Fort William 
Council hoped.  They wired Scott in February in hopes of having some of their young 
men released from the military authorities.56  An undisclosed number of young men from 
Fort William conscripted before the Order in Council.  They were not released from 
service when they established themselves as a “bona fide Indian.”57  Those already in 
service were offered three options: they could remain with their unit, join a non-
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combatant unit, or receive leave or absence without pay until such time as non-combatant 
units were called up.58  At least one anonymous observer described this discrepancy 
between the promise of exemptions and the reality of forced (if limited) service as 
“apparent discrimination.”59  Neither officials at the Department’s Ottawa headquarters 
nor Agent Brown in Port Arthur dealt with this contradiction, but the Fort William 
Council had not given up its defense of its internal integrity. 
Fort William Council members wrote to the Department again in early March.  
The Council argued that a few of their members had received a non-transmissible title in 
their treaty with the Crown.  The Council recognized their children as members, and they 
were educated at reserve schools and lived on the reserve.  These individuals were not on 
the annuity or treaty pay roll, however, and the Council sought to clarify these non-
payroll members’ status vis à vis the exemption (with the tacit suggestion they thought all 
members of the reserve ought to be exempt).60  The Councilors pointed out that their 
young men had enlisted voluntarily in great numbers.  As a result, “we are now reduced 
to a very low percentage of men able to do work,” and a rigorous implementation of 
conscription “would be a hardship to us if we are deprived of the few young men left at 
home.”61   
A specific rule about women’s status in the Indian Act was at the centre of at least 
two of the cases that concerned the Fort William Council.  According to the 1869 
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Enfranchisement Act, if a status Indian woman married a non-status man, Native or non-
Native, she lost her status, her children would not be recognized as status Indians, and 
neither she nor her children could claim treaty annuity or band membership.62  It seems 
however that the Fort William Council had not followed, at least in practical terms, the 
latter of these restrictions.  One of the young men in question, Paul Dick, had never on 
the treaty list because his mother had been struck from the list, presumably when she 
married Paul’s father, who was enfranchised and therefore did not hold Indian status.63  
Another young man, Robert Howard, was “Indian from his mother’s side,” and had 
married a status woman on the reserve.64  Yet, these men were considered band members 
and all of the Fort William band’s young men, on the treaty list or not, were needed on 
the reserve.  Hence, the Council sought to defend its economic integrity, its internal 
cohesion, and its power to determine the parameters of community membership. 
Secretary McLean informed the Fort William Councilors that, regardless of 
whatever rules they had employed for their own community, the specifications contained 
in the Indian Act were the only recognized method of determining eligibility for the 
conscription exemption.  McLean was specific in his correspondence with the Fort 
William Band’s Agent, W.R. Brown; the secretary informed the Agent that the 
conscription exemption applied only to those individuals the band recognized and who 
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received annuity money.65  Further marginalizing the band’s role in determining their 
own membership, McLean instructed Brown to “be guided by the Indian Act, in 
determining the standing of applicants, and in case of doubt, refer the matter, with full 
particulars to the Department.”66   
Brown complained to McLean that some individuals on his reserve were “‘white’ 
on election day and ‘Indian’ when they want special privileges,” and the Agent did not 
intend for this fluidity to continue.67  Agent Brown told Councilor Pelletier “that the 
Indians should be satisfied to get treaty Indians exempted without bothering about half-
breeds.”  Brown suggested to Scott that Pelletier had interested himself personally in 
expanding the definition of exemptible Indian men as Pelletier was “only a quarter-
breed,” although on the treaty list, and thought he would be conscripted.68  While 
Pelletier was entitled to the exemption, the Agent’s introduction of blood-quantum-style 
language into the discussion of Native and Indian identity underlines the constructed and 
contested character of those labels: that law, heritage and custom came into direct 
conflict. 
Agent Brown investigated his freedom to grant or refuse exemptions from 
conscription, and thereby through to include them under conscription’s umbrella through 
acts of omission.  Brown was disappointed with the legislation-based exemption, as he 
had planned to arrest one man on the Fort William reserve as soon as the 31 January 
deadline to register.  This individual had taken up with a soldiers’ wife and had refused to 
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register with the Military authorities.69  The Agent intended to use the conscription 
regulation to control the moral and political behaviour on the reserve, both in the case of 
this offending individual and more generally, as he judged “most of the Indians of this 
agency do very little work,” and therefore wanted to conscript the less industrious to 
work.70   
McLean offered some solace to the Agent, as he assured Brown that anyone who 
refused to register, regardless of the exemption, “will have to be dealt with by the 
Department of Justice,” as no matter how much the Department of Indian Affairs or its 
Agents were involved, conscription was ultimately not their jurisdiction.71  While the 
Agent could impose the tenets of the Indian Act on the community through the 
conscription exemption, he could not pick and chose which members of his reserve he 
protected with absolute impunity, if they were on the treaty list.  Those who failed to 
register would find little sympathy in Ottawa however, as Secretary McLean declared the 
Department was “unable to get them [Native men] out of trouble should they be arrested 
sometime as evaders of the Military Service Act.”72   
Only in the case of volunteers, such as Ambroise Fisher, was Brown able to keep 
those he deemed troublemakers in the CEF and out of Fort William.  Fisher had enlisted 
voluntarily when offered an ultimatum between arrest for stealing furs from others’ traps 
and soldiering.  Now that Fisher was a deserter, Brown claimed that he had convinced 
others to desert, stolen money from his comrades, and had not offered his parents any 
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separation allowance or support.73  Two months later the Department informed Fisher 
that regardless of being a treaty Indian with the Long Lake Band, “the Department did 
not propose to intervene in his case.”74  As Fisher had enlisted voluntarily, being a status 
Indian did not preclude him from service.  Brown and the Department chose not to 
advocate for Fisher.   
 In the immediate wake of the Order in Council’s exemption, P.G. Delisle of 
Caughnawaga offered the Department of Indian Affairs a possible alternative to Indian 
Agents as adjudicators of Indian identity.  Delisle suggested to Scott that a member of the 
band Council in question might be best qualified to determine who was a member of their 
band.75  As internal authorities, these individuals would be intimately aware of who 
belonged and who did not, but made no mention of previously-status Indian mothers.76  
Delisle only received a telegram confirming that the exemption applied to all eligible 
Indians.  Therefore, while Delisle and the Fort William band Council independently 
wanted their communities to take advantage of the exemption, both sought to push or 
challenge the Department’s control over how Native (Indian) identity was defined, 
particularly within their respective communities.  They offered alternative methods of 
determining membership than that contained within Indian Act and a different authority 
from the Agent, and ultimately failed in the face of cooperation between two centralized 
bureaucracies who sought standardization over dispersed local authorities. 
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Conflicts over the exemption between Military Authorities and Indian Affairs  
 One of the fundamental points contained in the various protests against 
conscripting Native men was that Native men were not enfranchised.  According to the 
Indian Advancement Act, a male individual sacrificed his status as an Indian as part of 
the transition to enfranchisement and citizenship.77  The Order in Council specifically 
discussed Native peoples’ inability to vote as a crucial point in differentiating them from 
non-Native peoples.  That the Order also included exemptions for other unenfranchised 
groups underlines the importance of the right to vote, or rather its absence, in the 
rationale to exempt these groups from conscription.  Yet, some Native men were 
enfranchised, were still on treaty lists, and were considered Indian by the Department of 
Indian Affairs’ standard.  This discrepancy between the rationale for exemption presented 
in the Order in Council, and its assumption that all those who qualified as Indians were 
not enfranchised, was dramatically displayed in the unique situation of the Gibson 
Mohawk. 
Each of the above sections has examined moments at which the difference 
between Indian and Native became clear when those who did not meet the Indian Act’s 
definition applied for an exemption.  In the case of the arrested men from Maniwaki, the 
Military reasoned they could not excuse Native men without exemption papers on the 
grounds of their ethnicity as “in many places, particularly in the West, there would be a 
considerable difficulty in determining who is an Indian and who is a half-breed.”78  Just 
as the Fort William Band Council had questioned the Department’s categorization of 
their own members, the Military disagreed with the Department of Indian Affairs as to 
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who could be deemed eligible for the Indian exemption; the Military believed any Native 
man who had voted could not be exempt from conscription based on the wording of the 
Order in Council.   
The residents of the Gibson reserve were “a bit anxious,” as they watched 
“constables are rounding up the conscripts” on the farms around Gibson, and “some of 
the Indians are getting rounded up too.”79  Chief Peter Strength did not rely on the 
intervention and advocacy of Superintendent Logan (Parry Island) however, and he wrote 
directly to Scott, demanding help for ten of his young men who had been brought before 
the local Military Tribunal.80  The Military authorities began arresting young men at the 
Mohawk community as deserters in the summer of 1918.81  Chief Strength demanded an 
explanation as to why “the Military authorities is [sic] still bothering the young men in 
this Reserve,” despite the fact the band “were once told by the Department [of Indian 
Affairs] that all Indian were exempted.”82  Strength had heard from Oka that they were 
exempt and he asserted, “We are not any different with the Oka Indians.”83 
The reason for the difficulties at Gibson rose specifically from the one 
circumstance that separated that community from their cousins at Oka.  The original 
residents of Gibson had migrated from Oka in 1881.  The transplants’ original patent of 
land was based on their settlement duties, that they had cleared the land,  and that as 
settlers, they had been included on Ontario’s provincial voters’ list.84  It was “a very short 
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time ago,” that the Ontario government recognized Gibson as a reserve.85  The 
Department recommended that the Registrar at Toronto recognize Indian Affairs as 
overriding any historical relationship between the Gibson residents and the province, as 
the final and only authority on Native peoples, although Secretary McLean also chastised 
Chief Peter Strength for not having his young men register in the first place.86   
The Department advocated for the young men on the Gibson reserve, defending 
their status as Indians against other governmental departments and agencies whose 
working definition of Indian did not derive specifically from Indian Affairs.  This 
specialized government body suddenly had other government officials on the defensive, 
confused by what they perceived as inherent contradictions in policy and practice.  C. 
Leslie Wilson, the Ontario Registrar, demanded confirmation of the Department of Indian 
Affairs that Gibson was in fact a reserve at all.  He doubted the members of Gibson ought 
to come under the Order in Council if they voted “as white men.”87  Wilson also 
defended himself, arguing that he had never withheld an exemption from “Indians who 
are entitled to them, but of course if an Indian has voted, he is not entitled to exemption 
under regular procedure.”88   
While Wilson explained himself to Colonel Machin, Director of the Military 
Service Branch, his was not the point of view that decided on the question of exempting 
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young men from Gibson.  Machin defended the Registrar’s office on the “possibility” that 
the individual “was not aware of the departmental ruling…hence the fact of his having 
treated them as non-Indians.”89  McLean dismissed the Military’s insistence on using 
voting as a benchmark, telling the officials at the Military Service Branch that voting 
could not “in any way prejudice their status as Indians.”90  Instead, just as with the Fort 
William Band Council, the Department referred to the Department of Indian Affairs’ 
records and the contents of the Indian Act as the essential litmus tests for whether an 
individual was an Indian and their employees the only valid judges.91  
Brothers Charles Edwin Benedict and Alex Benedict spent the summer of 1918 in 
the military’s custody, arrested for desertion.  Despite pleas from both the Benedicts’ 
father Solomon and from secretary McLean, Major H. P. Cooke refused to release the 
brothers because Charles and Alex both “admit voting at [the] last dominion election,” 
and therefore the officer asserted the men did not fall under the exemption as per the 
Order in Council.92  McLean sought to correct that conclusion, and demanded that the 
Director of the Military Service Branch release the Benedicts and “return them to their 
homes,” on the Pierreville reserve.93  The Department official was far less diplomatic in 
his exchange with Major Cooke.  McLean asserted his authority, almost patronizingly, 
with the officer: “allow me to point out that the fact that these men voted is not the 
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determining factor in the question as to whether they are Indians or white men.”94 
McLean asserted “these men are clearly members of the Pierreville (Abenaki) band,” 
which the secretary identified as the only relevant measure of Indian identity according to 
the Indian Act, and so McLean concluded “I do not see how, even if they did vote it can 
be claimed that they are not Indians.”95   
There is no evidence from the extant correspondence that Cooke’s investigation 
into the Benedicts’ Indian-ness extended beyond asking if they voted and receiving an 
affirmative.  McLean corrected not only the Major’s perception that this was a 
satisfactory test of Indian identity, but also who had the authority to perform any such 
test.  The secretary explained to Cooke that “some time ago” the Department of Indian 
Affairs and the Department of Militia and Defense “came to an understanding” that 
“anyone claiming to be an Indian should have his case referred to Headquarters for [a] 
decision.”  McLean assessed that “apparently in this instance this had not been done,” 
and as a result of this negligence the Benedict brothers “have been improperly ordered to 
report for duty.”96  McLean demanded of Cooke, as he had done of the Director of the 
Military Service Branch Colonel Machin, that the brothers be released immediately and 
that any future cases of their type be referred to Ottawa for a more appropriate evaluation.   
Cooke countered McLean’s proclamation with a reiteration of his interpretation of 
the Order in Council.  The officer reassured the Department of Indian Affairs official that 
he had not been performing “an evaluation of Indianness,” and he did not “contend that if 
                                                





an Indian votes, he is not an Indian.”97  Cooke argued that the Order in Council would not 
exempt a “bona fide Indian” who “exercised his franchise,” because a Native man was 
exempt not because he was Indian but “by reason of the fact that he has been deprived of 
a vote.”98  The issue was quite simple to the Major, as both the Benedict boys had voted, 
and had acknowledged such.  Further, they had “deliberately disobeyed” the order to 
report for military duty, which the Major asserted they had received.99   
Like Secretary McLean, D.C. Scott differed with Major Cooke on the latter’s 
interpretation of the Order in Council, distinguishing between the document’s discussion 
of Japanese men for instance, who were legally denied the vote, and Native men -- 
Indians -- whose disenfranchisement was one element of their separation from white 
society.100  Interestingly, and entirely inconsistent with his previous behaviour on this and 
other issues, Scott referenced treaty agreements as one of the things baring conscription 
of Indian men.  Importantly however, he underlined his Department’s role in obtaining 
exemptions for Native men, that according to the Order in Council itself “Any Indian 
Agent may make application for the exemption for ANY Indian attached to the reserve 
&c.”101  This mechanism for obtaining exemptions meant that exercising the franchise 
was not the key question as to whether Native men were exempted from conscription, but 
whether those men fell under the Department’s authority – through treaty payment lists or 
band memberships as to whether they were Indian.  Whereas the Major suggested the 
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Order in Council distinguished within the Native population under the administration of 
the Department of Indian Affairs, Scott and his Department argued the Order in Council’s 
exemption followed the divisions between those Native people under his auspices 
(Indians) and those not living under the authority of Indian Affairs.  While Scott may 
have allowed space for treaties in this line of argument, those documents and agreements 
were of historical, not modern legal, significance largely as precursors to the Indian Act 
in establishing a relationship between Native peoples and the Crown.  The Department of 
Indian Affairs could not and would not have an army officer supersede their authority or 
monopoly on the power to decide an individual’s Indian identity.  
Although it seems to have no influence on McLean’s position on the Gibson 
men’s claim to the exemption from conscription, service in the CEF offered Native 
soldiers voting rights, without loosing their Indian status.  After the introduction of the 
Military Voters Act of 1917, which enfranchised all members of the CEF, the federal 
government sought to establish special polls on reserves for Native veterans, as reserves 
were otherwise not included in electoral maps.102  However, the vote’s extension to 
Native women, through the Military Voters Act and the Wartime Elections Act, was 
contingent on the provincial laws against Native women’s voting.103  Additionally, the 
Six Nations Council actively fought against the establishment of a polling station on the 
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reserve, as a challenge to their sovereignty.104  The full right to vote in federal elections 
without loosing status was not extended to all Native people until 1960.105  The war 
contributed to the patchwork of practices surrounding Native peoples voting (or not) 
across the country.  The conflict between Military officials and Indian Affairs over the 
role of voting in determining Native men’s status as status Indians illustrates the uneasy 
entry of “Indians” into a broader Canadian context.   
 
An appeal from an Aboriginal community at Lac La Biche to be exempt from 
conscription 
Whereas the difference between exemptible and not exemptible could cut swaths 
among the people on a reserve, many of those with Native ancestry found themselves 
completely outside the protective umbrella of the Indian exemption.  These men were not 
Indian enough to be exempt from conscription, yet they did not perceive themselves as 
part of Canadian society.  In the summer of 1918, Military officials had taken a number 
of men living in a settlement to the east of Edmonton.  Some were willing to serve, 
conscripted or not.  Many were not.  The men’s rationale for not wanting to serve in the 
CEF arose partially out of a question of language skills, as only a few of the men could 
understand either English or French enough to follow commands.106   
The men petitioned the Prime Minister as the “Half Breed Residents of the 
District of Lac La Biche,” expressing their “great dismay” over conscription, and 
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asserting “we are a simple people…unfitted in every respect for warfare.”107  The 
petitioners argued that “we are regarded as being on a lower plane of civilization than the 
white man,” and therefore they believed white men should exhaust their own numbers 
before the Military looked to themselves for soldiers.  If the Prime Minister believed 
sending them overseas was absolutely necessary, the Lac La Biche men requested they do 
some sort of non-combat work, and “that, if it be possible, they may not be sent into the 
trenches.”108   
Two weeks before his comrades sent their petition, Samuel Laroque of Lac La 
Biche was arrested for failing to report for duty.  To stop his prosecution, Laroque argued 
he was “Half Cree,” and therefore ought to be exempt from conscription.  Colonel 
Machin asked the Department of Indian Affairs if “in your view, this man [Laroque] is an 
Indian, as if he has not the status of an Indian I have no doubt a consent to his prosecution 
will be accorded.”109  Secretary McLean asserted that as Laroque did not “take treaty” he 
did not fall under the Department’s jurisdiction and “cannot be classed as an Indian.”110  
Upon request of the Prime Minister’s Office however, the Military did consider 
exempting the Lac La Biche men and other “half breeds” as a class, similar to the Indian 
exemption.  However, the Military Service Council deemed such a categorization would 
not be practical as these men made up an “indefinite proportion of the population.”111  
The Military could, however, always “dispense with the services of any men of whom 
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they cannot make effective use.”112 Any of the Lac La Biche men who could not 
understand English (or French) might be freed from duty. 
 
Conclusion 
 While the debate over conscripting Native men hinged on the relationship 
between Native peoples and the Canadian government, the implementation of the 
exemption for Native men underlined a greater negotiation, albeit an extremely one-sided 
discussion, about who could be included in that relationship.  The question was not 
whether an individual was Native, but whether he was an Indian, a category defined 
through legislation, not heritage, or custom.  Although the Department’s own criteria 
might not always have been internally consistent – under the Indian Act, Indians could 
not vote but members of the Gibson Reserve could both vote and be Indians – but the 
Department defended its authority to make the distinction of identity.   
Many men found themselves suddenly placed outside a community of which they 
had always been a part.  Even if rules contained within the Indian Act and its associated 
legislation had previously been largely ignored, such as the situation with children of 
previously-status Indian mothers at Fort William, the conscription exemption enforced 
one definition of membership on all reserves in Canada.  Specific local factors in 
Maniwaki, Parry Island, Fort William, Gibson and Lac La Biche influenced the nature of 
their debate over identity and conscription, but there was one response from the 
government: “The Department is prepared to ask the exemption only of Indians as 
defined by the Act, and half-breed[s] who cannot be classed as such are not entitled to 
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benefit by the Order in Council of January 17.”113  The discussion leading to this 
exemption may have been a successful negotiation on the part of the assembled Native 
communities across the country, but the implementation of that exemption (re)enforced a 
standardized definition of Native identity – that of Indian. 
Conscription affirmed the Indian Act’s role in the war, as it provided the 
benchmark for judging whether a man was an Indian, and therefore exempt from 
conscription, or simply a Native, who was not.  Although Agents did not have the 
specific authority to conscript men, an agent’s decision to exclude an individual left him 
liable to conscription, and to the possibility of five years of imprisonment as a deserter if 
he did not respond when conscripted.114  Whereas leaving the reserve and joining the 
mass of the CEF overseas tested the Indian Act’s reach, bands and individuals appealed 
to the Department to recognize their unique status within Canadian society and its legal 
framework.  While some Native veterans challenged the Department’s role in Native 
peoples’ lives, the contingency of wartime conscription served to cement rather than 
disentangle that relationship. 
 Being an Indian, more than being Native, became the crucial point in the quest for 
exemption.  Appearance on a pay list was the deciding factor for inclusion in the Indian 
exemption, not lifestyle, heritage, or even residence on reserve.  A “bona fide Indian,” 
belonged to a separate legal category than their relatives and neighbours who did not 
appear on treaty lists or have the recognition of an Indian Agent.  The insistence on the 
Indian Act as the yardstick to measure an individual’s eligibility for the exemption 
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undermined the power of the Council and community to determine its own membership, 
and placed that authority firmly in Agents’ and the Department’s hands. This 
standardization of Indian was not wholly rejected at some reserves across the country, as 
evidenced by Chief Megis of Parry Island, who used the exemption to impose his 
conception of membership on a contested community.  Many communities and 
individuals sought to use the category of Indian to be exempted from conscription, 
without the conflict exemplified in the Parry Island case, however.  While they were 
specifically concerned with freedom from conscription, these declarations embraced, at 




Protests Against Registration 
 
In May 1918, Secretary McLean informed John Pollock of Jordan Station, 
Ontario, that to obtain the Indian exemption he needed to register with his Indian Agent.  
In addition, McLean informed Pollock that registration would also become part of a 
national census concerning work performed and food consumption.  McLean reassured 
Pollock, “your Indian Agent will give you any particulars, but I might add that it is the 
wish of the Department to have all Indians registered faithfully and promptly.”1  
This new registration, under the Canada Registration Board, focused on economic 
activity, “to make registration a true reflection of man power and woman power of 
Canada,” in which effort “Indians are essentially a part of that power.”2  This was a 
massive economic census meant to obtain a complete list of military prospects who had 
“evaded their responsibilities” under the Military Service Act, to increase the country’s 
industrial production and direct employment, to determine the number of workers doing 
non-essential jobs, and to measure food consumption for possible rationing.3  Those who 
refused to register faced fines and possible imprisonment.4  They could be unable to 
secure employment or collect wages, hire any workers, secure contracts, purchase a train 
or boat ticket, buy meals at hotels or restaurants, and could be refused rations should 
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rationing be introduced.5  The Canada Registration Board suggested Indian Agents be 
made Deputy Registrars for their reserves, again assigning authority through familiar 
bureaucratic structures and relationships, and again overlapping registration with treaty 
payment meetings. Indian Affairs was given until the 22nd of June 1918 to complete this 
registration.6   
Logistical and political problems with the conscription exemption registration 
process meant that it was frequently done at the same time as this broader, particularly 
when the eligible age under the Military Service Act dropped from twenty to nineteen in 
late May.7  Hunting and logging proved almost as frustrating to Agents-turned registrars 
as active political opposition.  Agents were still registering for conscription into the early 
summer of 1918.8  As these two registration programs coincided, Native observers, as 
Secretary McLean had, conflated the registration for conscription with that for the 
Canada Registration Board.  Dempsey is the only historian to have considered this 
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program, and has categorized it as an increase in government oversight in Native peoples’ 
lives.9  While some Native men sought to be identified as Indian in order to qualify for 
the exemption from conscription, others refused to register with the government for either 
purpose.  Protest against the registration was the least common of three responses to the 
exemption from conscription.  A larger minority openly accepted registration (see chapter 
five), and the largest group expressed no specific opinion for or against registration – 
they registered, or their Agent simply registered them and obtained their exemptions.10   
Native peoples were not the only group within Canada who protested the 
imposition of conscription, and, as J.L. Granatstein asserted, these protests have been 
generally described as the majority forcing a less-powerful minority into uniform.11 Many 
authors have pointed to the pre-war tensions that lay behind protests against conscription, 
whether those tensions were between French-English, or rural depopulation and the 
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associated drop in rural political power, or organized labour’s political resistance.12 
Native attitudes surround conscription similarly hinge on how Native peoples fit into the 
Canadian system, both during wartime and in peacetime.  Those Native men who 
continued to register, regardless of the exemption, did not elicit the same degree of 
response as the Quebec City Easter Riots of 1918, in which the Canadian government 
feared mass revolt and suppressed the rioters to both prevent political upheaval and 
enforce conscription.13  Yet, those Native men who continued to challenge this extension 
of federal power, although few in number, also questioned the legitimacy of the Canadian 
government, particularly Indian Affairs, as the chief authority in Native peoples’ lives. 
Wesley Martin of Six Nations in Ontario and Gaston Louie of Head-o-the Lake in 
British Columbia, and their defenders, contextualized their failure to register within the 
wider question of the Department of Indian Affairs’ authority in Native peoples’ lives.  
The former based his resistance on treaties and Six Nations’ sovereignty, and the latter 
argued on the basis of God-given Aboriginal title that the government could not override.  
Both men used the Canada Registration Act as an opportunity to present their arguments 
in court.  Each questioned the authority of the Canadian government to include Native 
people within its political realm.  Those who challenged their inclusion in registration 
articulated a distinct view of their political relationship with Canada.  Barrister A.G. 
Chisholm argued Native peoples were neither citizen nor subject, 
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A Canadian Indian Maintaining his tribal relationship is a member of 
a distinct political community, between which and the British or 
Canadian Government certain international relations are maintained, 
and which community allowing for the mutations of time, has existed 
intact and unchanged since the Conquest of Canada [1760].14 
 
This statement is extremely important to understand the purpose of examining two 
specific challenges to wartime registration.  While so many Native groups and 
individuals fought conscription on the grounds of treaty restrictions and/or the Indian 
Act, most sought to be included in the subsequent exemption.  Wesley Martin and Gaston 
Louie refused to accept the Department’s authority to label them Indian.  In their view, 
the continued effort of the Department of Indian Affairs to include Native people within 
the Canadian state through wartime registration had to be fought absolutely.   
The Department clearly understood this dimension of Wesley Martin’s and 
Gaston Louie’s fights and opposed them ever mindful of wider political debates.  
Speaking candidly, Scott explained to the Canada Registration Board members “if the 
Indians find out they are able to defy the registration law without being made to suffer 
therefore, it will tend to weaken the control which the Department of Indian Affairs 
exercises over them.”15  Indian Affairs would not tolerate the opposition of the Native 
groups who sought to undermine Departmental authority over the question of wartime 
registration programs. 
 
Registration, Sovereignty and the Six Nations: 
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In the spring of 1918, members of the Six Nations appealed twice to the 
Department, “and I [Scott] anticipate many more,” asking whether the reserve had to 
participate in this latest effort to document Canada’s population and direct its collective 
energy towards the war effort.16  Meanwhile, Six Nations’ Superintendent Gordon Smith 
appealed to Indian Affairs for information on the Canada Registration Board in time for 
the 7 May Council meeting and subsequent Sunday Church Services “in order to 
overcome the opposition which is sure to be made by certain elements.”17  Smith believed 
that the Six Nations would only comply with the new regulations if they knew the 
penalties for failing to register, and he suggested to Scott that the Department consider 
additional penalties specifically for unregistered Native people.18     
To achieve this end, Smith created a circular for Chiefs, missionaries and 
teachers, “pointing out the respective duties of each as men working for the best interest 
of the Indians.”19  The circular established the penalties for failure to register, but it also 
addressed and rejected some of the concerns that arose in the debate around conscripting.  
The circular unequivocally stated, “the British Crown has never broken any treaty with its 
Native population and has never forced any of them to serve in the army.”20  The circular 
praised the “splendid response made by the Canadian Indians from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific” in volunteering and fighting “to secure for Canada freedom from the German 
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yoke and to the Indians the peaceful occupation of their Reserve.”21  This statement 
might have left a bitter taste in the mouths of some among the Six Nations, as they had 
asserted repeatedly and forcefully that they were sovereign nations distinct from the 
Canadian state.22  Rather, according to Smith, a registered Six Nations member had 
demonstrated that he “is willing to place himself on the side of the King and to prove that 
he is a law abiding resident of Canada, the country in which he lives and which protects 
him.”23   
Smith warned Chiefs and Councilors to “not fail in your duty at this critical hour,” 
to use their influence and respect in the community to ensure the reserve’s population 
registered.  If they did not help the registration process however, the Superintendent 
warned, “very much hardship and suffering may occur on your Reserve.”24  To the 
reserve’s teachers and missionaries, Smith suggested that the registration program offered 
them a chance “as true patriots” to ensure that “no false conception, erronious [sic] ideas, 
or misleading stores gain ground and jeopardice [sic] its success.”  These educators were 
to instruct their audiences to “unite with their white brother all over Canada,” to display 
their “sympathy and steadfast purpose to our soldier boys at the front.”25  In addition to 
the circular, Smith brought in E.A. Ball, the Superintendent for the Registration Board of 
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Southern Ontario and A.F. Scott, the Registrar for District into which the reserve fell, to 
discuss the registration program’s purpose and operation to the Six Nations Council on 4 
June, which Ball did “at some lengths.”26   
A rumour on the reserve suggested this latest registration program was associated 
directly with conscription, forced enfranchisement (which was viewed as a challenge to 
the Six Nations’ sovereignty and a possible back door to assimilation and loss of status) 
and “curtailing present treaty rights.”27  The Department sent its Agents a message to 
circulate on their reserves, asserting that this national registration was unrelated to 
military service, but rather that “IT COMMITS [any] MAN OR WOMAN 
REGISTERING TO NOTHING THAT HE WOULD NOT [D]O FOR HIMSELF, HIS 
FARM, HIS PRODUCE, HIS LABOUR OR HIS TIME.”28  The Department wanted 
Native communities to understand that CEF soldiers, both Native and non-Native, could 
no longer produce but continued to consume Canadian goods, and the whole country 
needed to ensure efficient production and limited consumption in order to support the 
forces. 
The Ontario Gypsum Company employed between 20 and 30 members of the Six 
Nations.  The company considered these workers important, but worried about rumors 
that the Six Nations Council opposed registration.29  When the Department of Justice 
informed the company’s lawyers that “Indians who do not register [are] disqualified from 
                                                
26 Six Nations Council Resolution No. 24 June 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 452-26 Pt. 1. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Emphasis in original, The Department of Indian Affairs to all its Agents/Deputy Registrars 11 June 1918 
LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 452-26 Pt. 1. 
29 Harrison Arrell, County Crown Attorney for the Haldimand County of the Minister of Justice 20 June 
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employment and any person who employs them while unregistered is liable to penalty,”30 
Ontario Gypsum fired its unregistered Native employees.31  Company officials believed 
that the Six Nations’ reticence towards registration was the direct result of lawyer J.W. 
Bowlby’s interference.32  A fortnight before the company wrote to the Ministry of 
Justice, Bowlby had addressed the Six Nations Council suggesting to the assembled 
Chiefs and Councilors that their treaty rights freed them from having to register, but also 
suggesting that the reserve should go along with the program “to save trouble.”33   
 The Council appealed directly to the Governor General, to whom they argued 
they were Britain’s Allies and not citizens of Canada.  In addition, the Council referred to 
a clause in the Six Nations’ treaty with the Crown that promised to “remove all 
reasonable cause of discontent.”  The Council assured the Governor General that “to say 
that the Indians are discontented would be putting it very mildly,” and therefore they 
requested the Governor General exempt the Six Nations from having to register with the 
Canada Registration Board.34  Following the path of so many similar appeals, the 
Council’s message made its way to D.C. Scott, who simply reiterated that this registration 
had nothing to do with military service.35  
Speakers at the Council’s meetings advised people not to sign their registration 
cards, while some advocated placing men at the schoolhouses to intimidate Deputy 
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Registrars and disrupt the registration process.36  According to J.W.M. Elliott, a chief 
more sympathetic to the process, those opposed to registration gathered at the Longhouse 
schools, Smith Corners (a town in the South-west of the reserve) and the lower 
longhouses to plan their resistance.  To those who did not see themselves as Canadians, 
and who fiercely guarded all things tangible and symbolic that maintained that 
independence, this centralized program to document and control the economic activity of 
all Canadians could easily be construed as a threat.   
The conflict on the reserve became violent, as unknown but presumably anti-
registration individuals beat and shot at ex-Chief A.G. Smith on the assumption he was 
involved in the registration.  In response to this attack, Smith declared his intention to 
employ constables to guard the schools on registration day.37  On 18 June, Secretary 
McLean approved Smith’s plan to protect the registration process; that same day the anti-
registration faction held a raucous and well-attended meeting at the Council House where 
some made threats of “obstruction and bodily injury” against the Deputy Registrars.38  
The anti-registration meeting drew a crowd too large for the Council House, and 
attendees could not fit in the building itself crowded in the doorway and gathered at the 
windows to hear the discussion.  If this sign of interest in the anti-registration movement 
did not scare Smith, the Superintendent received an anonymous letter that threatened him 
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with bodily harm and promised the use of force to prevent Smith from using the 
schoolhouse if registration went ahead.39 
Chief Elliott dismissed his fellow Six Nations members who opposed registration 
as ignorant and acting “simply [out of] a desire to oppose the Department and the 
Government.”40  Elliott claimed the Chiefs were impotent against the threat of the anti-
registration movement, and though he personally believed that one third of Chiefs 
favoured registering, they “act as if they were muzzled.”  Whereas Superintendant Smith 
blamed Bowlby for inciting the anti-registration sentiment on the reserve, Elliott’s 
assessment of those who challenged registration follows a general pattern of reserve 
politics.  An earlier study of this process argued that the Six Nations’ responses to the 
war fell along preexisting sectarian and political conflicts between Christian and 
Longhouse reserve members and Chiefs on the Council.41  Those who openly challenged 
registration met in Longhouse facilities or in largely Longhouse portions of the reserve, 
reinforcing the perception that Longhouse members were the force behind opposition to 
war programs.   
Despite the violence, Smith registered a number of willing Six Nations residents 
at his office.  He claimed to have seen and dealt with the majority of Ohsweken, the 
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largest town on the reserve – the Superintendent claimed Smith Corners’ housed the anti-
registration faction.42  The conflict at Six Nations had drawn outside attention, however, 
as the Ottawa Journal Press reported that the Six Nations had taken “a decided stand 
against registration.”43  Chief Constable Slemin of the Brantford Police Force and 
Colonel Sherwood of the Dominion Police swore in six Special Constables to aide 
reserve registration on 22 June.44  Smith’s informants told him that Bowlby intended to 
defend the Longhouse members should any of them be arrested for failing to register. 
Yet, somewhat anti-climatically, and despite the significant number of Six 
Nations who refused to register, Smith reported to Secretary McLean two days after the 
Special Constables came onto the reserve that registration was going “very quietly.”45  
The Superintendent excused the low level of registration with the rationale that some of 
the reserve’s population had registered in Brantford and at the Ohsweken Post Office.  He 
blamed the registrars for failing to publicize accurate information about the registration, 
as he received innumerable phone calls from confused or inquiring members of Six 
Nations.46  Additionally it was rumored that the local postmaster declared a thirty-day 
extension to register for the Six Nations population, which Smith believed had caused 
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people to delay registration.47  Smith asserted that “on the whole I am pleased with the 
results as there was no open attempt to obstruct or intimidate,” would-be registrants.48   
On 29 June, while in Brantford, Six Nations member Wesley Martin was arrested 
for not having or not presenting his registration certificate when asked to do so.  J.W. 
Bowlby promised to defend him.  The Six Nations Council agreed to “furnish money to 
make this a test case,” in their opposition to the registration program.49  Bowlby asserted 
Martin’s arrest was unjustified as Native peoples had a thirty-day extension to register.50  
The lawyer presented the bewildered and unbelieving Police Magistrate with newspaper 
reports as proof.  As Bowlby defended Martin’s lack of registration papers, Smith 
worried that “this puts me in a very false position as they are laughing about it on the 
reserve and it will be a very serious matter if the agitators in this recent attempt to 
obstruct the wishes of the Government escapes scot [sic] free.”51 
The feeling at the first Council meeting after Martin’s arrest was “very bitter.”52  
Late one night two unidentified but self-declared unregistered young men drove up to the 
home of the deliveryman for McHutcheon’s bakery and threatened the deliveryman if he 
refused to bring bread to the unregistered families on the reserve. Brantford-area police 
had warned McHutcheon not to sell bread to unregistered residents and the baker 
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declared he would rather stop delivering goods to the reserve completely than be 
threatened into breaking the law.53   
In late June (it is unclear if this was before or after Martin’s arrest), the Council 
began registering the reserve population with their own special cards, on the backs of 
which they had printed an extract from the 1763 Treaty of Paris stating that Native people 
are not to be molested.54  The Council declared they were wards according to the Indian 
Act, a surprising declaration considering the Six Nations’ repeated assertions of 
sovereignty, and that the Canada Registration Act “requiring enumeration” violated the 
Treaty of Paris between the Six Nations and the British Crown, hence they decided not to 
register with the Canadian authorities.55  Despite the contradiction of both appealing to 
the authority of the Indian Act and the supranational power of a treaty between Native 
peoples and the British Crown, the Council made their continued displeasure with 
registration clear.   
With the exception of Wesley Martin, unregistered Six Nations members seemed 
to have no trouble moving around Brantford freely or buying meals in town.  Smith 
fumed that this “laxity” brought the entire Canada Registration Board “into contempt and 
makes things very unpleasant on the reserve for those who worked hard to secure the 
registration of the Indians.”56  Yet, an individual did not have to produce their registration 
before purchasing a meal or train ticket unless asked, therefore according to the Canada 
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Registration Board “the Six Nations Indians are not peculiar in the freedom from 
inconvenience which they have enjoyed.”57 
From Ottawa, D.C. Scott declared the Six Nation Council’s special registration 
was “quite worthless and will not protect them from the penalties which the law 
imposes.”58  The Canada Registration Board believed the Six Nations Council’s actions 
merited some special attention and they put the matter in front of the Crown Attorney of 
Brant County and were prepared to follow up with Ontario’s Attorney General and even 
the Deputy Minister of Justice if necessary. 59  
With Martin’s court date fast approaching, William Jamieson of Six Nations 
wrote to D.C. Scott on 6 July to express his concern with the Council’s decision and to 
question Wesley Martin’s general character and his image as a martyr.  Jamieson told 
Scott that Wesley was the son of George W. Martin, whom Jamieson described as one of 
the “ringleaders” of the anti-registration faction, and Jamieson felt it was wrong that the 
Martins and their followers were going to use band funds to defend Wesley.  Jamieson 
believed band funds should not pay “the Bill for the ignorance of those people when 
others are complying [with] the Laws of the Country,” and he demanded that Scott “set 
your foot down firmly saying this will never be done using [the] Nations money for that 
purpose.”60  Despite Jamieson’s concerns, the Council had officially decided to hire an 
additional lawyer, Mr. Kelly of Simcoe, to work alongside J.W. Bowlby.  
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Meanwhile, the Council sought to solidify its anti-registration stance.  Chief 
Lawrence Jonathan interviewed the women who had appointed the Chiefs with the goal 
of replacing those men that had participated in the registration.  He expelled all eight 
registered Chiefs.61  Three Chiefs (it is not clear from the Superintendant’s record of 
events if these men were among the eight ejected chiefs) came to Smith criticizing the 
Council’s support for Martin.  They told the Superintendent the Mohawk and Cayuga 
were split on the issue while the largely Longhouse Onondaga represented the strongest 
support for Martin and his case.62  Chief G.W. Hill explained how he was stripped of his 
chiefdom for registering.  Hill threatened to leave the country all together if the Canadian 
Government continued to support such behaviour, even passively, and pointed 
specifically to Seth Newhouse as one of the Council’s most heinous leaders.  Hill wanted 
the non-registered members punished, and asked the Superintendent why when he “have 
obeyed the government now shall I put up with the insults and persecutions of those who 
will not register?”63 
Smith acknowledged what the statements of Chief Elliott and William Jamieson 
had already suggested, that the registration debate “appears to have narrowed down to a 
fight between the Long House people and the Christians.”64  The Superintendent believed 
the Council had ceased to function in any meaningful capacity, and focused its attention 
solely on the political debate over registration.65  The Superintendent believed the 
dissatisfaction with the Council was widespread if less vocal, which presented “an 
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opportune time to have the system changes to an elective Council.”66  The 1880 revision 
to the Indian Act and the 1884 Indian Advancement Act allowed the Department to 
replace traditional councils with elected ones, although these compulsory powers were 
later curtailed when many bands refused to recognize the legitimacy of elected councils, 
or simply elected their hereditary leaders.67   
Complicating the sectarian divisions on the Six Nations reserve discussed above, 
the Christian factions tended to support elected leaders while Longhouse members 
preferred the traditional leadership.  Those opposed to the traditional leadership styles 
eventually became the Progressive Warriors or Dehorner party, referring to [the removal 
of] the Six Nations Chiefs’ deer antler headdress.68  Some Six Nations soldiers, many of 
whom had been affiliated with the Dehorners in their pre-war civilian lives, wrote home 
from the front in support of an elected rather than hereditary council.69  Smith believed 
that if the Six Nations soldiers returned home immediately, the general reserve opinion 
would swing in favour of registration.70  If Superintendent Smith’s assertion that the 
registered persons were “disgusted with the present display of lack of patriotism and 
duties,” on the part of the Council, no matter how self-serving that view might have been, 
this displeasure should be considered a mark against the traditional council.  
Scott wanted Brantford lawyer W.S. Brewster, whose firm the Department used to 
prosecute liquor trafficking on reserve, to attend Martin’s trial as a Departmental 
representative to emphasize the fact they were aware of and dismissed the Six Nations’ 
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arguments of sovereignty.71  Scott denied the legitimacy of the Six Nations’ anti-
registration faction when he blamed J.W. Bowlby for inciting the anti-registration 
sentiment in the oft-repeated refrain pointing to meddling whites as the cause of Native 
activism.72  Scott perceived his Department’s authority posed on a slippery slope at Six 
Nations, since “if they [the Six Nations Council] are allowed to defy the Government 
with impunity in this matter they will be encouraged to defy the Government in the 
Administration of Indian Affairs generally.”73  Scott suggested to Smith that they depose 
Chiefs and Councilors, using a power delineated in the Indian Act.74 
For all the posturing, mutual challenges to authority and legitimacy, and threats of 
violence, the key question of Wesley Martin’s actions relied on neither the Six Nations 
Council nor the Department for its resolution.  Instead, Martin, his supporters and 
detractors waited on the results of a court hearing in Brantford.  The Brantford Expositor 
presented an extensive description of Martin’s trial, whom the paper’s reporter described 
as “a young Six Nations brave,” who “chose in a defiant manner, to be a martyr to the 
cause” of anti-registration.75  Bowlby presented the court with the Six Nations’ argument, 
that the promises in the Treaty of Paris and Native peoples’ status under the Indian Act 
exempted the Six Nations from the registration.  Throughout the lawyer’s speech, Seth 
Newhouse sat directly behind Bowlby, with large historical volumes and wampum belts, 
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representing the written record and historical exchange of the Six Nations’ and the 
British, on full display for the legal officials and the civilian observers.76   
The documents and representations that reflected the foundational relationship 
between Six Nations and the British Crown proved to be more relics than relevant legal 
precedent in the case of Wesley Martin.  The judge pointed out that some of the Indian 
Act’s tenets directly challenged the principle that Native people were not to be molested.  
In particular, Native people could be arrested for being drunk.77  The judge and Bowlby 
engaged in a discussion of whether Native people were persons under the law, which the 
latter claimed to be unprepared to discuss.  The judge countered that according to Chief 
Justice Sir William Meredith “an Indian was not a person in the law only as far as the 
Indian Act applied,” and the judge suggested the Act did not cover registration.  Crown 
Attorney Wilkies pointed to the practical evidence that over one hundred reserve 
residents had registered.  Despite Bowlby’s declaration that Wilkie’s insistence on 
registering Native peoples “made him sick,” the Crown Attorney held that he must 
uphold the law.78 
Incensed, Seth Newhouse received permission to address the court.  Referring to 
the treaties and wampum bands he brought, Newhouse argued that the Six Nations “have 
never sworn to be British subjects.”  The special Six Nations registration cards, with the 
Treaty of Paris on the reverse, were presented to the Court, including one with Wesley 
Martin’s signature.79  Martin refused the judge’s offer to register now, so the judge fined 






Martin one hundred dollars.80  Superintendent Smith assured Ottawa that those members 
of Six Nations who had registered welcomed the judgment.81  Secretary de Wolf of the 
Canada Registration Board believed the conviction “had a salutary effect and caused 
more of them [on Six Nations] to comply with law.”  In addition, unregistered Six 
Nations men’s inability to secure employment in the flax fields and the ejection of those 
employed at the Ontario Gypsum Company had shown them “it is in their own interest to 
comply with the law,” believed de Wolf.82  Therefore, he believed there was no need to 
take further punitive measures.83 
With the image of Seth Newhouse holding the wampum belts and treaties in court 
in mind, Mayor McBride inquired of the Governor General about the Six Nations’ 
vehement claim that they were not British subjects.  Scott assured McBride that the Six 
Nations’ claim was “quite without foundation,” which fact the Six Nations “have been 
many times so informed.”84  Scott reassured Mayor McBride that the opposition to 
Canada Registration Board and the Military Service Act were “not general among the 
band.”85  The bureaucrat told the Mayor that if McBride wanted to help register the rest 
of the Six Nations, he should emphasize that all those living in and around Brantford, 
Native and non-Native, must “recognize that our birth-right as British subjects is the best 
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possession we have,” but that it holds specific privileges and responsibilities, one of 
which was the “obligation that the laws of the country must be obeyed.”86  
The Six Nations Council had intended Wesley Martin’s case to be a test for their 
anti-registration stance, and they did not generally accept Martin’s fine as the final word 
in the matter.  Less than two months after Martin’s trial, Brantford Police arrested his 
father, George Martin, and Seth Newhouse for failing to register.  Bowlby promised to 
defend the two men and declared he would get the entire reserve exempt from registration 
through an Order in Council.87  The Superintendent might have taken some solace in the 
fact that some on the Six Nations expressly did not support Newhouse and Martin, the 
“ringleaders of the anti-registration party,” including re-instated registered Chiefs on the 
Council.  Smith believed an Order in Council would be disastrous for the Department “as 
the Indians would acclaim it as a great victory over me and the Department, and when 
any trouble arises in the future, as it is sure to do, our influence would be weakened.”88 
Bowlby visited D.C. Scott in Ottawa in early September to argue the Six Nations’ 
case against registration.  Scott rejected the lawyer’s petition, and warned the Minister of 
Justice Doherty against Bowlby’s appeals.89  Scott shared Superintendent Smith’s serious 
view of the issue of ensuring the registration program continued on Six Nations, and by 
association the fear of losing face against persistent protests.  To Scott’s relief and to the 
dismay of Bowlby and the anti-registration faction, the Ministry of Justice refused to 
grant an Order in Council exempting Native people from the Canada Registration Act.90   
                                                
86 Ibid. 
87 Superintendent Gordon Smith to D.C. Scott 4 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 452-26 Pt. 
1. 
88 Ibid. 
89 D.C. Scott to Minister of Justice Doherty 5 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 452-26 Pt. 1. 
90 D.C. Scott to Superintendent Gordon Smith 9 September 1918 LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 452-26 Pt. 
1. 
 215 
George Martin was fined one hundred dollars or a month in jail.  He chose the 
month in jail.91  Martin Sr. believed “he would lose his birthright,” if he registered, that 
the registration program was essentially a backdoor for enfranchisement and the loss of 
Indian status.92  Newhouse however did not appear in court and Brantford police issued a 
warrant for his arrest.  Two weeks later, at the beginning of October, Newhouse and 
another man, George Everette, resurfaced at the Hagersville Indian Agent’s Office to 
register.  They explained they had been misinformed about the purpose of registration 
and fearful of its interference with some of their treaty rights and now “they are quite 
willing and anxious to register.”93  The influenza pandemic that began in the fall of 1918 
further undermined the anti-registration movement, as families needed supplies, which 
they could not purchase if they were not registered. The need for that rudimentary safety 
net temporarily quieted protests.   
 
Gaston Louie, James Christie, Inspector Megraw and Registration in the Okanagan 
Agency 
The members of the Six Nations who opposed registration did so in an effort to 
protect their foundational relationship with the British Crown.  Across the country, a 
handful of men chose to use the publicity of registration and the spectacle of arrest to 
continue their fight over land ownership, another basic tenet of the Department’s 
relationship with Native people, especially in British Columbia (as discussed in chapter 
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four).  In Blacktown in the Okanagan Valley, Gaston Louie, Tomasket, Speed Powers, 
and two other unidentified men “had obtained the largest following in opposition to it 
[registration].”94  Louie in particular (alternately described as a Chief by those who 
defended him, see below) opposed the registration on a question of principle, as his 
lawyer described him as “one of the Indians who hold peculiar ideas regarding two 
subjects, his lands and conscription.”95  On the one hand, Louie “holds strongly to the 
belief that the lands were given to the Indians by the Almighty and that no one could take 
them from them [the Native owners],” and on the other “in common with many other 
Indians he believed that if he registered under the Military Service Act that in some way 
or other he forfeited his rights as an Indian.”96  The linkage between land control, war 
plans and the defense of Native identity provided the basis for Louie’s personal challenge 
to the registration process and the Department’s control of the Okanagan Agency.  
While Agent Robert Brown registered about half of the population of the 
Okanagan Agency by the 22 June deadline, the Head-o-the Lake Indians “showed the 
most pronounced opposition,” among the Agency, whose population Inspector A.E. 
Megraw described as having “the poorest showing” at registration day “as usual.”97 
Agent Brown subsequently traveled around his reserve to register the delinquents, of 
which only eighteen evaded his efforts.98  Megraw and J.D. McLean both felt the penalty 
for failing to register should depend on the individual’s socio-political position.  Where a 
Chief refused to register “and thus was the means of deterring others in his Band,” the 
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Department should given that Chief a “reprimand.”99  For the more general populace 
however, Megraw insisted that no goods be sold on the Agency before the buyer 
produced their registration card. With the real threat of going hungry “the balance of 
them would have been registered within a week.”100   
McLean acknowledged that there was nothing in the registration regulations that 
would absolutely prevent merchants from selling goods to unregistered Native people, 
but he believed “it would have a very good affect,” if the police took action against the 
key players against registration.101  The police eventually arrested six “ringleaders” for 
failing to register.  All but two paid the necessary ten-dollar fine.102  Gaston Louie and 
Tomasket (whom one supporter described as “the martyr and champion of the band’s 
rights”) refused to pay, and waited in the Provincial Gaol as the Solicitor General 
appealed to Department for advice on whether or not to show the two men clemency.103  
Repeating the refrain about interference by meddling whites, Megraw attributed Louie 
and Tomasket’s refusal to the advice of local white man and former Mountie James H. 
Christie, who was threatening to take legal action for the two men’s lost crops.104  
The conflict between Gaston Louie, James Christie, and Inspector Megraw long 
preceded the question of registration.  The title of Chief, employed by Louie’s defenders, 
was both appropriate and not.  Louie was elected Chief in 1915, but was deposed the next 
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“by the proper authorities” for “incompetence and insubordination” according to 
Megraw, or because of “he opposed the Inspector in his unlawfully having forced the 
presence of outsiders upon our reserve…and the Department’s decision to remove this 
man, is proof that our chief was right” according to some of Louie’s supporters.105  In 
particular, Louie reopened certain land deals Megraw considered closed and not only 
refused to co-operate with police trying to arrest a band member, but tried to force the 
officers off the reserve as trespassers.106  At the time, Christie promised Louie he would 
get the Chief reinstated.  Although Louie was still not a chief in 1918, no one else had 
been elected or appointed in his stead.107 
The now former Chief Gaston Louie, Tomasket, Christie and “a few more of the 
irreconcilables,” (according to Megraw) formed the Okanagan Indian Defence League, 
with Christie as their paid secretary.108  The League wrote to Scott on 20 August 1916 
with a list of complaints and demands, including the removal of “Germany Enemy 
Aliens” from the reserve, that the Agent ought not and will not interfere in band voting 
(likely related to Louie’s removal) and non-band members would not vote, and that they 
generally did not trust Megraw, “that they resent his invasion of their rights, his 
unreasonable interference with our Chief,” and they wanted him fired.109 
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On 20 April 1917, Christie sent a pamphlet containing of his and Gaston Louie’s 
correspondence with the Department to members of the House of Commons and the 
Senate. This inspired a question by Dr. W.J. Roche, Minister of the Interior (and 
therefore political head of the Department of Indian Affairs) in the House.  Although 
Roche told his colleagues in the House of Commons that Christie did not represent the 
Okanagan population, and was “not an angel,” and that his complaints would be 
examined and “when investigated, [they will] be shown to be figments of the 
imagination, if not of Christie, at least of some others on that reserve.”110  In response, 
Frank Oliver of Edmonton retorted that it was not a question of character but of events, 
and as  
the welfare of the Indians and the good faith and good name of Canada 
are in my hon. friend’s hands.  I hope that he [Roche, and by extension 
the department] will not treat this matter lightly simply because Mr. 
Christie may be, in some degree, an undesirable person.111 
 
Although the Department’s original plan had been to have James McKenna of the 
McKenna-McBride Commission investigate the Okanagan Indian Rights League 
complaints, Chief Inspector Ditchburn took over the inquiry when McKenna was 
superannuated.112   
In January 1917, Megraw wrote to his friend, former Inspector John Kennedy, to 
ascertain details about the latter’s dealings with Christie.113  Kennedy told Megraw that 
Christie had convinced a number of Native people to claim (falsely, according to 
Kennedy) they had voted against a proposed land surrender at the Long Lake reserve.  
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Kennedy accused Christie of debauching Native women and using whiskey to influence 
the Okanagan population.  He wondered at Christie’s ability to gain the Department’s ear, 
for “they know his character from various sources,” but he allowed, “perhaps they are 
giving him plenty of role to enable him to properly hang himself.”114  Kennedy advised 
Megraw to bring Christie in front of Leonard Norris, Stipendiary Magistrate, for selling 
whiskey to Native people.115   
Megraw also wrote to the Commissioner of the Royal North West Mounted Police 
in Regina to inquire about Christie’s record with that organization.  Megraw identified 
Christie as “a squawman [married to a Native woman] here,” who was “causing much 
trouble among the Indians.”116  Megraw was particularly interested in verifying a rumor 
that Christie had shot off his own thumb “in a fit of cowardly malingering” to avoid a 
difficult patrol during his tenure as an officer (1876-1880).117  Unfortunately for 
Megraw’s attempt to tar Christie’s reputation, the force reported that its “records contain 
no reference to the shooting incident referred to.”118  
Chief Inspector Ditchburn traveled around the Okanagan Agency in July 1917 
and held public meetings at each reserve included in Christie’s petition to the House of 
Commons.  Although he gave Christie an opportunity to speak, the Chief Inspector 
pointed out that some Native people had paid Christie $200 to appear at the inquiry, 
which Ditchburn treated as suspicious.  Ditchburn publically rejected Christie’s 
interpretation of the Indian Act, from which “the Indians gave him a dressing down after 
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the meeting was over…as one of the Indians expressed it ‘They’re raising hell with 
Christie for not giving them the proper dope’.”119  Ditchburn explained to Scott that 
Christie felt his case was materially weakened when some Native witnesses refused to 
repeat in public what they had told Christie in private.120  The Chief Inspector did not 
completely dismiss the Okanagan complaints, as he reported the local Agent Brown “had 
a poor conception of what the duties of an Indian Agent are,” which had led to several 
serious problems in the Agency’s management, including prostitution and questionable 
land payments to possible non-band members.121  Despite his exoneration, Megraw spoke 
bitterly to Kennedy about Ditchburn’s treatment of Christie, particularly given that 
Ditchburn sided against Megraw on the failed Long Lake surrender, as “He [Ditchburn] 
says he is killing him [Christie] with kindness, but I prefer to do it with a club.”122 
Now a year later, and neither dead nor undeterred, Christie created a new 
pamphlet to argue that Louie and Tomasket were martyrs to the cause of self-preservation 
rather than criminals under the Canada Registration Act.  In his pamphlet “Okanagan 
Indians Non-Registered: The Reason Why,” Christie asserted the Okanagan faced 
“invading hordes of stray, foreign Indians, half-breeds that drift from the United States 
with an added quota from the reserve of B.C.,” and “negligent, ignorant and intently 
harsh officials,” who tried to secure land surrenders “in an underhand manner” and rented 
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reserve land in the fashion of a “comic opera.”123  Had the McKenna-McBride 
Commission been genuinely interested in the Okanagan’s concerns, it might have been 
useful, but instead Christie decried the Commission as partisan.  Even the current 
registration process was entrusted to “two prominent enemies of the peace of the 
Okanagans – both intruders and both prime movers in all things affecting the peace of the 
Okanagans.”124  When compared with the Department of Indian Affairs’ institutional 
corruption, Christie asked how “the chief’s objection to crooked work, constituted 
insubordination in a Canadian department of public affairs!”125  Christie suggested 
registration was the last straw:  
it is time for a showdown between the department of Indian Affairs of the 
Dominion of Canada…and the Okanagan band of British-born Indians – 
industrious and honestly striving for a chance to live in peace under the 
flag their men have done their duty fighting for.126   
 
Christie’s reference to “British-born Indians” strengthened the linkage he made between 
the Okanagan bands’ fight against oppression and popular war rhetoric, as well as 
underlined the suggestion the valley and Agency were overrun with American 
interlopers. 
Of the Native men arrested for failing to register, Stipendiary Magistrate Leonard 
Norris decided those who pleaded guilty would pay a five-dollar fine (rather than the 
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$250 maximum fine) and those who pleaded not guilty would pay ten dollars or serve a 
month in jail.127  Both Gaston Louie and Tomasket refused to plead guilty or to pay any 
fine; both found themselves in the Kamloops jail.128  Thanks to “the folly of the Jailer” 
however, both men were released early, and Megraw asserted they returned to the reserve 
“swaggering around, jeering at the other Indians who registered, telling them that the 
registration was all wind.”129  Megraw also criticized the Provincial Police’s “loose 
manner” that had reduced the question of registration to “a mere farce.”  This laxity made 
the position of the Department, who had emphasized the importance of registration, 
“almost intolerable.”130   
Megraw again questioned Christie’s motives in his efforts for the Louie and the 
Okanagan bands.  At the end of the harvest, the bands of the Okanagan Agency “are flush 
with money…it is a good opportunity for Christie to get busy and obtain his share,” as 
the Inspector asserted the Head-o-the Lake Band had already paid Christie one thousand 
dollars and the Penticton Band paid him four hundred “for his campaign of trouble-
making.”131  Scott shared this negative opinion of Christie, whom he described as “a man 
whose character is in every way doubtful,” which meant he was “likely to support the 
Indians at any time in illegal or contumacious conduct.”132  
On 23 October 1918, George A. Carter, Acting Police Chief of the Provincial 
District into which the Agency fell, “accosted” Louie and “several other unregistered 
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Indians” in a potato field.133  Louie refused to show the officer any documentation or 
answer any questions.  Carter met Louie again a few hours later when the latter drove 
home on a private road.  Louie again refused to answer Carter’s questions, and the officer 
followed the Chief into an adjacent field where Louie claimed he was going to eject a 
white lessee working the land; Louie declared, “he did not care what the law was, he was 
going to obey his own law.”134  Carter disagreed and arrested Louie – Carter believed 
himself specifically justified as he described Louie’s behaviour as “high-handed and 
insolent…on this occasion he [Louie] went to violent extremes and resisted arrest with 
every power at his disposal.”135  During the altercation, Louie cried “in Indian” to his son 
in the other field to help him, and “this boy then ran off to get a rifle and was ultimately 
turned back by another Indian else damage might have been done.”136  Later, Carter 
claimed Louie’s tubercular wife and son physically assaulted him during Louie’s arrest.  
The officer asserted Louie’s son did not stop his threatening behaviour until Megraw 
fired a shot at his feet.137  Christie presented the conflict in a different light in his editorial 
in the Vancouver Sun, where he asserted Louie’s son believed the constable and his 
associates were murdering his parents, and that “one of the gang” shot at the boy before 
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he could intervene.138  Christie informed his white audience, “Gaston Louie got Canadian 
department of Indian affairs’ justice.”139 
Although Magistrate Norris sentenced Louie to five months in prison for resisting 
arrest, a county court judge J.D. Swanson decided on appeal that Louie’s resistance was 
lawful because Carter had had no right to arrest him. The judge argued that Louie’s 
refusal to answer did not equate lying or evasion.140  In private correspondence with his 
friend Kennedy, Megraw declared Swanson “a narrow brute” who excused Louie as part 
of his continual battle with Magistrate Norris, whom Megraw unsurprisingly endorsed as 
the superior of the two judges on questions of criminal law.141  Megraw suggested to his 
friend that all was not lost however, as Swanson presented his own rationale for 
acquitting Louie, namely that Louie did not lie about his registration, so “it was no 
victory for MacIntyre [Louie’s lawyer] or Christie, although the public are left to infer it 
from Christie’s letter and the rotten editorial of the filthy Sun.”142 
The lawyers who authored the Departmental report on Louie’s trial reflected that 
the most troubling element of Louie’s acquittal was the possible erosion of the 
Department’s authority in Native peoples’ eyes, with the possible result that “they might 
be thus encouraged, or some of them, to further high-handed acts that may result not only 
in difficulty for the Department but in danger to life or limb of those with whom the 
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Indians come in contact.” 143  Judge Swanson underlined the need to obey the registration 
law in English, and the lawyers believed this undid the benefit of the pronouncement to 
his Native audience because few understood the language.144  Agent Brown similarly 
believed that Louie’s victory would make registration difficult and asserted he was “quite 
peeved” at the judge’s decision.145 
While Indian Affairs stewed over the potential threat to their authority and the 
registration program, Gaston Louie placed the question of his arrest in a very different 
light.  The Chief’s lawyer, Alec MacIntyre of Kamloops, presented his case against the 
Inspector to the Department, which consisted of a “flagrant violation of his rights.”146  
The Inspector leased Louie’s land to Vernon hardware merchants Galbraith and Speer, 
without the Chief’s consent, of which “everything in connection with this leasing was 
done by Inspector Megraw in a way calculated to rouse the ire of the Indian, to touch his 
pride and to humiliate him in the eyes of his fellow Indians.”147  Officer Carter testified 
that Megraw told him the land was uncultivated and therefore leased under the War 
Measures Act (of which the police and Megraw claim to have informed Louie), and 
Louie’s local Native supporters physically threatened and intimidated the SOS (Soldier of 
the Soil) farmer – a teenager – who attempted to work the land.148  As part of a concern 
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for idle or underproductive lands during a time of increased demand for Canada’s 
foodstuffs, the Canadian government had turned its attention to reserve especially and 
amended the Indian Act in the spring of 1918 to allow the Department to lease land 
without band consent.149  Megraw’s assertion that he needed to lease the land “on the 
grounds that Gaston Louie was not producing from what the land is capable of,” aligned 
with the Department of Indian Affairs’ rhetoric in altering the Indian Act.150   
 Louie decried both the decision to take his land and the rent Megraw collected, 
which the Chief’s lawyer described as “scandelously [sic] out of proportion to its 
value.”151  The lawyer pointed out that Megraw asked Officer Carter and Assistant 
Constable McDonald onto the reserve to threaten the Chief not to interfere with the white 
leasees of his land – not to check the reserve population’s compliance with the 
registration regulation.  To a limited extent, Megraw and Carter supported this assertion, 
as Megraw and one of the lessees asked Carter to help him prevent Louie from 
perpetually interfering with the lessees’ farming.152  According to a Ministry of Justice 
memorandum, it was only after finding Louie unmovable on the land question that 
“Constable [Carter], presumably with the object of finding some excuse for removing the 
Indian from the place, began to question him as to whether he registered.”153  Registration 
had been the tool to remove Louie.  Similarly, Louie’s challenge to Megraw’s actions and 
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his resultant successful appeal was more than a simple challenge to registration; it also 
challenged the Department’s increased powers and incursions during the war. 
Contrary to the story that Louie had incited all the violence of his arrest, 
MacIntyre claimed it was “with something like brutal violence and after a fierce struggle 
Gaston Louie was arrested and with his wife and two or three other Indians taken to 
Vernon to the Goal.”154  Louie believed this confinement was the indirect cause of his 
wife’s death a few months later, as the living conditions in the prison aggravated her 
preexisting tuberculosis.  To add insult to injury, Louie’s lawyer pointed out that the 
Chief had been tried under the Order in Council of the Registration “but with no offence 
in connection with the lands.”155  McIntyre’s suggestion was that authorities wanted to 
direct attention towards the straight-forward question of whether Louie had complied 
with registration, the Chief and other Native defendants at the trial wanted to focus 
attention on their case for land ownership.  During his trial, Louie and some of his fellow 
unregistered band members “said in Court the God gave them land and it wasn’t in the 
big Book to be registered.”156  This view closely follows those expressed among the Naas 
Agency during the McKenna-McBride Commission and underlines the continued fight 
over how the war would influence the conflict between Native groups and the 
Department of Indian Affairs over the overall legitimacy of Indian administration, not 
simply over specific wartime questions. 
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Alec MacIntyre asserted the Inspector “has not a solitary qualification for the 
office [of Inspector] and consequently is distrusted and detested by the Indians generally 
throughout his whole Inspectorate.”  Specifically, the lawyer claimed Megraw’s “lack of 
tact is amazing” and “as to [the] Conscription Act he has exhibited towards the Indians as 
arrogant insolence that they find intolerable.”157  The lawyer demanded Megraw be fired 
immediately, for “from his nature and temperament he is entirely unfit to be in a position 
of authority and it is dangerous to the peaceable relations between the white people and 
the Indians that he should continue any longer to exercise authority over them.”158 Scott 
rejected what he interpreted to be conspiracy theory on the part of Louie and his lawyer,  
it is intimated that this arrest [of Louie] was a put up job by Inspector 
Megraw and Constable Carter, but the evidence in my opinion does not 
bear this out…It does not seem possible that Mr. Carter would arrest a 
man on the mere suggestion of Mr. Megraw.159 
 
An internal Ministry of Justice consideration of MacIntyre and Louie’s arguments found 
“there is no evidence whatsoever that Megraw directed or ordered the arrest [of 
Louie]…I do not think the petitioners have made out a sufficient case to warrant an 
enquiry into the conduct of Megraw” and endorsed Scott’s decision not to fire the 
Inspector.160  This mutual rejection of Louie’s case against Megraw tacitly swept aside 
the Chief’s larger argument against the amendments in the Indian Act concerning leases 
and the Government’s control of Native peoples’ land in British Columbia generally.  
                                                
157 Ibid. 
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159 Although the file indicates this letter was never sent, there is no evidence to suggest this was not Scott’s 
opinion.  D.C. Scott, 5 September 1919 LAC RG 10 Volume 6770 File 452-26 Pt. 1. 
160 Memorandum for E.L. Newcombe 27 April 1920 LAC RG 13 Volume 241 File 1919-2232; Deputy 
Minister of Justice E.L. Newcombe to D.C. Scott 27 April 1920 LAC RG 13 Volume 241 File 1919-2232.  
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While he may have been acquitted for the specific conflict over registration, Louie’s 
greater argument, made to the people whom it challenged, ultimately failed. 
 
Conclusion 
 Wesley Martin fought registration in a Brantford court and failed, and Gaston 
Louie was acquitted of refusing to register, but failed to achieve his broader aim of 
toppling the Department of Indian Affair’s control of Native land and its refusal to 
recognize Aboriginal title.  While both men had allies within their own communities, 
Wesley Martin’s trial in particular displayed a stark division within the Six Nations 
between those who would stand for no incursion into their authority and those who 
challenged these individuals’ control over the communities’ political institutions.  
Apparently, not everyone evaluated the wartime registration programs as an existential 
threat to Native identity.   
 While Departmental authorities framed Martin’s and Louie’s cases as issues 
incited by a few troublemakers, both Martin and Louie offered fundamental challenges to 
the Department’s place in Native peoples’ lives. Despite their dismissive remarks, the 
Department’s employees clearly and correctly perceived Martin and Louie’s challenges 
to registration in exactly this way: as assaults on the Department’s authority.  Whereas 
both the Indian Act’s definition of an Indian and the counter-definition provided at the 
beginning of this chapter point to a historical relationship between Native peoples and the 
British Crown/Canadian Government, the former treated that relationship as a historical 
antecedent to the present ward-protector situation, whereas the latter placed the inter-
nation agreements firmly in the present tense.  These two men and their causes placed 
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Native peoples outside the Canadian state, unlike the tacit acknowledgement of those 
who registered and were exempt as Indians under the Indian Act.  
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Conclusion: Under the Indian Act 
 
The First World War was a catalyst on Native reserves in their interactions with 
the federal government.  This catalyst did not create a new situation – the Indian Act and 
its restrictive regime long predated the war – but war programs that arrived on reserves 
favoured the path offered by the legislative structure of the Act and the Department of 
Indian Affairs over others.  The war offered necessary pushes to grow the Native-
government relationship based on the Indian Act rather than treaties; this was an 
acceleration and affirmation of a new tradition, largely at the expense of an old one.  
Sarah Oak found out too painfully that the route her parents and ancestors had easily 
walked was now closed to her; the resolution of her ordeal brought her situation and 
future more closely under the Indian Act’s umbrella.  The war did not erase those 
traditions, but war programs presented crises and opportunities whose resolutions 
favoured the Indian Act over other solutions. 
Native involvement in the First World War strengthened the Department of Indian 
Affairs’ place on reserves.  Although the Indian Act predated the war, Native peoples’ 
and the Department of Indian Affairs’ navigation of the new expectations, possibilities 
and constraints of the war programs affirmed the Indian Act as the basic organizational 
principle in reserve life.  This does not question that the Department of Indian Affairs 
created and imposed the concept of the status Indian on reserves.  The above narrative 
neither disputes this, nor does it wish to simply repeat it.  Instead, this narrative follows 
this imposition and asks the possibly more important question of what happened after, of 
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how Native peoples sought to determine the parameters of their lives within and against 
the restraints of the Indian Act.  
Therefore, the First World War was a crucial moment in the Native-government 
relationship.  The many responses to war programs contributed to and cemented crucial 
debates about the legal identity of Indian.  Across the country, Native peoples’ 
participation in the war brought the structures of dependency and political authority on 
reserves into sharp relief.  This was a transition from broad principle into day-to-day 
practice, an important shift in the basic interactions between Native communities and the 
Department of Indian Affairs.  This change was not a sudden, abrupt and discreet 
transition, but the many resolutions of crises, the results of many local and personal 
strategies in a time of change and upheaval.  In some cases, this was an acceleration of 
existing trends, where new powers flowed through (and strengthened) existing channels.  
Agents took on new powers and responsibilities associated with recruitment, soldier 
family supports and registration programs.  In others, new crises forced responses, 
choices and declarations of those actively seeking to secure their best interest in the short 
term.  The implementation of programs such as the conscription exemption ensured that 
the legal identity of Indian was assured as a fundamental organizational principle of 
reserve life and determine Native peoples’ place Canada. 
Native peoples experienced the First World War’s role as a key catalyst of 
modern state building in both immediate and grand terms – in how their identity was 
defined, and ultimately controlled, and in how they as individuals and groups interacted 
with the Canadian state.  Service in the CEF and the exemption from conscription 
contributed to the question of what Indian identity entailed, both in terms of its 
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prohibitions and protections.  In addition to the restrictions and protections of Indian 
identity, the war emphasized who had authority on the reserve and what that authority 
could achieve.  Indian status, and specifically its possible protection, offered the 
Department of Indian Affairs a key tool to solidify its hegemony. 
These were not new issues but the ways Native peoples and the Department of 
Indian Affairs accommodated war programs favoured one type of Native-government 
relationship over others and the effects of those choices lasted long after the Armistice.  
In some cases, Native peoples’ part in this process was an unintentional outcome of a 
specific fight.  The campaign to gain exemption from conscription because Native people 
were wards of the government and not citizens was successful.  However, it also 
entrenched the role of the Indian Act and the authority of the Indian Agent as the final 
arbiter on Native peoples’ legal status and membership in the reserve community.  These 
battles illustrate the difference between agency and outcome; Native peoples individually 
and in groups tried and succeeded to get exempted from conscription.  This short-term 
victory however projected itself into the medium and long term as it influenced the 
parameters of Native-government interactions. 
The Native responses to war programs were ultimately relevant to wider Native-
government relations.  Historians have generally presented the war as leaving a Janus-
faced legacy in Native communities.  Some point to the benefits acquired by Native 
veterans through the equality they experienced in uniform.  As discussed above, 
historians argued this brief sense of equality invigorated nascent political activists and 
provided the essential catalyst to create inter-reserve organizations, such the League of 
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Indians of Canada.1  Yet, many of the same historians pointed to the ultimate futility of 
post-war enthusiasm in the face of the Department of Indian Affairs’ insurmountable 
authority.2  Dempsey argued the power the Department of Indian Affairs enjoyed after 
the war was a return to an antebellum status quo, that “the Indians were relegated to their 
pre-war status as wards of the federal government, under the domination of the Indian 
Department.”3  Winegard comes to a similar conclusion in his comparative analysis.4    
Suggesting that Native communities returned to a pre-war legal arrangement once 
the soldiers demobilized overlooks the important aspects of the war that changed the 
basic relationship between reserve communities, Native people and the Canadian 
government.  The war did not cause a brief pause in the Native-government relationship 
but was an important phase that shaped the relationship.  Again, this is a reminder that 
agency and outcome are not interchangeable.  Agency former exists in a context with 
restraints and opportunities, which influence actors’ behaviour, and the results of those 
decisions can determine a path completely unintended by the actors themselves.  The 
relationship between Native peoples and the government contained many such avenues 
for action, restraints and opportunities, many of which did not disappear during the war, 
but war programs serves to override or temporarily alter some, and strengthen others. 
Some of these restrictions were painfully clear in the treatment of Native soldiers 
and their families.  Native soldiers did not simply blend into the ranks of their non-Native 
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comrades.  While many observers have pointed to Native soldiers’ warrior-based 
interpretation of their experiences in Europe, these soldiers carried a number of 
prohibitions unique to their Indian identity, such as being forbidden from drinking 
alcohol.  Their families similarly found accessing soldiers’ family supports complicated 
by the Department of Indian Affairs’ authority structures that encouraged economic 
dependency on Agents and the Department.  The associated belief that Native people – 
particularly women – were unreliable with money and in need of constant supervision 
further complicated soldiers’ wives attempt to get support in their husbands’ absence.  
Rather than a largely meaningless moment in time, Native peoples spent the rest of the 
century fighting the conclusion of these First World War debates that affirmed the Indian 
Act. 
The debate over the introduction of conscription, and the conscription 
exemption’s implementation both hinged on the question of Native peoples’ legal status 
in Canada.  This was a success for Native peoples, but with consequences.  While 
conscription was a specific wartime policy, it held implications for Native peoples’ dual 
identities, as members of distinct political bodies within Canada and as wards of the 
Canadian state.  The Native exemption from involuntary military service was based upon 
both Native peoples’ incomplete citizenship, as exemplified by the lack of the franchise 
and at least one treaty arrangement.   
However, the exemption’s implementation shed a particular light on the balance 
between those two legal arguments.  While treaties were mentioned in the exemption 
decision, they played no role in it implementation as Agents were charged with obtaining 
exemptions only for (status) Indian men under their charge, and these men were still 
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expected to register with military authorities.  These men were treated as a subgroup of 
Canadian society, rather than members of politically distinct political entities.  This 
linkage between the war programs, such as the Canada Registration Board’s economic 
registration, and their long-term outcomes is evident in the cases of Wesley Martin and 
Gaston Louie.  Both men challenged the registration process by explicitly focusing on 
foundational questions about Native peoples’ relationships with the government, either as 
sovereign powers or the unresolved question of Aboriginal title (particularly although not 
exclusively in BC).  Louie and Martin felt these questions were not historical 
anachronisms but of immediate modern relevance.  Although their failure was ultimately 
unsurprising, their individual attempts underline the importance of specific war issues to 
the broader Native-government relations. 
To return briefly to the discussion of the Indian Act’s place in Native peoples’ 
lives, and the concept of a Janus-faced war.  Historians may have celebrated types of 
Native participation in the war effort, but they have generally been quick to condemn the 
government, either as racist in the face of Native loyalty, enthusiasm and skill, or 
opportunistic in the face of crises.  So the government took land used the guise of the war 
effort or soldier settlement when they could not coerce bands to sell according to the 
Indian Act.  The Department used wartime fears about sedition to further its campaign 
against the potlatch.  Although both these accusations are true, they are reminiscent of the 
argument the poverty Native peoples experienced in the Depression provided the 
Department with the opportunity to push their control on Native peoples.  No doubt the 
Depression was disruptive, even devastating, which made that rudimentary safety net the 
Indian Act provided more attractive.   
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Yet to simply emphasize a black and white Native-government relationship is 
incorrect, and the hint of this was already evident in many histories of Native 
involvement in the war.  Mike Mountainhorse’s moditional soldiering experience clearly 
mixed his traditional practices and beliefs with modern technology and practices.5  
Strategies Native communities employed to ensure they controlled, at least in part, how 
they contributed to the war effort point to a political sophistication not immediately 
apparently in either the outcome of many of these same war policies, or in the narrative 
that pits loyal Native peoples against a cruel government.  The story of this complicated 
relationships between Native peoples and the government, marked by imbalances in 
power, different motivations, and wide variation between intent and outcome for both 
partners, is much broader. Consider again the story of Sarah Oak, where the war changed 
her physical surroundings with a terrible outcome.  The bridge Sarah crossed had little 
risk of being taken by the Germans, and she intended no political comment or protest 
when she crossed.  Her parents looked to the Indian Agent for some form of resolution 
(as the most present and familiar government representative), and he responded by both 
advocating for Sarah and controlling her settlement.   
There are many relationships between Native peoples and the government, as 
Robert Talbot was correct to point out.  The war is an independent variable or catalyst in 
those relationships, changing the terrain in which they worked, necessitating both 
partners to change their movements, and moving them towards a specific endpoint.  This 
catalyst brings many of these relationships closer together, standardizing Native 
expectations of the Canadian government, or more specifically of the Department of 
Indian Affairs.  This is particularly clear in the mass use of the concept of status Indian, 
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wards of the Canadian state, in the debate over conscription.  Although the use of 
“Indian” was clearly a strategy, rather than necessarily a heartfelt assertion that Native 
peoples were wards, the outcome(s) of that debate was national in scope and implication.  
To be exempt was to be counted and recognized as Indian by the Department, from 
British Columbia to the Maritimes.  Treaties and history clearly did not disappear, as 
illustrated in the cases of Gaston Louie and Wesley Martin.  Yet the question of status 
emerged as a national standard in the interaction and expectations between Native 
peoples and the Canadian government. 
Across Canada, there was no one Native strategy to participate in the war effort.  
In many ways and in many different venues, Native peoples tried to shape the nature and 
outcome of their participation in the war effort, both in the immediate and long term.  
Several groups clearly enjoyed success talking back to Indian Affairs and Military 
officials, particularly in the short term.  Yet, even in moments of victory, the Indian Act 
and Indian Affairs’ hegemony was affirmed on reserves.  Economic family structures, 
band membership, and individual rights and restrictions, some of the most basic elements 
of everyday life, were placed unambiguously under the authority of the Indian Act.   
As Sarah Oak sat in her hospital bed, her Indian Agent determined his future 
importance in her financial life, and although her experience was certainly unique in 
particulars, its outcome would have seemed familiar to women like Sarah Cope, or to 
those men actively seeking protection against conscription.  There was a common 
government response during the war – look to the Indian Act for the answer to any 
question, to determine the hierarchy of authority for Native peoples, and for the 
resolution to any dispute.  By offering (or at least initially ceding) the protection of Indian 
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status against such massive intrusions as conscription, Indian Affairs ensured its central 
role in Native peoples lives.  The Department of Indian Affairs used the Indian Act to 
interpret new war policies, to justify their authority to direct the Native war effort(s), and 
to determine the freedoms (and limitation) of Native peoples. The First World War 
fundamentally enforced the reality of the hegemony Indian Act as the basic 
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